Opinion
CIVIL 1:23-CV-1680
10-12-2023
DENNIS JEFFRIES, Plaintiff, v. BOROUGH OF STEELTON, Defendant.
Rambo Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Daryl F. Bloom United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background
This case comes before us for a screening review of the plaintiff's pro se civil complaint. The plaintiff, Dennis Jeffries, brought this action against the Borough of Steelton. (Doc. 1). His complaint alleges a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against the Borough arising out of the Borough's denial of Jeffries' request for a handicap parking space in front of his house. (Id.).
Along with this complaint, Jeffries filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). We will provisionally grant Jeffries leave to proceed in forma pauperis, but for the reasons set forth below, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints - Standard of Review
We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We review such complaints to determine whether there are frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. This statutory preliminary screening mirrors review under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this legal benchmark, under federal pleading standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the non- movant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”).
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the court may consider such document in its determination. See Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
Finally, when reviewing a pro se complaint, we are reminded that such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial justice.'” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f)). We must apply the relevant law even if the pro se plaintiff does not mention it by name. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)).
B. This Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted.
Jeffries asserts his claim against the Borough under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), which provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Jeffries' complaint asserts in a short and conclusory fashion that he applied for a handicap sign to be placed in front of his home and his application was denied by the Borough police chief, the Borough manager, the city council president, and the mayor. (Doc. 1 at 2). As relief, Jeffries seeks two million dollars in punitive damages, as well as an apology from the Borough and an order directing that the Borough employees receive discrimination and sensitivity training. (Id.).
Noticeably missing from Jeffries' complaint is any allegation that his application was denied for a discriminatory purpose. It is well settled that, “to prevail on a disparate treatment claim [under the ADA], a plaintiff must demonstrate that some discriminatory purpose was a ‘motivating factor' behind the challenged action.” Allentown Victory Church v City of Allentown, Pa., 625 F.Supp.3d 370, 379 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (citations omitted). While the plaintiff need not show that discriminatory animus was a sole or primary factor in the decision, at the very least he must “show that a protected characteristic played a role in the defendant's decision to treat h[im] differently.” Id. (quoting Community Servs., Inc. v. Wind Gap Mun. Auth, 421 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2005))
Here, it appears that Jeffries would have us infer that because he is disabled, he was denied a parking sign for a handicap parking spot in front of his house. He attaches his applications to his complaint, but failed to attach anything from which we could even infer that his application was denied because of his disability or for a discriminatory purpose. Indeed, from the allegations in the current complaint, we cannot discern who at the Borough denied his application or why. In our view, this complaint runs afoul of Rule 8's basic requirement that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Accordingly, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed at this time, as Jeffries has failed to state a claim against the defendant under the ADA.
However, while we have concluded that Jeffries' complaint does not state a claim at this time, recognizing that Jeffries is a pro se litigant, we recommend that the court allow Jeffries an opportunity to amend his complaint to attempt to state a claim against the Borough under the ADA. See Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007); Alston v Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, (Doc 2), but IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff endeavoring to correct the defects cited in this report, provided that the plaintiff acts within 20 days of any dismissal order.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report
to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.