The uncontradicted opinion testimony of an expert medical witness is conclusive. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mankin, 223 Ala. 679, 138 So. 265; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Norfleet, 232 Ala. 599, 169 So. 225; Harris v. Nashville, C. St. L. R. Co., 153 Ala. 139, 44 So. 962, 14 L.R.A., N.S., 261. An abnormality of the body could not be considered a disease or infirmity until some manifestation thereof exhibits itself. Natl. Cas. Co. v. Hudson, 32 Ala. App. 69, 21 So.2d 568; Jefferson Life Cas. Co. v. Bevill, 38 Ala. App. 384, 86 So.2d 289; Royal Family Ins. Co. v. Grimes, 42 Ala. App. 481, 168 So.2d 262; United Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 275 Ala. 642, 157 So.2d 674. COLEMAN, Justice.
We have held that the word "originates," as appears in the exclusionary provision of the policy, refers ordinarily to the time the sickness or disease is manifested, although the medical cause existed prior to this time. United Security Life Insurance Company v. Hilyer, 41 Ala. App. 226, 128 So.2d 736(2), cert. den. 272 Ala. 710, 128 So.2d 741; Jefferson Life Casualty Company v. Bevill, 38 Ala. App. 384, 86 So.2d 289(4), cert. den. 264 Ala. 206, 86 So.2d 292(4); National Casualty Company v. Hudson, 32 Ala. App. 69, 21 So.2d 568(4); 53 A.L.R.2d 686. The provision of such origination must be strictly construed against the insurer, and the illness or disease will ordinarily be deemed to have its inception when it first becomes manifest or active or when there is a distinct symptom or condition from which one, learned in medicine, can, with reasonable accuracy, diagnose the disease. 53 A.L.R.2d, supra.
"An ulcer as trivial and benign as an uninfected pimple is at most a tendency to an infirmity, and not an infirmity itself. "Any different construction would reduce the policy and its coverage to contradiction and absurdity. * * *" See, also, Leland v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 233 Mass. 558, 124 N.E. 517; Jefferson Life Casualty Co. v. Bevill, Alabama, 38 ALa.App. 384, 86 So.2d 289; Brown v. U.S. Fidelity Guaranty Co., 336 Mass. 609, 147 N.E.2d 160; Braddock v. Pacific Woodmen Life Association, 89 Utah 75, 54 P.2d 1189, 1194. In Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Dodge, 4 Cir., 11 F.2d 486, 489, 59 A.L.R. 1290, the court stated:
This court has likewise followed this definition. Jefferson Life Casualty Co. v. Bevill, 38 Ala. App. 384, 86 So.2d 289 (1955). When faced with the question of whether a particular condition is a "disease," the courts have consistently applied the standard definition set out above.
Count alleging that insurer agreed to indemnify plaintiff and her family against loss of time, hospitalization, surgery and expense incident thereto, and that plaintiff was confined in hospital and as a result of sickness underwent a surgical operation which was covered by policy, and that policy was property of plaintiff, was sufficient. Jefferson Life and Cas. Co. v. Bevill, 38 Ala. App. 384, 86 So.2d 289. Where one in violation of the law does an act which in its consequences is injurious to another, he is liable for the damages caused by such wrongful act. Engle v. Simmons, 148 Ala. 92, 41 So. 1023; Van Norden v. Robinson, 45 Hun (N.Y.) 567. One may collect for bodily pain and suffering caused by the wrongful act of another, even though no physical violence is done to one's person.
This court, however, in a long series of cases has consistently held this to not be the case. In Jefferson Life Casualty Co. v. Bevill, 38 Ala. App. 384, 86 So.2d 289, cert. den. 264 Ala. 206, 86 So.2d 292, the court stated: "Clearly under the evidence the appellee's symptomless and benign abnormality could not be considered a disease until some manifestation thereof exhibited itself.
Further, in determining when a sickness or disease is contracted and commenced under the terms of insurance policy, the deciding factor ordinarily is the time that the sickness or disease is manifested, although the medical cause existed prior to this time. Jefferson Life Casualty Company v. Bevill, 38 Ala. App. 384, 86 So.2d 289; National Casualty Company v. Hudson, 32 Ala. App. 69, 21 So.2d 568; Annotation 53 A.L.R.2d 686. The equivocal testimony of Dr. Barclift cannot be considered as arising to that degree of proof necessary to overcome the prima facie case made by the plaintiff's evidence entitling her to recover, insofar as the 30 day limitation is concerned. Also clearly the evidence as to the date of the plaintiff's malignancy is insufficient.
The complaint was sufficient as against the demurrer. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 228 Ala. 146, 153 So. 198; Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Edmonson, 235 Ala. 365, 179 So. 185; Jefferson Life Cas. Co. v. Bevill, 38 Ala. App. 384, 86 So.2d 289; Id., 264 Ala. 206, 86 So.2d 292. If insurer with knowledge of facts which would bar existing primary liability, recognizes such primary liability by treating policy as in force, it will not thereafter be allowed to plead such facts to avoid its primary liability. Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Cole, 230 Ala. 450, 161 So. 818. If a policy is reasonably susceptible of two constructions and there is doubt as to the meaning and therefore an ambiguity, the policy is to be construed strictly against the insurer.