nor significantly affects the issues remaining for trial. See J.B.L. Constr. Co. v. Lincoln Homes Corp., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 250, 252-253 (1980). We discern no economy achieved or hardship avoided by the judge's certification.
SeeParis v. Snappy Car Rental, Inc., 18 Mass. App. Ct. 968, 969 (1984); Doe v. Roe, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 270, 271 (1985); Tiffany v. Sturbridge Camping Club, Inc., 32 Mass. App. Ct. 173, 178-179 (1992); Backus Plywood Corp. v. Commercial Decal, Inc., 317 F.2d 339, 340-341 (2d Cir. 1963); Spiegel v. Trustees of Tufts College, 843 F.2d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 1988); Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 860 F.2d 1441, 1443 (7th Cir. 1988); Monument Mgmt. Ltd. Partnership v. Pearl, 952 F.2d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 1992); Credit Francais Intl., S.A. v. Bio-Vita, Ltd., 78 F.3d 698, 706 (1st Cir. 1996). We note that Federal decisions are sources of precedent with respect to issues under our rule 54(b) because that rule "was taken verbatim from Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b)," J.B.L. Constr. Co. v. Lincoln Homes Corp., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 250, 252 (1980), so that in construing our rule we may rely upon Federal cases interpreting its Federal cognate. Rollins Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 368 Mass. 174, 179-180 (1975) (involving effort by litigant to obtain "piecemeal appellate review" of a nonappealable trial court ruling).
The determination whether to allow such relief is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and is subject to reversal only for an abuse of that discretion. J.B.L. Constr. Co. v. Lincoln Homes Corp., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 250, 252 (1980). Deciding that the plaintiff has failed to show that Deutsche Bank was fraudulent in acquiring the property, the motion judge could properly conclude that there was no just reason for delay.
Long, supra at 389, 737 N.E.2d 885, quoting Harriscom Svenska AB v. Harris Corp., 947 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1991). "Federal decisions are sources of precedent with respect to issues under our rule 54(b) because that rule โwas taken verbatim from Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b),โ J.B.L. Constr. Co. v. Lincoln Homes Corp., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 250, 252, 400 N.E.2d 871 (1980), so that in construing our rule we may rely upon Federal cases interpreting its Federal cognate." Long, 50 Mass. App. Ct. at 385 n.6, 737 N.E.2d 885.
We have over the past decade frequently declared the need for such findings when the judge's reasons are not, as they are not here, clear on the record. See J.B.L. Constr. Co. v. Lincoln Homes Corp., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 250, 252-253 (1980); Paris v. Snappy Car Rental, Inc., 18 Mass. App. Ct. 968, 969 (1984); High-Tech Sales, Inc. v. Olektron Corp., 31 Mass. App. Ct. 912, 913-914 (1991). Contrast Dattoli v. Hale Hosp., 400 Mass. 175, 176 (1987) (separate judgment for two of four defendants warranted because there were no other claims against them and no substantial overlap between the issues involving them and those remaining for trial).
See Weisman v. Saetz, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 829 (1980). He certainly never made the findings which various appellate opinions have stated should be made. See, e.g., J.B.L. Constr. Co. v. Lincoln Homes Corp., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 250, 253 (1980), and cases cited. We think that this is a case in which neither party was led to believe that the matter had been concluded.
Here, the entry of judgment is requested by Early, the party whose motions to dismiss was granted, and opposed by Plaintiff, the aggrieved party. Massachusetts Courts have held that "federal decisions are sources of precedent with respect to issues under our rule 54(b) because that rule 'was taken verbatim from Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b),'" Long v. Wickett, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 380, 385 n. 6 (2000) (quoting J.B.L. Constr. Co. v. Lincoln Homes Corp., 9 Mass.App.Ct. 250, 252 (1980)). Courts have consistently noted that there is "a long-settled and prudential policy against the scattershot disposition of litigation."
And if the Court finds that the settlement was not entered into in good faith, Anchor's cross-claim for contribution against Bankhead will be totally unaffected by the fact that there has been a dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims against Bankhead and the entry of separate judgment as between the plaintiffs and the defendant Bankhead. I find nothing to the contrary in the two cases cited by Anchor, i.e. J.B.L. Construction Co., Inc. v. Lincoln Homes Corp., 9 Mass.App. 250, 400 N.E.2d 871 (1980); Bragdon v. Bradford O. Emerson, Inc., 19 Mass.App. 420, 475 N.E.2d 76 (1985). However, it does not follow from these conclusions that the Court should enter separate judgment as to the plaintiffs' claims as against Bankhead.
We see no reason in the record before us why the petitioners would not prevail on a motion pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 54 (b), 365 Mass. 820 (1974), although we leave that to be decided by a judge in the Superior Court, who will be in a better position to decide the matter in the first instance. See generally Long v. Wickett, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 380, 387-403 (2000) ("likelihood of injustice or hardship to the parties" balanced against "traditional abhorrence of piecemeal appellate review"); J.B.L Constr. Co. v. Lincoln Homes Corp., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 250, 252 (1980) (separate and final judgment appropriate where showing of "hardship or injustice," or where early appeal may "simplify, shorten or expedite the trial of any of the other claims still pending in the Superior Court"). Regardless of the current status of the underlying Superior Court case, relief under G. L. c. 211, ยง 3, properly was denied because "there are other routes by which the petitioning party may adequately seek relief."
Our resolution of the questions raised on appeal will expedite the trial of the remaining claims. J.B.L. Constr. Co. v. Lincoln Homes Corp., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 250, 252 (1980), and cases cited. In 1980, the board began seeking a company to provide cable television services to the town.