Jefferson Cnty. v. Stines

3 Citing cases

  1. Jefferson Cnty. v. Jefferson Cnty. Constables Ass'n

    546 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. 2018)   Cited 22 times
    Holding deputy constables are "police officers" employed in the "police department" under chapter 174 because the constable's office was a department concerned with the administration of "a body of trained officers entrusted by a government with maintenance of public peace and order, enforcement of laws, and prevention and detection of crime." (citing Police department, Police force, WEBSTER'S THIRD INT'L DICTIONARY 1754 (2002))

    And in Jefferson County v. Stines , the Ninth Court of Appeals concluded that "the primary statutory duties of a constable" involve serving process and that, while such duties constitute "valuable and important services to the county and the public, [they] are not the type of critical emergency services to the public encompassed by the narrow definition [of police officer] enacted by the Legislature when it created the [Act]." 523 S.W.3d 691, 718 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2017, pet. filed). By contrast, in this case, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals found "no meaningful distinction between deputy sheriffs and deputy constables with respect to the [Act's] definition of ‘police officers.’ "

  2. Stines v. Jefferson Cnty.

    550 S.W.3d 178 (Tex. 2018)   Cited 2 times
    Holding that chapter 174 waived the County's governmental immunity because deputy constables were considered "police officers" under chapter 174

    The court of appeals reversed the denial of the plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, rejecting Stines's various arguments that the County's immunity had been waived. 523 S.W.3d 691 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2017). As relevant here, the court held that deputy constables are not "police officers" under the Act and have no right to collectively bargain with their public employers.

  3. City of Houston v. Hous. Prof'l Fire Fighters' Ass'n

    626 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App. 2021)   Cited 8 times

    Together, these two sections unambiguously waive the City's governmental immunity with respect to the Association's claim (1) brought under section 174.252 ; (2) to enforce the requirements of section 174.021 as to any unsettled issue relating to compensation or other employment conditions of fire fighters; and (3) after an impasse in the collective bargaining process occurred between the City and the Association and the City refused to engage in arbitration. See Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 174.008, 174.252 ; cf.Stines v. Jefferson Cty. , 550 S.W.3d 178, 179-80 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) ; Jefferson Cty. v. Stines , 523 S.W.3d 691, 713, 720-21 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2017), rev'd in part and vacated in part , 550 S.W.3d 178 (Tex. 2018). There is nothing in sections 174.008 and 174.252 (or in any other statutory provision of the Act) that would support the City's contention that the Act's governmental immunity waiver requires good faith collective bargaining based on private sector labor standards, nor has the City cited to any applicable authorities.