[Cit.]Jarrett v. Jarrett, 259 Ga. 560, 561 (1) ( 385 S.E.2d 279) (1989). See also Hendrix v. Stone, 261 Ga. 874 (1) ( 412 S.E.2d 536) (1992).
The February 18, 2014 temporary consent order provided that Moore's obligations to pay child support “terminated retroactively to January 31, 2014.” It is well settled that a child support judgment is enforceable until modified, vacated, or set aside. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 259 Ga. 560, 561(1), 385 S.E.2d 279 (1989). Although a permanent judgment of child support can be temporarily modified pending a final order in a modification action, OCGA § 19–6–19(c), a child support judgment cannot be modified retroactively.
Any modification of a child support award may operate prospectively only. See Robertson v. Robertson, 266 Ga. 516, 518 (1), 467 S.E.2d 556 (1996) ; Jarrett v. Jarrett, 259 Ga. 560, 561 (1), 385 S.E.2d 279 (1989). A forgiveness or reduction of child support arrears constitutes an improper retroactive modification.
See Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 244 Ga. 313, 314, 260 S.E.2d 47 (1979) (action for modification not part of original divorce action); McGuire v. McGuire, 228 Ga. 782, 786, 187 S.E.2d 859 (1972) (purpose in creation of statutory right to modify decree as to permanent alimony was to “remedy the ‘evil’... so as to allow by statute the modification of final decrees in Georgia courts”). See also Jarrett v. Jarrett, 259 Ga. 560(1), 385 S.E.2d 279 (1989) (permanent child support judgment is res judicata and enforceable until modified, vacated, or set aside). Accordingly, res judicata did not preclude the trial court from considering wife's petition to modify child support.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it set out the actual amount of child support to be paid by Mrs. Moon. The child support requirement does not preclude Mrs. Moon from seeking downward modification of her support obligation should she experience in the future a reduction in income that makes her child support payments fall outside the Guidelines. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 259 Ga. 560 (2) ( 385 S.E.2d 279) (1989). See also OCGA § 19-6-19.
Foster v. Foster, supra at 814 (2). See also Jarrett v. Jarrett, 259 Ga. 560, 561 (1) ( 385 S.E.2d 279) (1989) (recognizing that a child support judgment cannot be modified retroactively). Since the allegations in this suit are clearly such as would not render the judgment in the prior action void on its face, the effect of the instant action is to make a collateral attack on the judgment in the prior suit in violation of OCGA § 9-11-60 (a).Richardson v. Simmons, supra at 750.
It is equally well-established that an order modifying child support may operate only prospectively. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 259 Ga. 560(1) ( 385 S.E.2d 279) (1989). The purported compromise agreement was admitted, over appellant's objection, for the limited purpose of showing that appellee's contempt was not wilful. Pretermitting any issue concerning the validity of the agreement itself and whether the agreement was properly admitted for the stated purpose, it was error for the trial court to consider, in arriving at the amount of appellee's arrearage, evidence of the parties' intent to compromise appellee's support obligations under the final decree.
Self-executing and future modification provisions in the judgment of divorce undergo the necessary judicial scrutiny at the time of entry. See Weaver v. Jones, 260 Ga. 493 (396S.E.2d 890) (1990); Jarrett v. Jarrett, 259 Ga. 560 ( 385 S.E.2d 279) (1989); Cabaniss v. Cabaniss, 251 Ga. 177 ( 304 S.E.2d 65) (1983); Pearce v. Pearce, 244 Ga. 69 ( 257 S.E.2d 904)(1979). In the case at bar, the trial court found the existence of an oral agreement and, without more, made it the order of modification of the court.
We have, however, held that an order modifying a child support obligation can operate only prospectively. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 259 Ga. 560 (1) ( 385 S.E.2d 279) (1989); Skinner v. Skinner, 252 Ga. 512 (2) ( 314 S.E.2d 897) (1984); Butterworth v. Butterworth, 228 Ga. 277 (3) ( 185 S.E.2d 59) (1971). Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States, 2d ed., Vol. 2, § 17.6, p. 274.
(Punctuation omitted.) Jarrett v. Jarrett , 259 Ga. 560, 561 (1), 385 S.E.2d 279 (1989) ; see OCGA § 19-6-17 (e) (3) ("Any payment or installment of support under any child support order is, on and after the date due ... [n]ot subject to retroactive modification."). See Allen v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources , 264 Ga. 119, 120, 441 S.E.2d 754 (1994) (reversing an award because the trial court retroactively increased the child support obligation to the date of the modification action); see also Galvin v. Galvin , 288 Ga. 125, 126 (1), 702 S.E.2d 155 (2010) (holding that the trial court did not err by refusing to make a downward modification of child support retroactive to the date the father sought modification because "[t]he modification of a support obligation payable in installments pursuant to a judgment is effective no earlier than the date of the judgment of modification").