Jayhawk Equipment Co. v. Mentzer

19 Citing cases

  1. Davis v. Nelson

    610 P.2d 587 (Kan. 1980)

    It should be pointed out that since the court did have jurisdiction to divide the property and no appeal was taken from the decree it cannot be collaterally attacked in a later proceeding. Jayhawk Equipment Co. v. Mentzer, 191 Kan. 57, Syl. ¶ 2, 379 P.2d 342 (1963). We turn next to the ultimate question raised in this appeal. Can the wife's executor recover from the estate of the husband for alimony or support not previously decreed but claimed for a period of separation of the parties which preceded the husband's death?

  2. Taber v. Taber

    213 Kan. 453 (Kan. 1973)   Cited 12 times

    2. JUDGMENTS — Doctrine of Res Judicata. The doctrine of res judicata is plain and intelligible, and amounts simply to this — that a cause of action once finally determined, without appeal, between the parties, on the merits, by a competent tribunal cannot afterwards be litigated by a new proceeding, either before the same or any other tribunal. (Following Jayhawk Equipment Co. v. Mentzer, 191 Kan. 57, 379 P.2d 342.) 3. SEPARATE MAINTENANCE — Jurisdiction of District Court.

  3. Mid-Continent Casualty Company v. Everett

    340 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1965)   Cited 33 times
    Holding that a bus operator who was driving in the opposite direction from the normal route and two and a half hours behind schedule, without passengers, and while intoxicated, was not a permissive user at the time of the accident

    Under the doctrine of res judicata the final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the merits of a controversy is conclusive as to the parties to the litigation and their privies and it is a bar to any further litigation upon the same cause of action, either before the same or any other tribunal. Heron v. City of Denver, 10 Cir., 251 F.2d 119; Continental Oil Co. v. Jones, 10 Cir., 176 F.2d 519; Viles v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 10 Cir., 124 F.2d 78, cert. denied, 315 U.S. 816, 62 S.Ct. 906, 86 L.Ed. 1775; Henderson v. United States Radiator Corporation, 10 Cir., 78 F.2d 674; Jayhawk Equipment Company v. Mentzer, 191 Kan. 57, 379 P.2d 342. But, res judicata does not apply between cases involving different parties.

  4. Martin v. Frayser

    No. 97-1452-WEB (D. Kan. Dec. 28, 1999)   Cited 1 times

    The state materials cited by the defendant indicate a possible defense in this action based upon the doctrine of "claim preclusion." See Jayhawk Equipment Co. v. Mentzer, 191 Ran. 57, 61, 379 P.2d 342 (1963) (a judgment bars relitigation of the same controversy, including all issues that were raised or that could have been raised in the first action). Although Ms. Martin apparently was not formally named as a plaintiff in the state action, as an heir of the deceased she was represented in the action and she sought emotional damages in that action resulting from the death of her son, which was claimed to have been caused by Dr. Frayser's negligence. The general rule is that a person who is not a party to an action but who is represented by a party is nevertheless bound by the judgment as though she were a party.See Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 41. Thus, the fact that Ms. Martin was not formally named as a party is not necessarily determinative on the question of claim preclusion.

  5. Marshall v. Mayflower, Inc.

    817 F. Supp. 922 (D. Kan. 1993)   Cited 3 times

    Under this view, a "claim" is "coterminous with the transaction [from which it arises] regardless of the number of substantive theories, or variant forms of relief flowing from those theories, that may be available to plaintiff." Restatement, supra, Comment a. The Kansas Supreme Court suggested its acceptance of this approach in Jayhawk Equipment Co. v. Mentzer, 191 Kan. 57, 61, 379 P.2d 342 (1963): It is a general rule of law, indeed, an elementary one in this jurisdiction, that in a lawsuit between litigants in their ordinary capacity, so far as relates to a subsequent action on the same claim, not only is everything adjudicated between them which the parties may properly choose to litigate, but also everything incidental thereto which could have been litigated under the facts which gave rise to the cause of action.

  6. Crutsinger v. Hess

    408 F. Supp. 548 (D. Kan. 1976)   Cited 19 times
    In Crutsinger v. Hess, 408 F. Supp. 548 (D. Kan. 1976), the court concluded that defensive collateral estoppel is permissible by a party who was not present in the prior action — when at least the party against whom it is invoked was a party to the prior litigation.

    First, it precludes parties or their privies from relitigating a cause of action that has been finally adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction. Kansas cases applying this principle of "claim preclusion" — res judicata in its broadest sense — are legion. E.g., Parsons Mobile Products v. Remmert, 216 Kan. 138, 531 P.2d 435 (1975); Taber v. Taber, 213 Kan. 453, 516 P.2d 987 (1973); Hutchinson Nat'l Bank Trust Co. v. English, 209 Kan. 127, 495 P.2d 1011 (1972); Wells, Adm'r. v. Ross, 204 Kan. 676, 465 P.2d 966 (1970); Coffey, Adm'r. v. Gilbert, 204 Kan. 305, 461 P.2d 747 (1969); Jayhawk Equipment Co. v. Mentzer, 191 Kan. 57, 379 P.2d 342 (1963); Kansas Turnpike Authority v. Watson, 189 Kan. 593, 371 P.2d 119 (1962); Kenoyer v. Board of Barber Examiners, 176 Kan. 424, 271 P.2d 267 (1954); Miller v. Massman Construction Co., 171 Kan. 713, 237 P.2d 373 (1951); Hofstetter v. Myers Construction, Inc., 170 Kan. 464, 227 P.2d 115 (1951); Powell v. McChesney, 170 Kan. 692, 228 P.2d 925 (1951); Feldmann v. Feldmann, 166 Kan. 699, 204 P.2d 742 (1949); Wharton v. Zinger, 163 Kan. 745, 186 P.2d 287 (1947); Boyles v. Emery, 159 Kan. 300, 153 P.2d 936 (1944); Kearny County Bank v. Nunn, 156 Kan. 563, 134 P.2d 635 (1943); Stimec v. Verderber, 152 Kan. 582, 106 P.2d 708 (1940); Atchison Eastern Bridge Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 150 Kan. 24, 91 P.2d 34 (1939); Levi v. Levi, 149 Kan. 234, 86 P.2d 473 (1939); Clark v. Layman, 144 Kan. 711, 62 P.2d 897 (1936); McMichael v. Burnett, 136 Kan. 654, 17 P.2d 932 (1933); Farrar v. Perkins, 126 Kan. 71, 266 P. 751 (1928); First National Bank v. Schruben, 125 Kan. 417, 265 P. 53 (1928); A.T. S.F

  7. State v. Kingsley

    299 Kan. 896 (Kan. 2014)   Cited 61 times
    Barring claims that were "or could have been raised"

    The doctrine of res judicata provides that “where an appeal is taken from the sentence imposed and/or a conviction, the judgment of the reviewing court is res judicata as to all issues actually raised, and those issues that could have been presented, but were not presented, are deemed waived.” Neer, 247 Kan. at 140–41, 795 P.2d 362; see State v. Martin, 294 Kan. 638, 641, 279 P.3d 704 (2012) (res judicata consists of four elements: “ ‘[1] same claim; [2] same parties; [3] claims were or could have been raised; and [4] a final judgment on the merits' ”). The essence of the doctrine of res judicata is that issues “once finally determined ... cannot afterwards be litigated.” Jayhawk Equipment Co. v. Mentzer, 191 Kan. 57, 61, 379 P.2d 342 (1963). Kingsley's direct appeal from his convictions obviously involved the same parties, and it resulted in a final judgment on the merits.

  8. Blair v. Duncan

    533 P.2d 1224 (Kan. 1975)   Cited 1 times

    We hold that the decision in Blair, supra, precludes the plaintiff from maintaining this action under the rule of res judicata. ( Jayhawk Equipment Co. v. Mentzer, 191 Kan. 57, 379 P.2d 342; and Gray v. Johnson, 150 Kan. 276, 92 P.2d 46.) Having so resolved point No. 1, it is unnecessary to consider point No. 2. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

  9. Patrons State Bank Trust Co. v. Shapiro

    215 Kan. 856 (Kan. 1974)   Cited 28 times
    In Patrons State Bank Trust Co. v. Shapiro, 215 Kan. 856, 528 P.2d 1198 (1974), the Kansas Supreme Court held that an assignment passes all of the assignor's title or interest to the assignee, and divests the assignor of all right of control over the subject matter of the assignment.

    The test to be applied in determining inconsistency is whether proof of one theory must necessarily disprove or defeat the other. ( Jayhawk Equipment Co. v. Mentzer, 191 Kan. 57, 379 P.2d 342; Ondrasek v. Ondrasek, 172 Kan. 100, 238 P.2d 535.) The question which we must resolve here is whether the two theories — fraud and conversion — pled in the petition and later submitted at the trial are so repugnant as to preclude alternate remedies as a matter of law.

  10. Hutchinson Nat'l Bank Trust Co. v. English

    209 Kan. 127 (Kan. 1972)   Cited 20 times
    In Hutchinson Nat'l Bank Trust Co. v. English, 209 Kan. 127, 129, 130, 495 P.2d 1011 (1972), it was held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be invoked only as to questions and issues shown to have been actually decided in the prior action.

    In addition the present claim of the Bank against English is not brought to recover an account receivable. It is a separate claim for damages alleged to have been caused by the false representation and fraud of English. In Jayhawk Equipment Co. v. Mentzer, 191 Kan. 57, 397 P.2d 342, the court said: "The doctrine of res judicata is plain and intelligible, and amounts simply to this — that a cause of action once finally determined, without appeal, between the parties, on the merits, by a competent tribunal cannot afterwards be litigated by a new proceeding, either before the same or any other tribunal."