Opinion
521126.
02-04-2016
In the Matter of Dwight JAMES, Appellant, v. NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE, Respondent.
Dwight James, Moravia, appellant pro se. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kate H. Nepveu of counsel), for respondent.
Dwight James, Moravia, appellant pro se.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kate H. Nepveu of counsel), for respondent.
Opinion
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (LaBuda, J.), entered May 28, 2015 in Sullivan County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent denying petitioner's request for parole release.
In 1984, during the course of a supermarket robbery, petitioner shot and killed the proprietor and injured a store employee. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of murder in the second degree, robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second degree. He was sentenced as a second felony offender to an aggregate prison term of 25 years to life, to run concurrently with the sentence imposed upon a prior robbery conviction. In 2014, petitioner made his fourth appearance before respondent seeking to be released to parole supervision. Respondent denied his request and ordered him held for an additional 24 months. Petitioner filed an administrative appeal and, when it was not decided within four months, he commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding. Following joinder of issue, Supreme Court dismissed the petition. Petitioner now appeals.
We affirm. It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and “will not be disturbed so long as [respondent] complied with the statutory requirements set forth in Executive Law § 259–i” (Matter of Hill v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 130 A.D.3d 1130, 1130, 14 N.Y.S.3d 515 2015; see Matter of Diaz v. New York State Dept. of Corrections & Community Supervision, 127 A.D.3d 1493, 1494, 7 N.Y.S.3d 690 2015 ). Here, respondent considered the relevant statutory factors, including not only the serious nature of petitioner's crimes, but also his criminal history, prison disciplinary record, program accomplishments and postrelease plans, as well as the sentencing minutes and the COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment instrument (see Matter of Hill v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 130 A.D.3d at 1130, 14 N.Y.S.3d 515; Matter of Lackwood v. New York State Div. of Parole, 127 A.D.3d 1495, 1495, 8 N.Y.S.3d 461 2015 ). We note that respondent is not required to give each of the statutory factors equal weight and could, as it did, place greater emphasis on the severity of petitioner's crimes (see Matter of Feilzer v. New York State Div. of Parole, 131 A.D.3d 1321, 1322, 16 N.Y.S.3d 341 2015; Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 2014 ). Although petitioner complains that respondent did not have a folder before it setting forth his accomplishments since his prior appearance, petitioner elected to proceed without the folder and summarized its contents, which respondent accepted, during the course of the hearing. Accordingly, respondent was aware of the relevant information. Petitioner's remaining arguments have been considered and are lacking in merit. In sum, given that respondent's decision does not exhibit “ ‘irrationality bordering on impropriety’ ” (Matter of Partee v. Evans, 117 A.D.3d 1258, 1259, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 2014, lv. denied 24 N.Y.3d 901, 2014 WL 4357485 2014, quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982, 405 N.E.2d 225 1980 ), we find no reason to disturb it.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.