* * *" In face of the trial court's specific finding of this element, the appellants must be reduced to the contention that the evidence simply does not sustain this finding of good faith and bona fide intention of appellees to diligently proceed with the drilling of the well, and appellants ask us to find therefrom that appellees' real purpose was only to hold this lease. If there is substantial evidence we cannot do this, but must be bound by the finding of the trial court, Caillier v. City of Newcastle, Wyo., 423 P.2d 653, 656, and cases collected in 1 West's Wyoming Digest, Appeal and Error, p. 402, et sequitur, and cases in 1976 Cum.P.P. Further, "Findings of fact must be construed liberally and favorably to the judgment," and the presumption is that they are right, Jassman v. Wulfjen, 71 Wyo. 261, 257 P.2d 334, 336; Murphy v. Petrolane-Wyoming Gas Service, Wyo., 468 P.2d 969, 979. This court has held further that where the finding by the trial court is not inconsistent with the evidence it will not be disturbed on appeal, Wyoming Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. May, Wyo., 434 P.2d 507, 511. In our view there was sufficient evidence for the court to make this finding from the facts which have been heretofore set out, and we thus cannot disturb the trial court's finding on this first issue no matter what might be our personal view.

The judgment cannot stand, but the cause is as yet undeveloped and not in a state which would properly support action of this court either making the defendants liable or exonerating them. In our consideration of this matter and its disposition, we bear in mind the well established rule that findings of fact must be construed liberally and favorably to the judgment and that there is a presumption that the action of the trial court was right, Jassman v. Wulfjen, 71 Wyo. 261, 257 P.2d 334, 336; however, as we have pointed out during the discussion, the evidence in this case is uncontroverted and in that situation findings may be treated as legal conclusions, reversible by the appellate court, and where such evidence admits of only one conclusion, a contrary one may not stand. Wyoming Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. May, supra, 434 P.2d at 511; Hercules Powder Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 66 Wyo. 268, 208 P.2d 1096, 210 P.2d 824, 825. In Twing v. Schott, 80 Wyo. 100, 338 P.2d 839, 844, we said while "we are always reluctant to reverse a judgment unless it is clearly against the weight of the evidence, neither this nor any appellate court ought ever to hesitate about a reversal whenever it is apparent that the judgment is contrary to the law and contrary to the evidence."

It is also presumed the action of the board "was right." Jassman v. Wulfjen, 71 Wyo. 261, 257 P.2d 334, 336. The burden is on the challenging party to overcome the presumptions.

51 C.J.S. Sec. 37b, Landlord and Tenant, pp 555-556. It would seem to be clear that the Land Board in determining what was for the best interest of the state, had the right to let the land to the defendant in spite of the preference right which the plaintiff had since that right is not absolute. Howard v. Lindmier, supra. The presumption is that the trial court was right. O'Malley (O'Mally) v. Eagan, 43 Wyo. 233, 244, 2 P.2d 1063, 1066, 77 A.L.R. 582. The Board must be assumed to have known the law on the point, to have obeyed it and in its deliberations to have considered all facts and circumstances relating to the needs, uses and benefits of each of the parties and of the people of the State of Wyoming. Jassman v. Wulfjen, 71 Wyo. 261, 257 P.2d 334, 337. OPINION

We have never decided and no applicable statute requires, specifically at least, that a holder of an expiring grazing lease, in order to have a preference right of renewal must necessarily make actual use of the leasehold by livestock personally owned. Nor have we determined what is included or excluded in the concept "need" or "actual and necessary use" for the land, so that the question before us is new, although we closely approached it, inferentially at least, in Jassman v. Wulfjen, Wyo., 257 P.2d 334, in which a party with a preference right was awarded a new lease, though it was apparent that she had no livestock and had leased her own land to another, and the need of the tenant was treated the same as the need of the landlord. In the recent case of Stauffer v. Johnson, Wyo., 259 P.2d 753, we held that for a lessee from the state to permit pasturing on the leased land by the livestock of another for a consideration, did not prevent the state from granting a renewal lease pursuant to a preference right of renewal.