Since the subsection seems to have been rarely used or referred to in judicial decisions, it seems worthwhile to look into its legislative origins. Cf. Jersey City Chapter of the PropertyOwner's Protective Assoc. v. City Council of Jersey City, 55 N.J. 86 (1969). The Blighted Area Act was adopted originally by L. 1949, c. 187, N.J.S.A. 40:55-21.1 et seq.
See State v. Atlantic City ElectricCo., 23 N.J. 259, 272 (1957) (dissenting opinion); State v.United States Steel Corp., 22 N.J. 341, 355 (1956); State v.Sperry Hutchinson Co., 23 N.J. 38, 43 (1956). In J.C. Chap. Prop. Owner's, etc., Assoc. v. City Council, 55 N.J. 86 (1969), we recently had occasion to reiterate that matters of statutory construction do not generally turn on the so-called formal rules of interpretation but turn instead "on the breadth of the objectives of the legislation and the commonsense of the situation." 55 N.J. at 100.
In cases such as this, where it is clear that the drafters of a statute did not consider or even contemplate a specific situation, this Court has adopted as an established rule of statutory construction the policy of interpreting the statute "consonant with the probable intent of the draftsman `had he anticipated the situation at hand.'" J.C.Chap. Prop. Owner's etc. Assoc. v. City Council, 55 N.J. 86, 101, 259 A.2d 698 (1969) (quoting Dvorkin v. Dover Tp., 29 N.J. 303, 315, 148 A.2d 793 (1959)); Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Furman, 41 N.J. 467, 197 A.2d 366, appeal dismissed and cert. den., 379 U.S. 14, 85 S.Ct. 144,13 L.Ed.2d 84 (1964). Such an interpretation will not "turn on literalisms, technisms or the so-called rules of interpretation; [rather] it will justly turn on the breadth of the objectives of the legislation and the commonsense of the situation."
'" Ibid. (quoting Blair, supra, 60 N.J. at 338, 288 A.2d 855). The court acknowledged as well that "`The matter of statutory construction here will not justly turn on literalisms. . . . [I]t will justly turn on the breadth of the objectives of the legislation and the commonsense [sic] of the situation.'" Ibid. (quoting Jersey City Chapter Property Owners Ass'n v. CityCouncil, 55 N.J. 86, 100, 259 A.2d 698 (1985)). Ultimately, the court, based on common parlance, defined "physical violence or property damage" to mean "physical injury or tangible property damage resulting from the exertion of force."
J.C. Chap. Prop. Owner'setc. Assoc. v. City Council, 55 N.J. 86, 101 (1969) (quoting Dvorkin v. Dover Tp., 29 N.J. 303, 315 (1959));
In cases such as this, where it is clear that the drafters of a statute did not consider or even contemplate a specific situation, this Court has adopted as an established rule of statutory construction the policy of interpreting the statute "consonant with the probable intent of the draftsman `had he anticipated the situation at hand.'" J.C. Chap. Prop. Owner's etc. Assoc. v.City Council, 55 N.J. 86, 101 (1969) (quoting Dvorkin v.Dover Tp., 29 N.J. 303, 315 (1959)); Safeway Trails, Inc. v.Furman, 41 N.J. 467, appeal dismissed and cert. den., 379 U.S. 14, 85 S.Ct. 144, 13 L.Ed.2d 84 (1964). Such an interpretation will not "turn on literalisms, technisms or the so-called rules of interpretation; [rather] it will justly turn on the breadth of the objectives of the legislation and the commonsense of the situation."
It must be borne in mind that our Legislature has not at any time said that no reasons need be given when a nontenured teacher is not rehired. Bills bearing generally on the subject have been introduced periodically but thus far no pertinent legislation has been enacted; in the circumstances it is clear that no controlling inference as to intent may be drawn from the legislative silence. See Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 241-242, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 1587-1588, 26 L.Ed.2d 199, 205 (1970); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69-70, 66 S.Ct. 826, 829-830, 90 L.Ed. 1084, 1090-1091 (1946); cf. J.C. Chap. Prop. Owner's c. Assoc. v. City Council, 55 N.J. 86, 95 (1969); Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 203 (1969); Fraser v. Robin Dee Day Camp, 44 N.J. 480, 486 (1965); Walls v. Horbach, 189 Neb. 479, 203 N.W.2d 490, 492 (1973); State v. Gorham, ___ Iowa ___, 206 N.W.2d 908, 913 (1973). The Legislature has established a tenure system which contemplates that the local board shall have broad discretionary authority in the granting of tenure and that once tenure is granted there shall be no dismissal except for inefficiency, incapacity, unbecoming conduct or "other just cause."
The Assessor's Office intends to document the dual ownership of the subject property for its 2004 Tax Duplicate. Additional support for the notion that airspace can be the subject of a local property tax assessment may be found in the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion in Jersey City Chapter of the Property Owner's Protective Ass'n. v. City Council of Jersey City, 55 N.J. 86, 259 A.2d 698 (1969), in which the issue before the court was whether airspace could be blighted. While that case dealt with a different issue than the one before this court, the analysis employed by the Court in Jersey City Chapter is nevertheless relevant to the issue at hand and is helpful in resolving the present matter.
N.J. Builders, Owners and Managers Association v. Blair, 60 N.J. 330, 338, 288 A.2d 855 (1972). As our Supreme Court observed in Jersey City Chap. Prop. Owner's, etc., Assoc. v. City Council, 55 N.J. 86, 259 A.2d 698 (1969): When all is said and done, the matter of statutory construction here will not justly turn on literalisms, technisms or the so-called formal rules of interpretation; it will justly turn on the breadth of the objectives of the legislation and the commonsense of the situation.
[ New Capitol Bar Grill Corp. v. Division of Empl. Sec. Dep't of Labor and Ind., 25 N.J. 155, 160, 135 A.2d 465 (1957).] [ Id. at 323-24, 741 A.2d 149.] See also, e.g., Jersey City Chapter Prop. Owners, etc. Ass'n v. City Council of Jersey City, 55 N.J. 86, 100, 259 A.2d 698 (1969); Dvorkin v. Dover Twp., 29 N.J. 303, 315, 148 A.2d 793 (1959). As respected and respectable as these approaches may be when construing and applying a statute or other writing, they cannot appropriately be used here.