1. STATUTES — Title of Act. Same as that in Jefferson v. Toomer, 28 Okla. 658, 115 P. 793. 2. OFFICERS — Compensation — Fixing Salary — Constitutional Law. There being no provision of the statutes or the Constitution fixing the compensation for the several clerks of the district court prior to the passage of the act by the special or extraordinary session of the Legislature on March 19, 1910 (Sess. Laws 1910, c. 69, pp. 129, 139), the action of said Legislature in fixing the compensation of such officers is not in conflict with Const. art. 23, sec. 10, forbidding the enactment of a law diminishing or increasing the emoluments or salary of a public officer after his election or appointment or during his term of office.
In re County Com'rs of Counties Comprising Seventh Judicial Dist., 22 Okla. 435, 98 P. 557; Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co. v. Excise Board of Stephens Co., 168 Okla. 519, 34 P.2d 274; Dabney v. Hooker, 121 Okla. 193, 249 P. 381; State v. Bonner, 86 Okla. 280, 208 P. 825. Unless the body of the act contains provisions that cannot be said to relate to the general subject referred to in the title and the act clearly contravenes the requirements of said section, it should not be declared unconstitutional on such ground. See Jefferson v. Toomer, 28 Okla. 658, 115 P. 793; State ex rel. Read v. Midwest Mutual Burial Ass'n, 176 Okla. 468, 56 P.2d 124; Walker v. Local Building Loan Ass'n, 176 Okla. 168, 54 P.2d 1078; Wallace v. Gassaway, 148 Okla. 265, 298 P. 867; State v. Pitts, 137 Okla. 59, 277 P. 918. . . ."
The first sentence in the title is very general, and it seems clear that if the Legislature had stopped with that sentence it could not be seriously contended that the title was not broad enough to cover section 6836. Crawford v. Corporation Commission, 188 Okla. 101, 106 P.2d 806; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Hill, 174 Okla. 33, 49 P.2d 1067; Jefferson v. Toomer, 28 Okla. 658, 115 P. 793; In re County Com'rs, 22 Okla. 435, 98 P. 557; Bowman v. Cockrell, 6 Kan. 311. The question, then, is whether the fact that the Legislature, after stating in the first sentence of the title the subject covered in very general terms, proceeded to abstract some of the provisions but not the section in question, destroyed the effect of the general statement contained in the first sentence.
Unless the body of the act contains provisions that cannot be said to relate to the general subject referred to in the title and the act clearly contravenes the requirements of said section, it should not be declared unconstitutional on such ground. See Jefferson v. Toomer, 28 Okla. 658, 115 P. 793; State ex rel. Read v. Midwest Mutual Burial Ass'n, 176 Okla. 468, 56 P.2d 124; Walker v. Local Building Loan Ass'n, 176 Okla. 168, 54 P.2d 1078; Wallace v. Gassaway, 148 Okla. 265, 298 P. 867; State v. Pitts, 137 Okla. 59, 227 P. 918. Viewed in the light of the foregoing principles, it is obvious that the defendants' contention that article 17, chap. 65, supra, violates section 57, art. 5, of the Oklahoma Constitution cannot be upheld.
"Sec. 22. All taxes levied and collected under this act, less any expenses of collection, shall be paid into the treasury of the State, and one-half of same shall be used for the public schools of this State, as other available State common school funds, and one-half shall be applicable to the expenses of the State Government and to such other purposes as the Legislature may by law direct." These authorities held such titles sufficient and are further fortified on this point by Jefferson v. Toomer, 28 Okl. 658, 115 P. 793; McAlester-Edwards Coal Co. et al. v. Trapp, supra, Ex parte Ambler, 11 Okl. Cr. 449, 148 P. 1061, Insurance Co. of North America v. Welch, 49 Okl. 620, 154 Pac. 48, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 471, Missouri K. T. Ry. Co. v. Myer, 204 Fed. 140, and Geren v. Courts Trading Co., 99 Okl. 170, 226 Pac. 369.
However, following the most illiberal construction, so far as the title is concerned in this case, the procedure is not prohibited. In the case of Jefferson v. Toomer, 28 Okla. 658, 115 P. 793, an act was assailed as being in conflict with this section of the Constitution, and the title was, "An Act Relating to Certain County and District Officers." Authorities at that time, from this state and others, were reviewed.
We think the defendant is in error in this argument. The question as to what should be embraced in the the title of an act under the Constitution has been before this court in Jefferson v. Toomer, 28 Okla. 658, 115 P. 793, and Binion, Sheriff, v. Okla. Gas Elec. Co., 28 Okla. 356, 114 P. 1069, and the following rule stated and approved: "Legislative enactments will be sustained if the subject-matter of the act is not in conflict with the general subject matter expressed in the title.
It is a provision which has been frequently before this court. Jefferson v. Toomer, 28 Okla. 658, 115 P. 793; Pond Creek v. Haskell, 21 Okla. 711, 97 P. 338; Noble State Bank v. Haskell et al., 22 Okla. 48, 97 P. 590; In re Menefee, State Treas., et al., 22 Okla. 365, 97 P. 1014; In re Co. Com'rs of Counties Comprising 7th Judicial Dist., 22 Okla. 435, 98 P. 557; State ex rel. Hooker, Co. Judge, 22 Okla. 712, 98 P. 964; Atwater v. Hassett et al., 27 Okla. 292, 111 P. 802; Holcomb v. C. R.I. P. Ry. Co., 27 Okla. 667, 112 P. 1023; Coyle v. Smith, 28 Okla. 121, 113 P. 944; Binion, Sheriff, v. O. G. E. Co., 28 Okla. 356, 114 P. 1096; Johnson v. Grady Co., 50 Okla. 188, 150 P. 497. But there is a very potent reason, lying in the background of this provision, which has not heretofore been taken into consideration by this court in passing upon the sufficiency of the title of an act, viz.
If this is the principal abuse against which this provision is directed, it seems to us that the generality of the title, not defining the particulars of the proposed legislation, would be more apt to excite general attention than otherwise, since the general words would give warning that everything within their limits might be affected, and thus draw the attention of the whole body of the legislators; while narrower words would only interest those concerned with the matters specially named. Mobile Transportation Co. v. City of Mobile, 128 Ala. 335, 30 So. 645, 64 L. R. A. 333, 86 Am. St. Rep. 143; Jefferson v. Toomer, Clerk, 28 Okla. 658, 115 P. 793. Many of the authorities construing this and similar constitutional provisions in harmony with the foregoing views may be found collected in Jefferson v. Toomer, Clerk, supra. Having reached the conclusion that the subject of the part of section 10, supra, now under discussion is properly embraced in the general title of the act, we will now take up the questions: (1) Whether the Legislature intended to authorize the additional levy of two mills for a drag tax; (2) if so, whether the levy can be made in excess of the limitation prescribed by section 7376, supra, without a vote of the people; and (3) by what authority.
"Under this clause of the Constitution, the title of a bill may be very general, and need not specify every clause in the statute, it being sufficient if they are all referable and cognate to the subject expressed; and, when the subject is expressed in general terms, everything which is necessary to make a complete enactment in regard to it, or which results as a complement of the thought contained in the general expression, is included in and authorized by it." See, also, In re County Com'rs, 7th Jud. Dist., 22 Okla. 435, 98 P. 557; State v. Hooker, 22 Okla. 712, 98 P. 964; Holcomb v. C., R.I. P. Ry. Co., 27 Okla. 667, 112 P. 1023; Coyle v. Smith et al., 28 Okla. 121, 113 P. 944; Binion, Sheriff, v. Okla. Gas Elec. Co., 28 Okla. 356, 114 P. 1096; Jefferson v. Toomer, 28 Okla. 658, 115 P. 793; Rea, County Clerk, v. State, 29 Okla. 708, 119 P. 235; Leatherock v. Lawter, 45 Okla. 715, 147 P. 324; Ex parte Ambler, 11 Okla. Cr. 449, 148 P. 1061. The fact that penalties are imposed for violation of the provisions of the act does not render these sections void as being without the title; for it would be a natural complement to the act regulating the business of insurance to include any just and proper provisions for enforcing the duties imposed upon the persons and companies affected, and to prescribe penalties for the violation thereof.