Opinion
No. 2 CA-HC 2017-0001
03-06-2018
WILFREDO JARAMILLO, Petitioner/Appellant, v. STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent/Appellee.
COUNSEL Barton & Storts, P.C., Tucson By Brick P. Storts, III Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General By Louis Caputo and Aubrey Joy Corcoran, Assistant Attorneys General, Phoenix Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. A20060008
The Honorable Richard S. Fields, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Barton & Storts, P.C., Tucson
By Brick P. Storts, III
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
By Louis Caputo and Aubrey Joy Corcoran,
Assistant Attorneys General, Phoenix
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Espinosa authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Vásquez and Judge Eppich concurred. ESPINOSA, Judge:
¶1 Wilfredo Jaramillo appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking immediate release from the Arizona Community Protection and Treatment Center (ACPTC). We affirm the court's dismissal order.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 In 2007, Wilfredo Jaramillo was committed to ACPTC pursuant to Arizona's Sexually Violent Persons Act (SVPA). In re Commitment of Jaramillo (Jaramillo I), 217 Ariz. 460, ¶ 1 (App. 2008); see also A.R.S. §§ 36-3701 to 36-3717. We affirmed his commitment on appeal. Jaramillo I, 217 Ariz. 460, ¶ 1.
¶3 In 2011, Jaramillo petitioned the trial court for absolute discharge. In re Commitment of Jaramillo (Jaramillo II), 229 Ariz. 581, ¶ 2 (App. 2012); see also A.R.S. § 36-3714(B) (providing SVP may "annually petition[] the court for discharge without the approval of the superintendent of the state hospital or the director of the department of health services"). In the alternative, he asked the court to order ACPTC to provide treatment consistent with the recommendation of his evaluating psychologist, Dr. Jerry Day. Jaramillo II, 229 Ariz. 581, ¶ 2. Day had "opined that Jaramillo's 'profound delusion system' prevented the treatment currently provided from being effective and recommended that ACPTC provide treatment for Jaramillo's delusions in addition to the treatment it was already providing." Id. ¶ 3.
¶4 In affirming the trial court's denial of Jaramillo's petition for discharge under the SVPA, we concluded "nothing in the SVPA . . . gives the trial court authority to mandate a particular treatment plan in these circumstances." Id. ¶¶ 8, 13. Despite the absence of a statutory cause of action, we further observed that Jaramillo might seek special action relief, stating, "At its core, his claim is that the ACPTC has failed to perform its duty to provide adequate treatment. A person may, via special action, bring a claim that a government official has failed to fulfill a duty required by law." Id. ¶ 12.
¶5 Jaramillo has since unsuccessfully challenged his treatment plan in SVPA annual review proceedings and by petitions for habeas corpus relief, relying on the same or similar opinions offered by Dr. Day. See In Re Pima Cty. Mental Health No. A20060008, No. 2 CA-MH 2014-0002-SP, ¶¶ 3-4 (Ariz. App. Nov. 14, 2014) (mem. decision). In January 2017, he filed, in the division of the Pima County Superior Court assigned to his SVPA proceedings, a petition for writ of habeas corpus naming "The State of Arizona," and the court consolidated the habeas and SVPA proceedings. He served the petition on Cara Christ, as Director of the Arizona Department of Health Services, as well as a representative of the Pima County Attorney's Office. The latter office filed a response to the petition, seeking its dismissal, and the Arizona Attorney General, representing Christ, filed a motion to dismiss. On May 16, 2017, the court granted Christ's motion to dismiss, and this appeal followed.
Jaramillo has twice petitioned for special action relief in this court, but we have declined jurisdiction, noting his failure to comply with Rules 4(b) and 7(b), Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. See Jaramillo v. Humble, No. 2 CA-SA 2013-0061 (Ariz. App. Aug. 15, 2013) (dec. order); Jaramillo v. Humble, No. 2 CA-SA 2012-0045 (Ariz. App. June 13, 2012) (dec. order). Rule 7(b) requires our dismissal of a petition that fails to explain why it was filed in an appellate court when it "might lawfully have been initiated in a lower court"; Rule (4)(b) requires a superior court special action against "a state officer or body" to be brought "either in Maricopa County" or in Jaramillo's "county of residence," which is Maricopa County, and further directs any appellate court special action to be brought "before whichever Court of Appeals has territorial jurisdiction over the county in which the action might have been brought." --------
Discussion
¶6 On appeal, Jaramillo argues the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his petition for habeas corpus relief. He contends the state has violated his substantive due process rights by failing to offer treatment "that has a real potential for being effective," and he asserts this failure renders "his confinement at the ACPTC . . . punitive and illegal," entitling him to immediate release. He also argues the court improperly considered Cara Christ's motion to dismiss, asserting she lacked standing to challenge his habeas corpus petition.
Failure to State a Claim for Habeas Corpus Relief
¶7 We review the denial of a writ of habeas corpus for abuse of discretion. State v. Cowles, 207 Ariz. 8, ¶ 3 (App. 2004). "[T]he purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to test the legality and correctness of a prisoner's judgment and confinement." Griswold v. Gomes, 111 Ariz. 59, 62 (1974). Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4121, "[a] person unlawfully committed, detained, confined or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatever, may petition for and prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint." But habeas corpus is not the "appropriate means to order something less than 'absolute release'" or to remedy conditions of confinement. Long v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 180 Ariz. 490, 494 (App. 1994), quoting Escalanti v. Dep't of Corr., 174 Ariz. 526, 527 n.1 (App. 1993); Foggy v. State ex rel. Eyman, 107 Ariz. 532, 533-34 (1971) (habeas corpus "may not be utilized for the purpose of correcting alleged mistreatment of a prison inmate by prison authorities subsequent to valid judgment and commitment"), quoting In re Dutton, 95 Ariz. 96, 97 (1963); see also Goodman v. State, 96 Ariz. 139, 142 (1964) ("Relief cannot be granted while petitioner is still lawfully held in custody."). Rather, a writ of habeas corpus may be used "only to review matters affecting a court's jurisdiction"; thus, if a petitioner alleges a denial of due process, a writ will issue only if the due process violation is "such as to deprive a court of jurisdiction." In re Oppenheimer, 95 Ariz. 292, 297 (1964); cf. State ex rel. Murphy v. Superior Court, 25 Ariz. 226, 230 (1923) (habeas relief requires showing that petitioner "did not have a fair and impartial trial before a court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the question of his guilt").
¶8 In his habeas petition below, Jaramillo did not dispute the legality of his original commitment pursuant to the SVPA, based on findings that he had been "found guilty but insane of a sexually violent offense" and "[h]as a mental disorder that makes [him] likely to engage in acts of sexual violence," A.R.S. § 36-3701(7). Nor did he dispute the trial court's determinations, in annual reviews through 2016, that he continued to meet this definition of a sexually violent person and that his continued commitment to ACPTC was therefore warranted. See § 36-3714(C) (at hearing on SVP's petition for discharge, "the state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the person's mental disorder has not changed and that the person remains a danger to others and is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if discharged"). Instead, he alleged in his petition that he "is being illegally detained," in violation of his due process rights, because he is not receiving "the treatment contemplated by the SVP laws, which are intended to restore the person to a condition in which they will no longer be likely to engage [in] acts of sexual violence." He requested his "release . . . from unlawful detention" or a "demonstrat[ion that] the ACPTC will secure mental health professional(s) that have the ability to provide the type of treatment required for Mr. Jaramillo to successfully respond."
¶9 Jaramillo thus seeks relief from the conditions of his confinement; his allegations implicate neither the trial court's jurisdiction nor the fairness of court proceedings that have resulted in his continued commitment pursuant to the SVPA. Accordingly, he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. See Foggy, 107 Ariz. at 533-34; Murphy, 25 Ariz. at 230. And because his petition was facially inadequate, the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing it. See Findlay v. Lewis, 172 Ariz. 343, 345 (1992) (trial court properly dismissed, for failure to state a claim, habeas petition that sought transfer to Utah prison); see also Oppenheimer, 95 Ariz. at 299 (petitions for habeas relief "based upon identical grounds" as previous petitions will be dismissed without a hearing).
¶10 Our conclusion is unaltered by Jaramillo's assertion of a substantive due process violation or his reliance on Fuller v. Olson, 233 Ariz. 468 (App. 2013), and Martin v. Reinstein, 195 Ariz. 293 (App. 1999). In Fuller, a petitioner for habeas corpus relief had been detained at the Arizona State Hospital on an SVPA petition for more than a year, without trial ever being set, despite a statutory provision that he be tried within one hundred twenty days. 233 Ariz. 468, ¶¶ 1-4, 6, 16; see also § 36-3706. After the trial court denied Fuller's habeas petition and his motion to dismiss the SVPA proceeding, he filed a consolidated appeal and special action petition, appealing from the habeas ruling and seeking special action relief from the denial of his motion to dismiss. Fuller, 233 Ariz. 468, ¶¶ 4, 17.
¶11 In addressing that habeas corpus claim, we concluded Fuller, who had been long-detained without opportunity for the prompt determination of SVP status contemplated by statute, was entitled to release. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8-9, 17. In determining he was also entitled to special action relief from the denial of his motion to dismiss, we considered the prejudice resulting from Fuller's illegal detention, distinguishing the prejudice resulting from delay in an SVPA proceeding from that associated with a criminal trial. Id. ¶¶ 10-15. We noted our determination in Martin that one of the purposes of the SVPA is to "provid[e] services to ameliorate the condition causing confinement," and we concluded, "When persons who ultimately are determined to be sexually violent are denied timely process under title 36, they suffer commensurate delays in the professional treatment for their condition and in the periodic reviews of their progress that could result in their release from confinement." Id. ¶ 13 (citation omitted); see also Martin, 195 Ariz. 293, ¶ 26 (two-fold objective of SVPA is to "(1) protect society by sequestering the sexual psychopath so long as he remains a menace to others, and (2) subject him to treatment to the end that he might recover from his psychopathic condition and be rehabilitated"), quoting V. Woerner, Annotation, Statutes Relating to Sexual Psychopaths, 24 A.L.R.2d 350, 351 (1952).
¶12 In its ruling dismissing Jaramillo's habeas corpus petition, the trial court concluded, "Fuller offers no relief under these circumstances," noting that, unlike Fuller, Jaramillo "has already been tried and found an SVP, has been given years of treatment opportunities, years of annual trials resulting in being found a continued danger to society, and years of refusal to participate in treatment." On appeal, Jaramillo simply "submits the court incorrectly distinguished" Fuller, but he offers no explanation for that assertion. We find the trial court's distinction well-reasoned and correct and, like that court, we conclude Fuller affords no relief here.
¶13 Jaramillo's reliance on Martin is similarly unavailing. He correctly notes this court's approval of a trial court's determination that the SVPA is "'a regulatory act for the treatment of respondents and for the protection of the community'" and was therefore "civil, not criminal, in nature." Martin, 195 Ariz. 293, ¶ 20. But without citation to any authority, Jaramillo then asserts, "If the State lacks the ability to treat [Jaramillo] in a manner that has a real potential for being effective, then [his] substantive due process rights are violated, and his confinement at the ACPTC is punitive and illegal." Nothing in Martin suggests that someone like Jaramillo, whose confinement for dangerous mental illness continues to be warranted under the procedural protections afforded by the SVPA, is entitled to immediate release because the treatment offered by the ACPTC has been unsuccessful.
¶14 In sum, Jaramillo has developed no argument to support his conclusory assertion that the insufficiency of his treatment at the ACPTC is a violation of substantive due process that renders his confinement "punitive and illegal" and subject to habeas corpus relief. Contrary authority suggests otherwise. For example, in Kansas v. Hendricks, the United States Supreme Court observed:
[W]e have never held that the Constitution prevents a State from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is available, but who nevertheless pose a danger to others. A State could hardly be seen as furthering a "punitive"
purpose by involuntarily confining persons afflicted with an untreatable, highly contagious disease.521 U.S. 346, 366 (1997). And, in Seling v. Young, the Supreme Court rejected a petitioner's federal habeas claim that he was entitled to release because of conditions of his confinement under a Washington statute pertaining to "sexually violent predators." 531 U.S. 250, 253, 267 (2001). The Court noted, "Whether a confinement scheme is punitive has been the threshold question for some constitutional challenges." Id. at 266, citing, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987) (substantive due process claim). Although the Washington statute previously had been determined to be civil in nature and constitutionally permissible, Young argued it was nonetheless punitive "as applied" to him, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted relief. Id. at 253-54. But the Supreme Court "reject[ed] the Ninth Circuit's 'as-applied' analysis for double jeopardy and ex post facto claims as fundamentally flawed" and "unworkable," suggesting a claim that the Washington law was punitive as to an individual petitioner would constitute an impermissible "end run" around the prior determination that it was civil in nature. Id. at 263-65. The Court further observed, "It is for the Washington courts to determine whether the Center is operating in accordance with state law and provide a remedy." Id. at 265. In Jaramillo II, we noted that Jaramillo might pursue such a claim in a petition for special action relief filed in the appropriate forum. 229 Ariz. 581, ¶ 12, citing Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 3(a), (c); see also supra, n.1. In the instant matter, the trial court correctly concluded that Jaramillo failed to state a claim for habeas corpus relief.
Cara Christ's Standing to Seek Dismissal
¶15 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4122, an application for a writ of habeas corpus must "nam[e] all the parties," including "the officer or person by whom [the subject of the petition] is . . . confined or restrained." Although the caption of Jaramillo's petition below identified only the State of Arizona as a respondent, without naming the officer or person confining him, it nonetheless provided that he "is currently being detained at the [ACPTC], under the supervision of the director of the Arizona State Hospital, Cara M. Christ," pursuant to court order. Jaramillo's service of the petition on Dr. Christ further evinces his recognition that she is a proper respondent to his petition.
¶16 As we understand his arguments, Jaramillo maintains Dr. Christ lacked standing to file a motion to dismiss the habeas action because she had not appeared in the SVPA proceeding. By analogy to cases addressing a party's standing to appeal from a lower court's decision, he also asserts she was not "aggrieved" by his confinement. We are not persuaded by these arguments, however, as they conflate Jaramillo's habeas corpus proceeding with his SVPA matter or with a non-existent appeal by Christ. Jaramillo provides no authority for the proposition that Christ's motion to dismiss was an improper response to the service of his petition for habeas corpus relief. Indeed, our supreme court has dismissed, sua sponte, a "petition showing no legal grounds for . . . issuance[]" of a writ of habeas corpus. People ex rel. Gusick v. Eyman, 81 Ariz. 206, 207 (1956); see also Findlay, 172 Ariz. at 345 (before issuing writ of habeas corpus, court considers facial validity of petition); Oppenheimer, 95 Ariz. at 299 (dismissing repetitive petitions for habeas relief "based upon identical grounds" as previous petitions; allegations of legal conclusions, without more, insufficient to support issuance of writ).
Disposition
¶17 The trial court's dismissal of Jaramillo's petition for writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.