Opinion
111,458.
05-08-2015
Kohler Z. JEFFRIES, Appellant, v. KANSAS PRISONER REVIEW BOARD, Appellee.
Benjamin N. Casad, of Leavenworth, for appellant. John Wesley Smith, assistant attorney general, for appellee.
Benjamin N. Casad, of Leavenworth, for appellant.
John Wesley Smith, assistant attorney general, for appellee.
Before POWELL, P.J., McANANY, J., and BUKATY, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
This is Kohler Z. Jeffries' second appeal to this court in which he again claims his life sentence from 1987 should be declared determinate. Because we find his claims are barred by res judicata, we affirm the district court.
Factual and Procedural Background
In August 1987, Jeffries was given a life sentence for his murder conviction and two sentences of 15 years to life for two aggravated robbery convictions. The three sentences were ordered to run consecutively. Jeffries is incarcerated at the Lansing Correctional Facility.
Jeffries filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to K.S.A. 60–1501 in 2005 (2005 Petition), arguing his life sentence was determinate, meaning his parole eligibility was improperly calculated under K.S.A. 22–3717(c) (Ensley). The Butler County District Court disagreed and denied Jeffries' petition on the merits. On appeal, this court affirmed the decision:
“Applying K.S.A. 22–3717(c), we conclude Petitioner should serve 15 years for his life sentence (a class A felony) without any deduction for good time, plus 7½ years on each of his 15 to life sentences—meaning he would have to serve a total of 30 years before becoming eligible for parole. While we understand Petitioner's argument related to K.S.A. 21–4608(g), we disagree. K.S.A. 22–3717(c) clearly addresses how Petitioner's parole eligibility should be calculated, and the State correctly followed the statute.”
Jeffries v. Roberts, No. 97,600, 2007 WL 2377303, at *1 (Kan.App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 285 Kan. 1174 (2007).
In May 2013, Jeffries filed the present petition for availability of other relief pursuant to K.S.A. 60–2606, alternatively K.S.A.2014 Supp. 60–1501 (2013 Petition) with the Leavenworth County District Court, again alleging that his class A felony sentence should be categorized as determinate. At the hearing on the 2013 Petition, Jeffries argued the district court should consider his life sentence a determinate sentence and asserted that his arguments were not barred by res judicata. The district court found the prior district court order and subsequent appeal had preclusive effect, thus barring Jeffries' current claims, and dismissed the case.
Jeffries timely appeals.
Did the District Court Err in Applying the Doctrine of Res Judicata and Dismissing Jeffries' Petition?
Jeffries challenges the district court's holding that his claims were barred by res judicata and the subsequent dismissal of his petition. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in' a certain situation is an issue of law over which we exercise de novo review. Miller v. Glacier Development Co., 293 Kan. 665, 668, 270 P.3d 1065 (2011).
“ ‘Res judicata encompasses both issue preclusion and claim preclusion.’ “ Knowles v. Fleetwood Motorhomes of California, Inc., 40 Kan.App.2d 573, 577, 194 P.3d 38 (2008) (quoting In re Marriage of Ormsbee, 39 Kan.App.2d 715, 718, 186 P.3d 806 [2008] ). Claim preclusion necessitates: “(1) the same claim; (2) the same parties; (3) claims that were or could have been raised; and (4) a final judgment on the merits.” In re Tax Appeal of Fleet, 293 Kan. 268, 777–78, 272 P.3d 583 (2012). Meanwhile, issue preclusion requires:
“(1) a prior judgment on the merits that determined the parties' rights and liabilities on the issue based upon ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings and judgment; (2) the same parties or parties in privity; and (3) the issue litigated must have been determined and necessary to support the judgment.” 293 Kan. at 778.
In the case at hand, the district court held that, under either analysis, Jeffries' claims were the same ones as in his 2005 Petition.
Jeffries' 2013 Petition alleges his rights are being violated because his class A felony sentence is not classified as definite/determinate, and he requests the district court to:
“1) Declare that Petitioner is detrimentally affected by not classifying his Class A felony sentence as definite/determinate. 2) Declare that Petitioner's Class A felony sentence is a definite/determinate term. 3) Declare that the mandates of K.S.A. 21–4608(7), Supp.1986 controls the method of how Petitioner's terms shall be combined and term calculated.”
Jeffries claims his 2013 Petition is different than his 2005 Petition for two basic reasons: First, his 2013 Petition seeks declaratory relief under K.S.A. 60–2606, whereas his 2005 Petition did not; and second, in this action he seeks to have the class A sentence characterized as a determinate sentence, whereas the 2005 Petition sought to have his parole eligibility date recalculated. Jeffries argues neither the issue nor the claim is the same, so res judicata is inapplicable.
For comparison, Jeffries' brief appealing the district court's denial of his 2005 Petition cited K.S.A. 21–4608(g) and stated his life sentence was not an indefinite or indeterminate sentence. He alleged there was clearly a conflict between K.S.A. 22–3717(c) (Ensley) and K.S.A. 21–4608(g), and he claimed the specific mandate of K.S.A. 21–4608(g) —commanding that the definite term of incarceration was satisfied by the completion of the indefinite terms—took precedence over any contradictions that arose from the generalities of computation of K.S.A. 22–3717 (Ensley).
While Jeffries tries to distinguish between the exact relief requested, it appears to us the same claim and issue are being relitigated. While the 2005 Petition references K.S.A. 21–4608(g) and Jeffries' current appeal cites K.S.A. 21–4608(7) (Ensley), this citation difference was discussed during the district court's hearing on the 2013 Petition. Jeffries admitted that K.S.A. 21–4608(g) and K.S.A. 21–4608(7) (Ensley) used the same language and referred to the same statute but were renumbered due to other amendments. It is clear to us that each petition argued Jeffries' class A life sentence was being incorrectly treated as an indeterminate sentence for purposes of deciding his parole eligibility date. Thus, the claims and issues raised by Jeffries have already been decided and are barred by res judicata. Because we hold that Jeffries' claims are barred by res judicata, we decline to address his merits argument that a life sentence is a determinate sentence.
Finally, we note that while this matter was pending on appeal, our court granted Jeffries' first request to remove appellate counsel. Apparently dissatisfied with his new counsel, Jeffries filed a second motion to remove appellate counsel, which this court denied on the grounds that Jeffries had not contended he had any conflict with his new appellate counsel. However, the court did inform Jeffries that he could proceed pro se upon proper notice. Jeffries then filed his third motion to remove counsel, stating he had proper grounds to seek removal of his new appellate counsel and that the Clerk of the Appellate Courts had improperly refused to file his petition for review of his motion. We summarily rejected his third motion to remove counsel, prompting Jeffries to file a motion for reconsideration or in the alternative for leave to proceed pro se. The court gave Jeffries until November 17, 2014, to provide notice he wished to proceed pro se; his motion for reconsideration seeking in the alternative leave to represent himself pro se was not filed until April 7, 2015. We therefore deny the motion for reconsideration or in the alternative for leave to proceed pro se as it is out of time.
Affirmed.