Opinion
No. 3:01cv0318 AS
November 2, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On April 23, 2001, pro se plaintiff, Frank Jarver, an inmate at the Indiana State Prison, Michigan City, Indiana, filed a complaint purporting to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and invoking this Court's federal question subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343(3). The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed.R.Civ.P.) on July 29, 2002, which complies with the necessary mandates of Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1982). The plaintiff filed a response on November 22, 2002, which this Court has carefully examined. The plaintiff is a convicted felon serving a sentence imposed by a court in the State of Indiana.
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Bragg v. Navistar Int'l Trans. Corp., 164 F.3d 373 (7th Cir. 1998). Celotex addressed the initial burdens of the parties under Rule 56, and Anderson addressed the standards under which the record is to be analyzed within the structure of Rule 56.
The initial burden is on the moving party to demonstrate, "with or without supporting affidavits," the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that judgment as a matter of law should be granted in the moving party's favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 56); Larimer v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 137 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1998). A question of material fact is a question which will be outcome determinative of an issue in the case. The Supreme Court has instructed that the facts material in a specific case shall be determined by the substantive law controlling the given case or issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Once the moving party has met the initial burden, the opposing party must "go beyond the pleadings" and "designate `specific facts shows that there is a genuine [material] issue for trial.'" Id. The nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, Weicherding v. Riegel, 160 F.3d 1139 (7th Cir. 1998); Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 1994); nor may that party rely upon conclusory allegations in affidavits. Smith v. Shawnee Library Sys., 60 F.3d 317, 320 (7th Cir. 1995).
During its summary judgment analysis, the court must construe the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, it is required to analyze summary judgment motions under the standard of proof relevant to the case or issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252-55. Applying the above standard, this Court addresses defendants' motion.
It is also basic and elementary that Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 generally requires proof of more than negligence. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986), and Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). This case was filed on or about April 23, 2001, and has therefore been on file now for more than a year and-a-half. It deserves to be ruled upon in an expeditious manner. The incidents that apparently formed the basis of this plaintiff's complaint occurred while he was incarcerated in the Miami Correctional Facility in Bunker Hill, Indiana, which is in this district. He filed claims against four correctional officers claiming a violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which has been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment of that Constitution and is therefore binding on the state.
This Court is concerned here with the outer limits of Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), and does indeed have respect for the dissent of Justice Thomas there, but is necessarily bound by the majority opinion. There is a considerable necessity here to search this record carefully. Necessarily, there must be personal involvement in this § 1983 case. See Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988). In the case of the defendant Holt, even giving the plaintiff all of the best of it, the defendant Holt is entitled to summary judgment, which is now GRANTED.
The argument is advanced as to the remaining defendants that some species of qualified immunity is available under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). The Attorney General also relies on Saucier v. Katz, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001). It does not appear that the facts here fall into the conceptual pit outlined in Hope v. Pelzer, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (2002). However, this Court remains unconvinced that the claims as against Liddell, Mann and Wilson are subject to protection by Harlow, and this Court remains unconvinced that there are not issues of fact that must be resolved under the authority of the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Notwithstanding this, the plaintiff must give close attention to such cases as Sellers v. Henman, 41 F.3d 1100 (7th Cir. 1994), Pacelli v. DeVito, 972 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1992), McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 907 (1992), Salazar v. Chicago, 940 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1991), Holmes v. Sheahan, 930 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 960 (1992), Maul v. Constan, 928 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1991), and Graham v. Sauk Prairie Police Comm., 915 F.2d 1085 (7th Cir. 1990).
With reference to the claims as against the defendant Holt, summary judgment is GRANTED. With reference to the claims as against the defendants Liddell, Mann and Wilson, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED.