The purpose of the sanctions ... is to coerce this cooperation rather than to dispose of litigation as a form of punishment.” Jancauskas v. Tow Motor Corp. 126 Ill.App.2d 289, 261 N.E.2d 753, 755 (1970). Ordinarily, our rule's automatic reimbursement provision for “reasonable expenses incurred because of any noncompliance” with a court order will mitigate the harms caused by simple negligence and oversight.

• 1 The plaintiff contends the court abused its discretion because there was no showing of a deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority. ( Booth v. Sutton (1968), 100 Ill. App.2d 410.) Under the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, § 59), the trial judge has broad discretion in allowing or denying a motion for a continuance, but such discretion must be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. ( Jancauskasv. Tow Motor Corp. (1970), 126 Ill. App.2d 289.) A decisive consideration in evaluating the exercise of discretion is whether the party applying for a continuance has shown a lack of due diligence in proceeding with the cause. ( Krupinski v. Dension (1956), 9 Ill. App.2d 155.)

"[T]he purpose of sanctions. . . is to coerce . . . cooperation rather than to dispose of litigation as a form of punishment." Estate of Lewis v. Lewis, 229 Ariz. 316, ¶ 17 (App. 2012), quoting Jancauskas v. Tow Motor Corp., 261 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Ill. App. 1970). "Drastic sanctions running counter to that policy therefore are disfavored and must be based on a determination of willfulness or bad faith by the party being sanctioned."

"'The purpose of the sanctions . . . is to coerce [a party's] cooperation rather than to dispose of litigation as a form of punishment.'" Id. at ¶ 17 (quoting Jancauskas v. Tow Motor Corp., 261 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970)). Therefore, the sanction imposed "must be appropriate to the circumstances."

The exercise of such discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion or a palpable injustice. ( Kincl v. Hycel, Inc. (1977), 56 Ill. App.3d 772, 790, 372 N.E.2d 385, appeal denied (1978), 71 Ill.2d 603; Needy v. Sparks (1977), 51 Ill. App.3d 350, 358, 366 N.E.2d 327, appeal denied (1977), 66 Ill.2d 639.) A trial court should not refuse to grant a continuance where the ends of justice clearly require it. ( Bullistron, 52 Ill. App.3d 66, 70.) As stated in Jancauskas v. Tow Motor Corp. (1970), 126 Ill. App.2d 289, 292, 261 N.E.2d 753: "The dismissal of a party's cause of action is drastic punishment and should not be invoked except in those cases where the actions of the party show a deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority."

(See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, par. 59.) Such discretion, however, must be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. ( Jancauskas v. Tow Motor Corp. (1970), 126 Ill. App.2d 289, 261 N.E.2d 753.) In the instant case we do not deem the trial court's denial of the motion for a continuance to be an abuse of discretion.

• 2 Within this context, a court should not refuse a continuance where the ends of justice clearly require it and any abuse in so doing will justify reversal. ( Reecy v. Reecy (1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 1024, 271 N.E.2d 91.) As stated in Jancauskas v. Tow Motor Corp: (1970), 126 Ill. App.2d 289, 292, 261 N.E.2d 753, 755: "The dismissal of a party's cause of action is drastic punishment and should not be invoked except in those cases where the actions of the party show a deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority."

The record in the instant case fails to show any act on the part of the plaintiff to warrant so drastic a punishment. Jancauskas v. Tow Motor Corp., 126 Ill. App.2d 289. • 3 The dismissal of a party's cause of action is drastic punishment and should not be invoked except in those cases where the actions of the party show a deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority.