Opinion
TSRCV144006034S
07-14-2016
Michael Antonio James (#113879) v. State Prison Warden
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Samuel J. Sferrazza, S.J.
The petitioner, Michael James, seeks habeas corpus relief from a total, effective sentence of twelve years imprisonment followed by three years special parole imposed, after a jury trial, for the crimes of two sales of crack cocaine by a non-drug-dependent person in a file designated docket no. CR-06-157646; and for violations of probation, following a hearing, in files docket nos. CR-05-151303 and CR-05-151900. The narcotics convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, State v. James, 297 Conn. 911, 995 A.2d 639 (2010). It appears that the petitioner never appealed from the violation of probation determinations.
The petitioner filed a habeas corpus action collaterally attacking the drug sale convictions, which petition was denied, James v. Warden, Superior Court, Tolland JD, docket no. CV-09-4003098, (June 3, 2010), Fuger, J. Also, the petitioner filed another habeas case that was also denied, James v. Warden, Superior Court, Tolland JD, docket no. CV-07-4001911, (May 31, 2011), Schuman, J. In that habeas action, the petitioner attempted to overturn his violation of probation adjudications, and Attorney Edward Joy represented him in that endeavor. The Appellate Court dismissed that appeal on May 1, 2013, in docket file AC33055.
In the present habeas action, the petitioner asserts, in two counts, that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel, Attorney Annette Lawrence, and habeas counsel, Attorney Edward Joy, respectively. The respondent denies that either lawyer was constitutionally deficient and that, as to the first count, the claim is barred by res judicata. The respondent also moves to dismiss the first count as a successive petition.
MOTION TO DISMISS
The respondent submits that this court ought to dismiss the first count, which decries the representation of trial counsel, because the petitioner previously litigated and lost an ineffective assistance case regarding Attorney Lawrence in case docket no. CV-07-401911. Practice Book § 23-29(3) empowers a habeas court to dismiss a habeas claim that was previously denied if the latter case presents the same ground for relief.
The earlier, unsuccessful habeas matters addressed the violation of probation hearings and criminal proceedings separately. The present specification of ineffective assistance alleges that Attorney Lawrence acted beneath acceptable professional standards regarding both cases, conjointly, concerning global plea disposition negotiations. Although it poses a close question as to whether the instant claim presents a specification of ineffective assistance that could have been asserted in the earlier proceedings, the court will apply the doctrine that favors decisions on the merits and deny the motion to dismiss.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIMS
Before beginning a discussion of these contentions, the court notes that Attorney Joy only represented the petitioner in the habeas case that assailed the violation of probation judgments. It is an interesting issue whether Attorney Joy could ever be found delinquent with respect to a habeas case for which he was not counsel, namely the one dealing with the criminal proceedings for the drug sale charges. There is no allegation that Attorney Joy had an obligation to become habeas counsel in the other case or to seek consolidation of the two habeas cases. The untangling of that issue waits for another day.
Because the issue of whether Attorney Lawrence provided effective assistance is dispositive as to both counts, the court addresses these counts in tandem.
In Lozada v. Warden, 223 Conn. 834, 613 A.2d 818 (1992), our Supreme Court recognized a purely statutory right to raise, in a second habeas action, a claim of ineffective assistance on the part of previous habeas counsel in presenting claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Id. at 835. However, the petitioner's burden becomes a two-tiered application of the Strickland standard by which allegations of ineffective assistance claims are gauged, Id. at 842. To succeed in his bid for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner must prove both (1) that his appointed habeas counsel was ineffective, and (2) that his trial counsel was ineffective, id. (emphasis added). Also, the petitioner must prove that, but for the derelictions of habeas counsel, he was prejudiced in the sense that the outcome of the first habeas case was suspect, and that burden demands proof of the existence of a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the original, criminal trial would have been different, Id., at 842-43. The Supreme Court described this double-layered obligation as " a herculean task, " Id., at 843.
Our Supreme Court has adopted the two-pronged Strickland test for evaluating ineffective assistance claims. Johnson v. Commissioner, 218 Conn. 403, 425, 589 A.2d 1214; Ostolaza v. Warden, 26 Conn.App. 758, 761, 603 A.2d 768 (1992). The Strickland criteria require that the petitioner demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, both that his attorney's performance was substandard and that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Id.
As to the performance prong of Strickland, the petitioner must establish that trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Johnson v. Commissioner, supra .
This standard of reasonableness is measured by prevailing, professional norms. Id. The habeas court must make every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight and to reconstruct the circumstances surrounding counsel's conduct from that attorney's perspective at the time of the representation. Id.
If it is easier to dispose of a claim of ineffective assistance on the ground of insufficient proof of prejudice, the habeas court may address that issue directly without reaching the question of counsel's competence. Pelletier v. Warden, 32 Conn.App. 38, 46, 627 A.2d 1363 (1993). In order to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, the petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there exists a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Levine v. Manson, 195 Conn. 636, 640, 490 A.2d 82 (1985). Reasonable probability means a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict. DaEira v. Comm'r of Corr., 107 Conn.App. 539, 542-43, 946 A.2d 249 (2008), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 911, 957 A.2d 877 (2008); that is, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that he remains burdened by an unreliable determination of guilt. Id. Thus, the failure of the petitioner to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, either that allegations against trial counsel or habeas counsel or the requisite prejudice as to both the first habeas case and the criminal trial will defeat a claim for habeas corpus relief in the present action.
Consequently, a determination as to the factual presence of prejudice will resolve the legal questions for both counts.
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court recognized the legitimate use of habeas corpus as a source of relief when an inmate contends that trial counsel inadequately communicated to the client information necessary for the client to make a prudent decision whether or not to accept a plea offer before the offer lapsed, Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012). The legal analyses of these cases were adopted by the Connecticut Supreme Court, Ebron v. Comm'r of Corr., 307 Conn. 342, 53 A.3d 983 (2012).
In order to meet the prejudice component as adopted by the Ebron case, the petitioner has to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that, but for his attorney's missteps, he would have changed his plea to guilty in order to effectuate the proposed disposition, Ebron v. Commissioner, supra, 349-50.
With these principles in mind, the court finds the following facts. In 2006, the petitioner was on probation arising from sentences imposed for committing the crimes of assault second degree and promoting prostitution third degree. The unexecuted portion of his sentences totaled four years. In November 2006, the police arrested the petitioner for making two, hand-to-hand sales of crack cocaine to undercover law enforcement officers. As a result, the petitioner faced violation of probation charges as well as the underlying criminal charges.
In April 2007, shortly before the violation of probation hearing was to commence, the state's attorney agreed to recommend a total, effective sentence of six years imprisonment, followed by four years of special parole, if the petitioner pleaded guilty to one drug sale count and admitted the violations of probation. The petitioner rejected this offer. After a hearing on May 2007, the trial court found that the petitioner violated his probation, and the court sentenced him to serve the full four years remaining on his original sentence.
In September 2007, the petitioner was convicted, after a jury trial, of the narcotics sales charges. The trial court sentenced him, on November 19, 2007, to serve eight years imprisonment, consecutive to the four-year term previously imposed, for a total effective sentence in all cases of twelve years incarceration, followed by three years special parole.
The petitioner testified at the habeas trial that, had Attorney Lawrence more thoroughly explained the strength of the cases against him and informed him of the maximum potential sentences upon conviction, he would have accepted the state's offer and disposed of his cases by plea.
Attorney Lawrence also testified at the habeas hearing. She recounted that she felt the cases against the petitioner were strong and would likely result in convictions, especially the violation of probation matters. She discussed the state's proposed disposition with the petitioner multiple times, but he had no interest in accepting the offer. Although Attorney Lawrence could not recall the specifics of her conversations with the petitioner, her customary practice was to explain the elements of the crimes charged, the strengths and weaknesses of the case, and the likely outcomes. She related that the petitioner denied committing the crimes and informed her that he would rather serve one hundred years behind bars than plead guilty.
On May 23, 2007, one week before the violation of probation hearing was to begin, Attorney Lawrence hand-delivered a letter to the petitioner, which letter he acknowledges she gave him, confirming his rejection of the state's offer and his indication that he would prefer to do " 100 years of jail time." In his testimony, the petitioner never denied making that statement to Attorney Lawrence. The petitioner expressed his belief that he would be acquitted of one of the drug sale counts and that the violations of probation would then " go away."
The court finds Attorney Lawrence's version of events credible and disbelieves the petitioner's assertion that he was open to accept the state's offer had he received better legal assistance from Attorney Lawrence. Therefore, the court concludes that the petitioner has failed to satisfy his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the prejudice component of the Strickland standards as elucidated by Missouri v. Frye, supra, and Lafler v. Cooper, supra .
For these reasons, both counts for habeas corpus relief are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.