Opinion
No. 2 CA-JV 2017-0015
12-04-2017
J.C., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY AND MARCIA R., Appellees.
COUNSEL Peter G. Schmerl, P.C., Tucson By Peter G. Schmerl Counsel for Appellant Domingo DeGrazia, Tucson Guardian Ad Litem for Minor Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General By Laura J. Huff, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety The Hopkins Law Office, P.C., Tucson By Cedric Martin Hopkins Counsel for Appellee Marcia R.
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(G). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. JD20140107
The Honorable Jennifer P. Langford, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Peter G. Schmerl, P.C., Tucson
By Peter G. Schmerl
Counsel for Appellant Domingo DeGrazia, Tucson
Guardian Ad Litem for Minor Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
By Laura J. Huff, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety The Hopkins Law Office, P.C., Tucson
By Cedric Martin Hopkins
Counsel for Appellee Marcia R.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Chief Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Vásquez and Judge Eppich concurred. ECKERSTROM, Chief Judge:
¶1 J.C., born June 2002, appeals from the juvenile court's order finding he was no longer a dependent child and dismissing the dependency proceeding. He argues the court violated the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children (ICPC), A.R.S. §§ 8-548 to 8-548.06, by placing him with his mother, Marcia R., in Texas and erred by finding she "was a safe and appropriate parent" in the absence of a placement order compliant with the ICPC. We affirm.
¶2 In February 2014, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) filed a dependency petition alleging J.C. was dependent as to his father, Louis C., on abuse grounds and as to Marcia, who resides in Texas, for failing to protect J.C. from that abuse. Marcia then filed a separate special paternity proceeding seeking to modify a foreign judgment granting Louis sole legal decision-making authority and primary custody of J.C. Based on the abuse allegation against Louis, Marcia requested that she be given sole legal decision-making authority and "be designated as primary residential custodian." The juvenile court consolidated the actions and, in September 2014, found J.C. dependent as to both parents. In February 2015, the court found both parents had completed their case plans, dismissed the dependency, and unconsolidated the case from the special paternity proceeding.
¶3 In October 2015, DCS filed a new dependency petition, again alleging J.C. was dependent as to Louis on abuse grounds and as to Marcia for inability to protect J.C. The matter was again consolidated with the ongoing special paternity action. After Louis failed to appear at a contested dependency hearing, the juvenile court found J.C. dependent as to him. The court found J.C. dependent as to Marcia after she admitted the allegations made in an amended petition.
The amended petition emphasized that Marcia had been unable to protect J.C. "due to a legal impediment," presumably her lack of legal decision-making authority.
¶4 While the dependency petition was pending, DCS submitted a referral for a home study of Marcia's home under the ICPC as ordered by the juvenile court. And the court ordered that J.C. was "entitled to priority placement" with Marcia in Texas pursuant to the ICPC. However, the home study was denied in April 2016, apparently because Marcia's husband "ha[d] not completed his FBI check." J.C. then requested to be placed with Louis.
¶5 Approximately eight months later, in the consolidated special paternity proceeding, the juvenile court awarded Marcia sole legal decision-making authority for J.C. and restricted Louis to supervised parenting time. DCS moved to dismiss the dependency, arguing the "legal impediment" that had prevented Marcia from protecting J.C. from Louis's abuse had been remedied by that order. Upon being informed J.C. had "boarded [a] plane to his mother's home," the court dismissed the dependency, concluding Marcia "has remedied the circumstances that caused [J.C.] to be a dependent child as to her," she "is a fit and proper person to parent [J.C.] and a dependency no longer exists under A.R.S. § 8-201(14)." The court also unconsolidated the matter from the special paternity proceeding. This appeal followed.
Louis separately appealed the juvenile court's order. That appeal was dismissed when he failed to file an opening brief.
¶6 On appeal, J.C. asserts the juvenile court erred by "dismissing the dependency by placing [him] with [Marcia] in Texas despite the ICPC denial." "The ICPC is an interstate compact that facilitates interstate cooperation in the placement and monitoring of dependent children." Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Stanford, 234 Ariz. 477, ¶ 16 (App. 2014). Article III(d) of § 8-548 requires that, before a child may be placed in another state during a dependency proceeding, "the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state shall notify the sending agency, in writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear to be contrary to the interests of the child." Absent that notification, J.C. claims, the court violated the ICPC by placing him in Texas.
In its answering brief, DCS argues only that "[t]he issue of whether the juvenile court violated the ICPC by placing [J.C.] in Texas is . . . moot" because J.C. has left Texas and returned to Arizona to live with Louis "and the parties have no intention of sending [him] to Texas." Although J.C.'s return arguably renders moot the court's purported violation of the ICPC, it does not make moot the court's decision to end the dependency. See Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614, ¶ 5 (App. 2012) ("[G]enerally, we will dismiss an appeal as moot when our action as a reviewing court will have no effect on the parties."). --------
¶7 We disagree. ICPC regulations, "promulgated by the Association of Administrators of the ICPC . . . pursuant to article VII of § 8-548," Stanford, 234 Ariz. 477, ¶ 18, state the ICPC "does not apply in court cases of paternity, divorce, custody, and probate pursuant to which or in situations where children are being placed with parents." ICPC Reg 3(3)(d), available at www.aphsa.org/content/AAICPC/en/ICPCRegulations.html; see also § 8-548 art. VIII(a). The order granting Marcia sole legal decision-making authority, resulting in J.C.'s placement in Texas, was made in the special paternity proceeding, not the dependency proceeding. J.C. has cited no authority, and we find none, suggesting ICPC Regulation 3(3)(d) does not apply when there is a parallel dependency proceeding. Cf. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Leonardo, 200 Ariz. 74, ¶ 20 (App. 2001) ("If a parent has full custodial rights following a dissolution proceeding, presumably there has been a judicial determination that the person is a fit parent.").
¶8 And, although J.C. argues the juvenile court erred in concluding his mother was an appropriate parent, he does not meaningfully develop this issue beyond his claim that the court violated the ICPC. Thus, we do not address this argument further. See Melissa W. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 238 Ariz. 115, ¶ 9 (App. 2015) (argument unsupported by authority is waived); City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 218 Ariz. 172, ¶ 88 (App. 2008) (argument on appeal waived by party's failure to adequately develop it).
¶9 We affirm the juvenile court's order dismissing the dependency.