Jefferson v. State

3 Citing cases

  1. State v. Peppers

    369 Ga. App. 189 (Ga. Ct. App. 2023)   Cited 1 times
    In State v. Peppers, 369 Ga.App. 189 (892 S.E.2d 816) (2023) ("Peppers I"), we vacated the trial court's order granting a motion for new trial and remanded the case for further actions consistent with our opinion.

    See Ga. Const. art. I, § 1, ¶ XVIII ("No person shall be put in jeopardy of life or liberty more than once for the same offense except when a new trial has been granted after conviction or in case of mistrial." ); U.S. Const. Amend. V ("No person shall be ... subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."). Jefferson v. State , 310 Ga. 725, 726, 854 S.E.2d 528 (2021) ; accordGreen v. State , 291 Ga. 287, 288 (1), 728 S.E.2d 668 (2012) ; Hall v. State , 244 Ga. 86, 93 (5), 259 S.E.2d 41 (1979). Cf.Prather v. State , 303 Ga. App. 374, 376 (1), 693 S.E.2d 546 (2010) ("As a general rule, a post-conviction reversal or grant of a motion for new trial which is not based on insufficiency of the evidence does not preclude retrial."

  2. Gonzales v. State

    315 Ga. 661 (Ga. 2023)   Cited 12 times

    See Jenkins v. State , 294 Ga. 506, 509, 755 S.E.2d 138 (2014) (stating general rule that the grant of a new trial on a ground other than insufficiency of the evidence does not preclude retrial). Compare Jefferson v. State , 310 Ga. 725, 727, 854 S.E.2d 528 (2021) (holding that the partial grant of the motion for new trial on the basis that the evidence as to two counts was constitutionally insufficient rendered the judgment on those counts final such that the defendant's direct appeal of his other convictions was authorized). In Seals , this Court made clear that when one or more counts of an indictment remain pending following convictions on other counts, the defendant is authorized to appeal the judgment on the convictions only by following the procedures for interlocutory review set forth in OCGA § 5-6-34 (b).

  3. Fitts v. Franklin

    312 Ga. 134 (Ga. 2021)   Cited 24 times
    Noting that, if disbelieved by the jury, the defendant’s testimony denying involvement in the crimes could have served as direct evidence of guilt

    Also, because these basic facts proved by the State would not allow a rational jury to reasonably infer that Franklin had the criminal intent to support her convictions beyond a reasonable doubt, I would conclude that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of constitutional due process and that as a result, Franklin's convictions must be reversed, and she cannot be retried. See Jefferson v. State , 310 Ga. 725, 726, 854 S.E.2d 528 (2021) (citing Burks v. United States , 437 U.S. 1, 16-17 (III) (98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) ). I also note that the majority does not point to any case in which the evidence has been found sufficient under similar circumstances.