Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3-01-CV-0512-G.
May 22, 2001.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is the motion of the defendant Montgomery-Kone, Inc. ("Kone" or "the defendant") to dismiss the plaintiff's claims against it, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons stated below, the defendant's motion is denied.
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 14, 2001, the plaintiff J.C. Penney Co., Inc. ("J.C. Penney" or "the plaintiff") filed its complaint against Kone, alleging causes of action for declaratory judgment and breach of contract. See Plaintiff's Original Complaint at 5-8 ("Complaint"). The complaint alleges that, because the plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of different states, and because the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, this court has jurisdiction over the instant case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Id. 3.
The plaintiff contends that the parties are of diverse citizenship by virtue of the fact that J.C. Penney is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Plano, Texas and Kone is an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Moline, Illinois. Id. ¶¶ 1-2. In the instant motion to dismiss, however, Kone contends that it is a Delaware corporation, not an Illinois corporation, and that the plaintiff has therefore not satisfied the requirement of complete diversity. See Defendant Kone[,] Inc.'s Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss ("Motion to Dismiss") at 1.
II. ANALYSIS
"A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) should be granted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. `A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.'" Home Builders Association of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Madison, Mississippi, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996)).
Rule 12(b)(1) allows a court to "`look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.'" Capitol Leasing Company v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 999 F.2d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Grafon Corp. v. Hausernann, 602 F.2d 781, 783 (7th Cir. 1979)). In addition, "the court may properly look to evidence beyond the pleadings" in order to determine jurisdiction for the purposes of a dismissal motion under Rule 12(b)(1). Commodity Trend Service, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 149 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Calderon v. United States, 123 F.3d 947, 951 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1997)). In considering a "factual attack", such as the one included in Kone's motion challenging the court's subject matter jurisdiction based upon facts alleged in J.C. Penney's complaint, this court will not presume the allegations of fact in the complaint to be true. See United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868 (1994). Rather, this court is obligated to weigh the conflicting evidence to determine whether the proper jurisdiction exists. See Ohio National Life Insurance Company v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990). In weighing this evidence, the court has broad discretion to consider affidavits and documents to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts. See Ohio National, supra, 922 F.2d at 324.
In the instant case, although Kone has alleged in its motion to dismiss that it is a Delaware corporation, it has provided no evidence whatever in support of this allegation. The defendant has therefore failed to establish with certainty, as required, "that [J.C. Penney] cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Accordingly, Ione's motion to dismiss must be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Kone's motion to dismiss is DENIED.