Opinion
24A-JC-350
12-13-2024
In the Matter of S.B. (Minor Child), Child in Need of Services, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner And J.B. (Father), Appellant-Respondent
APPELLANT PRO SE J.B. Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Abigail R. Recker Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Marie Kern, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D24-2310-JC-009158
APPELLANT PRO SE
J.B. Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General
Abigail R. Recker Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
FELIX, JUDGE
Statement of the Case
[¶1] J.B. ("Father"), pro se, and his wife ("Mother") took their nine-month-old child (the "Child") to the hospital for evaluation of bruising based on the recommendation of the Child's primary care physician. Following examination of the Child, a report of suspected abuse was made, the Child was removed from Mother and Father's care, and a petition alleging the Child to be a child in need of services ("CHINS") was filed. The Child was placed in foster care and remained there for approximately one month before being returned to Mother and Father (the "Parents"). The CHINS petition was subsequently dismissed with prejudice. Father appeals, raising several issues for review, which we restate as the following two issues:
Mother is not a party to this appeal.
1. Whether Father's appeal is moot because the underlying CHINS petition has been dismissed; and
2. Whether the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applies.
[¶2] Because we conclude that Father's appeal is moot and because Father has failed to demonstrate that the public interest exception applies, we dismiss.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] The Child was born January 19, 2023, to the Parents. On October 23, 2023, Mother consulted the Child's primary doctor about unusual bruising on the Child's leg and abdomen. The Parents took the Child to the Riley Hospital for Children ("Riley") to be evaluated. Upon examination at Riley, the Child was found to have bruising on both knees and an inner thigh, and there was "concern for bruis[ing] on her upper left abdomen" that was "bluish in color." Appellant's App. Vol. II at 84. The Child had begun to "cruise" in the last couple of days, but the primary care physician "was concerned that bruising was abnormal for [the Child's] development level." Appellant's App. Vol. II at 89.
The preliminary inquiry states that the Parents took the Child to Community East Hospital and to Riley. However, all medical records and references to doctors are from Riley.
[¶4] According to the preliminary inquiry, a Riley child protection team physician reviewed the Child's examination records and photos and concluded the bruises on the Child were suspicious due to the Child's age and their location on the Child's body. Mother suggested that the bruising could have been caused by the Child lying across a diaper box for approximately 15 minutes or from bumping and climbing things. The Parents stated the shape of some of the 2 bruising "appeared to have been in the shape of fingerprints," and Mother stated it "appeared as though [the Child] had been squeezed too hard or grabbed too quickly." Appellant's App. Vol. II at 13.
[¶5] Hospital staff reported the bruising to the Indiana Department of Child Services ("DCS"). DCS sought emergency removal of the Child because the "story provided by [Mother] did not provide a plausible explanation for the bruising" on [the Child] due to the "location of the bruising and age of [the Child]." Appellant's App. Vol. II at 22. On October 24, 2023, DCS took emergency custody of the Child, and filed its request to file a CHINS petition and to continue custody.
[¶6] On October 25, 2023, the trial court held an initial and detention hearing, at which Father was represented by retained counsel and for which the trial court excluded public access. The same day, the trial court authorized DCS to file the CHINS petition and found probable cause for the Child's continued removal. On November 16, 2023, the trial court held a hearing at which "DCS stated after continued evaluation of the case and agreement of the team, the [C]hild was returned home on 11/14 and DCS is requesting dismissal" of the CHINS case. Appellee's App. Vol. II at 2. As a result, the trial court dismissed the CHINS case with prejudice. Father now appeals.
On October 19, 2024, while this appeal was still pending, Father filed an Appellant's Motion for Judicial Notice, citing law he purports supports his argument on the merits regarding the emergency detention of the child. Because we determine Father's appeal is moot, we do not consider his additional authority.
Discussion and Decision
[¶7] Father claims that the trial court erred by excluding the public from the CHINS proceedings and challenges the trial court's determination that DCS demonstrated probable cause to support the emergency detention of the Child. DCS counters that Father's appeal is moot because the Child has been returned to Father and because the trial court dismissed the CHINS action.
[¶8] "When the controversy at issue has been ended or settled, or somehow disposed of so as to render it unnecessary to decide the question involved, the case will be dismissed." T.W. v. St. Vincent Hosp. &Health Care Ctr., Inc., 121 N.E.3d 1039, 1042 (Ind. 2019) (citing In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 1991)), reh'g denied. The Child has been returned to Father, the trial court dismissed the CHINS action with prejudice on DCS's motion, and no CHINS determination was made prior to the dismissal. As a result, DCS argues, there is no relief available to Father and his appeal is moot. We agree with DCS that there is no relief available, see In re A.C., 198 N.E.3d 1, 9 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022) (concluding that no relief was available for alleged errors in the CHINS probable cause determination because the relevant allegations had been dismissed), and thus, Father's appeal is moot.
[¶9] However, Father asks us to apply the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. "Indiana recognizes a public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, which may be invoked when the issue involves a question of great public importance which is likely to recur." E.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. &Health Care Ctr., Inc., 188 N.E.3d 464, 466 (Ind. 2022) (quoting In re Tina T., 579 N.E.2d 48, 54 (Ind. 1991)). Specifically, Father argues that the public interest exception applies due to the voluntary cessation doctrine, and because the present issue is capable of repetition yet evades review. However, we conclude that Father has waived his public interest exception arguments due to failure to comply with our appellate rules.
[¶10] Father, representing himself on appeal, has failed to support his arguments with citations to the record and cogent reasoning as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Father's status as a pro se litigant does change the requirements of our appellate rules. See Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014) (citing In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158 (Ind. 2014)) ("A pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented."). "The purpose of our appellate rules, Ind. Appellate Rule 46 in particular, is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case." Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021)). Further, "[w]e will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf, 'nor will we address arguments' that are 'too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.'" Id. (quoting Dridi, 172 N.E.3d at 364). Father fails to include a single citation to the record to further his argument that his appeal is not moot, including for broad proclamations such as "Marion [C]ounty's family courts have a reputation for flouting Parents' constitutional rights." Appellant's Br. at 42. Additionally, Father fails to support his argument with adequate legal support or cogent reasoning. For the most part, Father's "argument" is nothing more than a recitation of several legal doctrines.
[¶11] Father acknowledges that he "has not been able to find a case which addressed probable cause determinations regarding emergency custody orders obtained without a warrant, after the child has been removed." Id. at 41. Instead, he cites to portions of our Trial Rules and Rules of Judicial Conduct, which are inapposite here. We conclude that Father's failure to support his argument with citations to the record, citations to legal authority, and cogent reasoning substantially impedes our review, and thus Father has waived these arguments. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015). Because Father's appeal is moot and because Father has failed to demonstrate the public interest exception applies, we dismiss Father's appeal.
Because we determine Father's appeal is moot, we need not consider Father's arguments that he is entitled to reimbursement from DCS or that we should consider evidence that was not before the trial court.
[¶12] Dismissed.
Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.