Jancauskas v. Tow Motor Corp.

8 Citing cases

  1. Lewis v. Lewis (In re Estate of Lewis)

    229 Ariz. 316 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 32 times
    In Lewis, the superior court sanctioned the plaintiff for failing to comply with the court's discovery order by dismissing the case.

    The purpose of the sanctions ... is to coerce this cooperation rather than to dispose of litigation as a form of punishment.” Jancauskas v. Tow Motor Corp. 126 Ill.App.2d 289, 261 N.E.2d 753, 755 (1970). Ordinarily, our rule's automatic reimbursement provision for “reasonable expenses incurred because of any noncompliance” with a court order will mitigate the harms caused by simple negligence and oversight.

  2. Duran v. Chicago N.W. Ry. Co.

    26 Ill. App. 3d 645 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)   Cited 7 times
    In Duran, the appellate court found the trial court's denial of the motion for a continuance filed by the plaintiff's counsel was an abuse of discretion where the record showed plaintiff had been diligent in prosecuting her case and was justified in believing she would be granted a final continuance for the purpose of bringing in a material witness who was in delicate health from outside the country.

    • 1 The plaintiff contends the court abused its discretion because there was no showing of a deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority. ( Booth v. Sutton (1968), 100 Ill. App.2d 410.) Under the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, § 59), the trial judge has broad discretion in allowing or denying a motion for a continuance, but such discretion must be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. ( Jancauskasv. Tow Motor Corp. (1970), 126 Ill. App.2d 289.) A decisive consideration in evaluating the exercise of discretion is whether the party applying for a continuance has shown a lack of due diligence in proceeding with the cause. ( Krupinski v. Dension (1956), 9 Ill. App.2d 155.)

  3. In re $119,805 in U.S. Currency

    No. 2 CA-CV 2017-0136 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jul. 11, 2018)

    "[T]he purpose of sanctions. . . is to coerce . . . cooperation rather than to dispose of litigation as a form of punishment." Estate of Lewis v. Lewis, 229 Ariz. 316, ¶ 17 (App. 2012), quoting Jancauskas v. Tow Motor Corp., 261 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Ill. App. 1970). "Drastic sanctions running counter to that policy therefore are disfavored and must be based on a determination of willfulness or bad faith by the party being sanctioned."

  4. Leyva v. Dome Ctr., L.L.C.

    No. 1 CA-CV 13-0587 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2015)

    "'The purpose of the sanctions . . . is to coerce [a party's] cooperation rather than to dispose of litigation as a form of punishment.'" Id. at ¶ 17 (quoting Jancauskas v. Tow Motor Corp., 261 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970)). Therefore, the sanction imposed "must be appropriate to the circumstances."

  5. Curtin v. Ogborn

    75 Ill. App. 3d 549 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 28 times
    Upholding a 10% liquidated damages provision

    The exercise of such discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion or a palpable injustice. ( Kincl v. Hycel, Inc. (1977), 56 Ill. App.3d 772, 790, 372 N.E.2d 385, appeal denied (1978), 71 Ill.2d 603; Needy v. Sparks (1977), 51 Ill. App.3d 350, 358, 366 N.E.2d 327, appeal denied (1977), 66 Ill.2d 639.) A trial court should not refuse to grant a continuance where the ends of justice clearly require it. ( Bullistron, 52 Ill. App.3d 66, 70.) As stated in Jancauskas v. Tow Motor Corp. (1970), 126 Ill. App.2d 289, 292, 261 N.E.2d 753: "The dismissal of a party's cause of action is drastic punishment and should not be invoked except in those cases where the actions of the party show a deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority."

  6. Tamimie v. City of Galesburg

    365 N.E.2d 1177 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)   Cited 4 times

    (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, par. 59.) Such discretion, however, must be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. ( Jancauskas v. Tow Motor Corp. (1970), 126 Ill. App.2d 289, 261 N.E.2d 753.) In the instant case we do not deem the trial court's denial of the motion for a continuance to be an abuse of discretion.

  7. Bullistron v. Augustana Hospital

    367 N.E.2d 88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)   Cited 11 times

    • 2 Within this context, a court should not refuse a continuance where the ends of justice clearly require it and any abuse in so doing will justify reversal. ( Reecy v. Reecy (1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 1024, 271 N.E.2d 91.) As stated in Jancauskas v. Tow Motor Corp: (1970), 126 Ill. App.2d 289, 292, 261 N.E.2d 753, 755: "The dismissal of a party's cause of action is drastic punishment and should not be invoked except in those cases where the actions of the party show a deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority."

  8. Conover v. Smith

    20 Ill. App. 3d 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974)   Cited 24 times
    Holding that "an order declaring a mistrial is not a final and appealable order"

    The record in the instant case fails to show any act on the part of the plaintiff to warrant so drastic a punishment. Jancauskas v. Tow Motor Corp., 126 Ill. App.2d 289. • 3 The dismissal of a party's cause of action is drastic punishment and should not be invoked except in those cases where the actions of the party show a deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority.