" (Footnote omitted.) Rivers v. New Britain , 288 Conn. 1, 18–19, 950 A.2d 1247 (2008). Our Supreme Court's statutory analysis in Rivers is particularly instructive in the present case.
"When the legislature intends to waive immunity from suit or liability, it expresses that intent by using explicit statutory language." Rivers v. New Britain , 288 Conn. 1, 12, 950 A.2d 1247 (2008). Accordingly, we must consider whether § 13a-144 operates as a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to the actions of the state police, which presents a question of statutory construction that constitutes a question of law over which our review is plenary.
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rivers v. New Britain , 288 Conn. 1, 11, 950 A.2d 1247 (2008). "[O]ur case law is clear that ambiguity exists only if the statutory language at issue is susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation."
See Hay v. Hill, supra, 137 Conn. 281-88. Additionally, members of the public were "likely, and in fact encouraged" to use the sidewalk when traveling on Route 113—albeit by the town, rather than the state—as in Baker and Ferreira. See Ferreira v. Pringle, supra, 255 Conn. 350; Baker v. Ives, supra, 162 Conn. 299; see also Rivers v. New Britain, 288 Conn. 1, 22 n.18, 950 A.2d 1247 (2008) ("[w]hen a municipality places a sidewalk next to a road, it invites pedestrians to use the sidewalk"). Pedestrians were actually required to use the sidewalk; see General Statutes § 14-300c (a); Bellman v. West Hartford, supra, 96 Conn. App. 394 (duty under highway defect statute "extends to pedestrian travel as well as to vehicular traffic" [internal quotation marks omitted]); and bicyclists could utilize the sidewalk as a "necessary incident" to their travel over Route 113. Kozlowski v. Commissioner of Transportation, supra, 504.
See Hay v. Hill, supra, 137 Conn. at 287–88, 76 A.2d 924. Additionally, members of the public were “likely, and in fact encouraged” to use the sidewalk when traveling on Route 113—albeit by the town, rather than the state—as in Baker and Ferreira. See Ferreira v. Pringle, supra, 255 Conn. at 350, 766 A.2d 400 ; Baker v. Ives, supra, 162 Conn. at 299, 294 A.2d 290 ; see also Rivers v. New Britain, 288 Conn. 1, 22 n. 18, 950 A.2d 1247 (2008) ( “[w]hen a municipality places a sidewalk next to a road, it invites pedestrians to use the sidewalk”). Pedestrians were actually required to use the sidewalk; see General Statutes § 14–300c (a) ; Bellman v. West Hartford, supra, 96 Conn.App. at 394, 900 A.2d 82 (duty under highway defect statute “extends to pedestrian travel as well as to vehicular traffic” [internal quotation marks omitted] ); and bicyclists could utilize the sidewalk as a “necessary incident” to their travel over Route 113. Kozlowski v. Commissioner of Transportation, supra, at 504, 876 A.2d 1148.
” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Envirotest Systems Corp. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 293 Conn. 382, 388–90, 978 A.2d 49 (2009)( Envirotest ) ; see also Rivers v. New Britain, 288 Conn. 1, 13–14, 950 A.2d 1247 (2008) (“this court long has stated that, in the absence of express language indicating that a statutorily created duty applies to the state, the statutory provision will not be construed as constituting a waiver of sovereign immunity”). Because, as we have explained, sovereign immunity and nullum tempus share a common history and purpose, there is no reason why the foregoing principles should not apply equally to both doctrines.
We find this task to be very different from the task of determining whether the legislature intended to waive sovereign immunity in the absence of an express waiver. We note that the issue of whether consideration of extratextual sources is necessary or appropriate when statutory language that plainly and unambiguously signifies that the legislature did not intend to waive sovereign immunity leads to absurd or unworkable results is not before us. Cf. Rivers v. New Britain, 288 Conn. 1, 9, 18-19, 950 A.2d 1247 (2008) (resorting to legislative history when statute, which did not waive sovereign immunity, failed to impose duty on state or municipality to remove snow and ice from sidewalk abutting state owned property, leading to unworkable result). In her concurrence, Justice Katz criticizes our adoption of the approach of the concurring opinion in Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 301. The majority opinion in Miller is of limited precedential value in this context because it was released after this court discarded the plain meaning rule in State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 577-78, 816 A.2d 562 (2003), but before the legislature responded to Courchesne by passing § 1-2z.
In claiming that the statute implicitly waives sovereign immunity from suit because it exempts certain state actors from the provisions of subsection (a), the plaintiff conflates a waiver of the state's sovereign immunity from liability with a waiver of its sovereign immunity from suit. See Rivers v. New Britain , 288 Conn. 1, 11, 950 A.2d 1247 (2008) ("[s]overeign immunity is comprised of two concepts, immunity from liability and immunity from suit" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). There is a "conceptual distinction between sovereign immunity from suit and sovereign immunity from liability.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rivers v. New Britain , 288 Conn. 1, 10, 950 A.2d 1247 (2008). "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.... The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under the applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ... and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact."
” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rivers v. New Britain, 288 Conn. 1, 10, 950 A.2d 1247 (2008). “A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case.... It is not enough for the moving party merely to assert the absence of any disputed factual issue; the moving party is required to bring forward ... evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings to show the absence of any material dispute.... The party opposing summary judgment must present a factual predicate for his argument to raise a genuine issue of fact.... Once raised, if it is not conclusively refuted by the moving party, a genuine issue of fact exists, and summary judgment is inappropriate.”