Opinion
No. 05-08-01441-CV
Opinion issued February 8, 2011.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. CC-05-09385-A.
Before Justices MORRIS, FRANCIS, and MURPHY.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
J. Howard Jaster, individually and as assignee of the Edinburgh Trust, appeals the trial court's take-nothing judgment in favor of Shelter Mutual Insurance Company following a jury trial. In a single issue, Jaster complains the trial court erred in failing to render judgment in his favor against Shelter based on the jury's agency finding. We affirm.
In 2004, Jaster moved from Tennessee to Texas. Shortly after he arrived, the U-Haul truck containing his personal property was stolen. The stolen property included valuable antique furniture, paintings, and other items of high value, and much of it was owned by the Edinburgh Trust, established by Jaster's parents. Jaster filed a claim with his insurance carrier, Shelter. Shelter contacted Michael Hanna d/b/a Cornerstone Replacement Services to provide an appraisal of the property's value and notified Jaster that Cornerstone might be contacting him to obtain additional information. Cornerstone and Jaster had several conversations, and Cornerstone completed the appraisal. Because Jaster was going to use Cornerstone to replace the stolen property, he asked Shelter to pay the settlement funds directly to Cornerstone. Shelter told Jaster it needed the trust's approval. Jaster contacted the trust's lawyer, who sent Shelter written instructions directing it to pay Cornerstone to replace the items. Shelter then delivered a check to Jaster for $189,875.03; the check was issued jointly to Jaster, the trust, and Cornerstone. Jaster obtained the trust's signature, signed the check himself, and then hand-delivered it to Cornerstone.
Soon after, Jaster canceled his order with Cornerstone and requested a refund. Cornerstone issued the refund, but the check bounced. Ultimately, Cornerstone returned $140,000, but never repaid the remaining amount owed. Jaster contacted Shelter and eventually requested that it "give consideration to working with Cornerstone to replace the lost funds so that the settlement with [the trust] may be completed." After reviewing the case, Shelter responded that it did not "owe any more money for his claim." Jaster then sued Shelter and Cornerstone.
At trial, Jaster testified he did not realize he had a choice in whether to use Cornerstone to receive his settlement proceeds and further did not realize Cornerstone was a separate company from Shelter. Other evidence, however, contradicted Jaster, including the testimony of Craig Erickson, Shelter's claim adjuster. Erickson testified Cornerstone was only appraising the property for Shelter and that he explained to Jaster that it was Jaster's decision to use Cornerstone to replace the property.
After hearing the evidence, the jury answered no to Question 1, which asked whether Shelter breached its contract with Jaster. The jury answered yes to Questions 9 and 12, which asked whether Cornerstone engaged in false, misleading, and deceptive practices and whether Cornerstone was liable for fraud.
Most relevant to this appeal, however, are Questions 5 and 6. Question 5 asked whether "Michael Hanna d/b/a Cornerstone Replacement Services was the agent of defendant Shelter Mutual Insurance Company with regard to the actions of Michael Hanna d/b/a Cornerstone Replacement Services." The question included a definition of apparent agency. The jury answered yes. Question 6, which was conditioned on a "yes" answer to Question 5, asked whether Shelter "engage[d] in any false, misleading or deceptive act or practices that [Jaster] relied on to his detriment and that was a producing cause of damages to [Jaster]." The question then defined producing cause and included seven of the "laundry list" items in the DTPA. To this question, the jury answered no.
The trial court rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of Shelter and awarded damages against Cornerstone for the liability found by the jury. Jaster filed a motion for new trial, motion to reform judgment, and motion for entry of judgment JNOV, asserting the jury's finding of agency entitled him to judgment against Shelter for the damages awarded by the jury against Cornerstone. Jaster brings this same argument on appeal. While he directs us to law regarding principal-agency relationships and liability in his brief, he wholly fails to analyze this law within the context of the jury charge in this case.
An appellant has the burden to show the trial court's judgment was erroneously rendered and entered. Jackson v. U.S. Fidelity Guar. Co., 689 S.W.2d 408, 412 (1985). Moreover, if possible, we must interpret the jury's findings in a manner to support the judgment. Jackson v. U.S. Fid. Guar. Co., 689 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tex. 1985); Chubb Lloyds Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Andrew's Restoration, Inc. 323 S.W.3d 564, 580 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet. filed).
Here, it was Jaster's burden to obtain the necessary finding to hold Shelter liable for Cornerstone's acts. Question 5 did nothing more than establish an agency relationship existed between Cornerstone and Shelter; it did not link this relationship to the conduct of Cornerstone found by the jury to be either false, misleading, or deceptive, or fraudulent in Questions 9 and 12. See Wheaton Van Lines, Inc. v. Mason, 925 S.W. 722, 731 n. 3 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied) (explaining that where agent acts for principal, principal is liable for agent's acts within scope of agency). The only portion of the charge that can reasonably be read to inquire as to Shelter's vicarious liability is Question 6. Question 6 asked jurors whether Shelter engaged in false, misleading, or deceptive practices and was expressly conditioned on an affirmative finding of agency in Question 5. The jury answered no. While the charge perhaps is not as clear as it could be, Questions 5 and 6 can be read in a manner to support the judgment because, read together, they inquired about Shelter's vicarious liability for Cornerstone's actions. In fact, Jaster acknowledged as much at oral argument when he argued Question 6 was a vicarious liability question. Because the findings support the trial court's judgment, we overrule the sole issue.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.