People v. Williams, 140 Ill. App. 3d 216, 228 (1986). The Department relies on Jeffrey v. St. Clair, 933 F. Supp. 963 (D. Haw. 1996), as an example of state officials adopting a blanket constitutional policy without the exercise of individualized professional judgment. In Jeffrey, the state officials closed one treatment program because of asbestos and other safety concerns in the building where the patients resided.
Here, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff from raising any claim against Defendant Patton State Hospital. See Shaw v. State of California Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600, 603 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment has been held to bar suits against a state brought by its own citizens, whether the relief sought is money damages or an injunction."); Jeffrey v. St. Clair, 933 F. Supp. 963, 971 (D. Haw. 1996) (holding claims against employees of state hospital were barred by the Eleventh Amendment). As the state of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed.
Putting the standard in different words, the Sample court noted that "[t]here must be a `demonstrated probability' that [the] plaintiff will again be among those injured." Id.; see also Jeffrey v. St. Clair, 933 F. Supp. 963, 971 (D.Hawaii 1996) (applying the same standard). 2
While it might have been medically improper to do so, the State did not violate the integration mandate. (See Jeffrey v. St. Clair (D.Hawaii 1996) 933 F. Supp. 963, 970 [state hospital patients were transferred from less restrictive to more restrictive environment when building they occupied had to be shut down, alleging this interfered with their eventual chances for release; preliminary injunction denied because plaintiffs failed to show discrimination by reason of their disability and because the integration mandate did not apply].) The other primary basis for appellant's position comes from Cable, supra, 973 F. Supp. 937.