The split is not extreme. Cf. Berger, 277 Mich App at 722 (holding that a 70-30 split constituted punishment where trial court's distribution appeared to be punishment for the defendant's affair); Jansen v Jansen, 205 Mich App 169, 171; 517 NW2d 275 (1994) (concluding that a the trial court's 23-77 split of marital property was not justified by a finding of fault). Defendant next argues that the trial court should have ordered plaintiff to pay the equalization payment immediately because she received liquid assets in the property distribution.
The trial court's valuation of $412,000 for the property is within the range of values established by the proofs, and therefore, is not clearly erroneous. Jansen v Jansen, 205 Mich App 169, 171; 517 NW2d 275 (1994) (stating that "where a trial court's valuation of a marital asset is within the range established by the proofs, no clear error is present"). Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider the full amount of debt associated with the property, when calculating the property's value.
If the trial court's value of any given asset is within the range established by the evidence then there is no clear error. Jansen v Jansen, 205 Mich App 169, 171; 517 NW2d 275 (1994). The trial court is in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses.
Because of the difficulty in determining the value of stock in a closely held corporation, the trial court is given great latitude in determining the valuation. Jansen v Jansen, 205 Mich App 169, 171; 517 NW2d 275 (1994). There is no error in the valuation if the determination falls within the range of the evidence presented.
It follows that the division of property "need not be equal, but it must be equitable." Jansen v Jansen, 205 Mich.App. 169, 171; 517 N.W.2d 275 (1994). While equality is not the goal, a trial court still must clearly explain "any significant departures from congruence." Welling, 233 Mich.App. at 710.
According to David's calculations, the trial court's property award resulted in him receiving only 36.89 % of the marital estate while plaintiff, Rhonda Blaisdell, received 63.11 % of it. He asserts that, given the disparity in the division of assets (particularly in the division of marital debt), the trial court's award was not "roughly congruent" as required by Jansen v Jansen, 205 Mich.App. 169; 517 N.W.2d 275 (1994). For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm.
"[W]here a trial court's valuation of a marital asset is within the range established by the proofs, no clear error is present." Jansen v Jansen, 205 Mich.App. 169, 171; 517 N.W.2d 275 (1994).
As for defendants contention that, once the trial court rejected the appraisal value, there was no evidence left in the record from which owelty could be calculated, this argument ignores both the equitable nature of owelty, which gives rise to the trial court exercising its discretion, and that when the trial court acts as the fact-finder for the value of an asset, a trial court is free to accept either party's valuation or to find some middle ground. See Pelton v Pelton, 167 Mich.App. 22, 25-26; 421 N.W.2d 560 (1988) and Jansen v Jansen, 205 Mich.App. 169, 171; 517 N.W.2d 275 (1994) (holding that there is no clear error where a trial court's valuation of a marital asset is within the range established by the proofs).
This was a factual question, which we review for clear error. Jansen v Jansen, 205 Mich.App. 169, 171; 517 N.W.2d 275 (1994). In doing so, we give due regard "to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it."
"[W]here a trial court's valuation of a marital asset is within the range established by the proofs, no clear error is present." Jansen v Jansen, 205 Mich.App. 169, 171; 517 N.W.2d 275 (1994). A. MARITAL HOME