Summary
In Janco v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 164 Pa.Super. 128, 63 A.2d 138, the trial court entered judgment on the pleadings for plaintiff-beneficiary. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed this decision and directed judgment be entered for defendant.
Summary of this case from Wilmington Trust Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co.Opinion
October 5, 1948.
January 14, 1949.
Insurance — Life — Exclusion of risks — Result clauses — Status clauses — Military service — Death in airplane.
Where it appeared that a policy of life insurance provided that death was not a risk assumed where (a) death occurred while the insured was serving outside the United States in the military service of any country at war; (b) death resulted from service, training, travel, or flight in aircraft (when the insured was not a fare-paying passenger); and (c) death occurred within two years from the date of the policy as a result of war while the insured was outside the United States; and where it further appeared that the insured was killed within the United States, while a member of the Army Air Force in the late war, as the result of a crash of an airplane in which he was flying and training as a part of his military duties; it was Held that (1) clause (b) was a result clause, and the death of the insured fell squarely within it; (2) clause (a) was a status clause, with a geographical limitation, and there was no ambiguity nor conflict between it and clause (b); (3) clauses (a) and (b) related to entirely different things, and clause (a) did not prevail over clause (b); (4) clause (c) was a result clause, geographically limited, and there was no ambiguity nor conflict between it and clause (b); and (5) judgment should be entered for the defendant.
Before RHODES, P.J., HIRT, RENO, DITHRICH, ROSS, ARNOLD and FINE, JJ.
Appeal, No. 66, Oct. T., 1948, from judgment of Municipal Court, Philadelphia Co., June T., 1944, No. 400, in case of John Janco v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company. Judgment reversed.
Assumpsit.
Defendant's rule for judgment dismissed and judgment entered for plaintiff, opinion by BONNELLY, J. Defendant appealed.
William H. Peace, 2nd, with him Ira Jewell Williams and White, Williams Scott, for appellant. Abe J. Goldin, for appellee.
Argued October 5, 1948.
The plaintiff brought this action in assumpsit as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy issued by the defendant. All the facts appeared in the pleadings, and upon motion thereon judgment went for the plaintiff and defendant appealed.
The insured was a member of the Army Air Force in the late war, and was killed in Alabama as the result of a crash of an airplane in which he was training and flying as a part of his military duties.
The defense was that the policy contained the following: ". . . that death as hereinafter described is not a risk assumed under the Policy and in the event of such death the liability of the Company shall be limited as hereinafter set forth.
"(a) . . .
"(b) Death which results from service, training, travel, flight, ascent or descent in, on or from any species of aircraft; except death that results from travel as a fare-paying passenger on a licensed aircraft operated by a licensed passenger pilot on a scheduled passenger air service regularly offered between specified airports.
"(c) . . .
"In the event of any such death, the liability of the Company shall be limited to the amount of premiums paid on the Policy [less dividends and plus interest] . . ."
The plaintiff admitted in the pleadings that the insured was not a fare-paying passenger.
Clause (b) above quoted is a result clause. See Wolford v. The Equitable Life Insurance Company of Iowa, 162 Pa. Super. 259, 57 A.2d 581. Therefore, unless something else appears, the insured fell squarely within sub-paragraph (b) above quoted, and could not recover.
Allocatur refused by the Supreme Court.
The appellee attempts to answer this, first, by calling attention to sub-paragraph (a) which reads: "Death while the Insured is serving outside the forty-eight states of the United States, . . . in the military or naval or air forces of any country at war . . ." This clause is a status clause with a geographic limitation, i.e. "outside the forty-eight states." It is not in conflict with sub-paragraph (b). See Wolford v. The Equitable Life Insurance Company, supra. Appellee next calls attention to sub-paragraph (c) which reads: "Death within two years from the date of issue of the Policy, as a result of war or any cause incident thereto . . . while the Insured is outside the States of the United States . . ." This is also a result clause, geographically limited, under which it is immaterial whether the insured was in the military service or not. It denies recovery where the death is the "result of war or any cause incident thereto" while the insured is outside the United States. Under sub-paragraph (c), except for the geographical limitation, the insured would have been denied recovery under Selenack, Admr., v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 160 Pa. Super. 242, 50 A.2d 736. There is no ambiguity between the status clause (a), geographically limited, and the result clause (b) denying liability where death results in connection with aircraft (when not a fare-paying passenger). Likewise clause (b) is not in conflict or ambiguous when read with the result clause (c), i.e., death as the result of war while the insured is outside the United States. Cf. Wolford v. The Equitable Life Insurance Company, supra, and see Caruso v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. (N.J.), 53 A.2d 222, affirmed in 57 A.2d 359; Provident Life Acc. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 166 Fed. 2d 492 (Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals); Selenack, Admr., v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 160 Pa. Super. 242, 244, 50 A.2d 736; Hyfer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (Mass.), 61 N.E.2d 3; and McKanna v. Continental Assur. Co. (Kan.), 194 P.2d 515, in which the court refused to follow the opinion of the court below in the instant case.
The argument is also advanced that the status provision (geographically limited) in clause (a) "prevails" over the result provision of clause (b). No authority is cited for such a proposition. The two clauses are entirely different, relate to entirely different things, and each clause stands on its own particular wording.
Judgment reversed and now entered for appellant.