Jay Realty, Inc. v. Ahearn Development Corp.

90 Citing cases

  1. New England Dairies, Inc. v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores

    Civil Action No. 3:97CV894(CFD) (D. Conn. Feb. 4, 2002)   Cited 5 times
    Holding defendant liable for breach of provision of contract requiring that the defendant could not sell its business without requiring the assumption of the contract by the buyer

    Thus, a court may admit extrinsic evidence to interpret ambiguous provisions of contracts, among other reasons. HLO Land Ownership Assocs. Ltd. P'Ship. v. City of Hartford, 727 A.2d 1260, 1265 (Conn. 1999) (citing Jay Realty, Inc. v. Ahearn Dev. Corp., 453 A.2d 771, 773 (Conn. 1983)); Hare, 662 A.2d at 1251. As part of its examination of extrinsic evidence, courts may look to the parties' actions and declarations subsequent to the agreement.

  2. TIE Communications, Inc. v. Kopp

    218 Conn. 281 (Conn. 1991)   Cited 108 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In TIE Communications, Inc., we examined the application of the parol evidence rule to testimony regarding whether a party had fully performed its obligations under an integrated contract.

    When offered for that purpose, it is inadmissible not because it is parol evidence, but because it is irrelevant. By implication, such evidence may still be admissible if relevant "(1) to explain an ambiguity appearing in the instrument; (2) to prove a collateral oral agreement which does not vary the terms of the writing; (3) to add a missing term in writing which indicates on its face that it does not set forth the complete agreement; or (4) to show mistake or fraud." Jay Realty, Inc. v. Ahearn Development Corporation, 189 Conn. 52, 55-56, 453 A.2d 771 (1983). These recognized "exceptions" are, of course, only examples of situations where the evidence (1) does not vary or contradict the contract's terms, or (2) may be considered because the contract has been shown not to be integrated; or (3) tends to show that the contract should be defeated or altered on the equitable ground that "relief can be had against any deed or contract in writing founded in mistake or fraud."

  3. Falcigno v. Falcigno

    CV126033535S (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 2018)   Cited 1 times

    The rule is also designed to require parties to put their complete agreement including oral contemporaneous agreements in writing at the risk of losing the benefit of any term agreed-upon that is not in writing. But it also must be kept in mind that the policy behind the parol evidence rule gives way when extrinsic evidence is offered and proven to show mistake or fraud including fraud in the inducement of a contract. Jay Realty, Inc. v. Ahearn Development Corp., 189 Conn. 52, 56 (1983); Colliers Dow & Condon, Inc. v. Schwartz, 77 Conn.App. 462, 470 (2003). This is an inherent corollary of a rule enforced so as to prevent perjury.

  4. Chapco, Inc. v. Hot Tub Products, LLC

    MMXCV166016697S (Conn. Super. Ct. Sep. 28, 2017)

    By contrast, parol evidence is admissible (1) to explain an ambiguity appearing in the instrument; (2) to prove a collateral, oral agreement that does not vary the terms of the writing; (3) to add a missing term in a writing that indicates on its face that it does not set forth the complete agreement; and (4) to show mistake or fraud. Jay Realty, Inc. v. Ahearn Development Corp., 189 Conn. 52, 56, 453 A.2d 771 (1983). " In order for the bar against the introduction of extrinsic evidence to apply, the writing at issue must be integrated, that is, it must have been intended by the parties to contain the whole agreement . . . and to be a final expression of one or more terms of [the] agreement . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotations marks omitted.)

  5. Royal Bank v. Lexham Farmington I

    2011 Ct. Sup. 19847 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2011)

    Lexham is apparently attempting to have this court rewrite the express terms of the sophisticated commercial Loan Agreement. It is not within the power of courts to create new and different agreements. Jay Realty, Inc. v. Ahearn Dev. Corp., 189 Conn. 52, 55, 453 A.2d 771 (1983). Competent persons shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and their agreements voluntarily and fairly made shall be held valid and enforceable.

  6. Giuliani v. Unifirst Corp.

    2000 Ct. Sup. 2589 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000)

    Parol evidence offered solely to vary or contradict the written terms of an integrated contract is, therefore, legally irrelevant. When offered for that purpose, it is inadmissible not because it is parol evidence, but because it is irrelevant. By implication, such evidence may still be admissible if relevant (1) to explain an ambiguity appearing in the instrument; (2) to prove a collateral oral agreement which does not vary the terms of the writing; (3) to add a missing term in a writing which indicates on its face that it does not set forth the complete agreement; or (4) to show mistake or fraud. Jay Realty, Inc. v. Ahearn Development Corporation, 189 Conn. 52, 56, 453 A.2d 771 (1963). These recognized exceptions are, of course, only examples of situations where the evidence (1) does not vary or contradict the contract's terms, or (2) may be considered because the contract has been shown not to be integrated; or (3) tends to show that the contract should be defeated or altered on the equitable ground that relief can be had against any deed or contract in writing founded in mistake or fraud. Noble v. Comstock, 3 Conn. 295, 299 (1820); see also Dale v. Gear, 38 Conn. 15, 18-19 (1871) (agency, trust, equitable relation or equity may be shown by parol evidence).

  7. Pratt v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.

    1999 Ct. Sup. 3575 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999)   Cited 1 times

    Parol evidence offered solely to vary or contradict the written terms of an integrated contract is, therefore, legally irrelevant. [S]uch evidence may still be relevant `(1) to explain an ambiguity appearing in the instrument; [or] (2) to prove a collateral oral agreement which does not vary the terms of a writing. . . .'" (Emphasis in original.) TIE Communications, Inc. v. Kopp, 218 Conn. 281, 288-89, 589 A.2d 329 (1991), quotingJay Realty, Inc. v. Ahearn Development Corp. , 189 Conn. 52, 55-56, 453 A.2d 771 (1983). "The operative question becomes whether parol evidence is offered to contradict the writing or to aid in its interpretation."

  8. Dow v. New Haven Savings Bank

    1998 Ct. Sup. 8271 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998)

    It . . . [was] well established that the requirements of ยง 20-325a (b) . . . [were] mandatory rather than permissive and that the statute . . . [was] to be strictly construed." McCutcheon Burr, Inc. v. Berman, 218 Conn. 512, 520, 590 A.2d 438 (1991); New England Land Co. v. DeMarkey, 213 Conn. 612, 623, 569 A.2d 1098 (1990) (listing agreement must include sale price of property); Jay Realty, Inc. v. Ahearn Development Corporation, 189 Conn. 52, 54, 453 A.2d 771 (1983) (listing agreement lacking addresses of both parties unenforceable); Thornton Real Estate, Inc. v. Lobdell, 184 Conn. 228, 230-31, 439 A.2d 946 (1979) (brokerage contract signed by owner's agent unenforceable under the statute as then worded); Hosan v. Hudiakoff, 178 Conn. 381, 383, 423 A.2d 108 (1979) (failure to include broker's address fatal to listing agreement). "A broker who . . . [did] not follow the mandate of the statute . . . [did] so at his peril." Thornton Real Estate, Inc. v. Lobdell, supra, 184 Conn. 230-31.

  9. Carey v. Clark

    1992 Ct. Sup. 10320 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992)

    Moreover, it has been well established that the requirements of Gen. Stat. Sec. 20-325a(b) are mandatory rather than permissive and that statute is to be strictly construed. McCutcheon Burr, Inc., supra, 519. New England Land Co., Ltd. v. DeMarkey, 213 Conn. 612, 621, 569 A.2d 1098 (1990); Jay Realty, Inc. v. Ahearn Development Corp., 189 Conn. 52, 54, CT Page 10322 453 A.2d 771 (1983); Rostenberg-Doern Co. v. Weiner, 17 Conn. App. 294, 305-07, 552 A.2d 827 (1989). "A broker who does not follow the mandate of [ 20-325a(b)] does so at his peril."

  10. Woodling v. Garrett Corp.

    813 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1987)   Cited 158 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that lower court properly honored parties' contractual choice of Connecticut law with respect to matters of substance where Connecticut was principal place of business of one of the parties

    It is well settled under Connecticut law that parol evidence is admissible to show fraud or misrepresentation. See Jay Realty, Inc. v. Ahearn Development Corp., 189 Conn. 52, 453 A.2d 771, 773 (1983); Paiva v. Vanech Heights Construction Co., 159 Conn. 512, 271 A.2d 69, 73-74 (1970); Kiss v. Kahm, 132 Conn. 593, 46 A.2d 337, 338 (1946). The presence of a disclaimer such as that signed by Woodling provides no exception to this general rule.