Opinion
Case No.: 3:16-cv-01592-AJB-JLB
04-07-2017
KYLE ROBERT JAMES, Booking # 15746082, Plaintiff, v. BARBARA LEE, et al. Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AS FRIVOLOUS AND FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) AND § 1915A(b)
I. Procedural History
On June 21, 2016, Plaintiff, Kyle James, currently incarcerated at the California State Prison - Los Angeles County located in Lancaster, California, filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1) and a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). Because Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP complied with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), the Court granted him leave to proceed without full prepayment of the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), but dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). On November 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). (ECF No. 6.) In this FAC, Plaintiff names only Defendant Barbara Lee, John Doe Doctor, Jane Doe Doctor and "S.D.C.J. Med. Supervisor" as Defendants.
The Court, once again, dismissed Plaintiff's FAC on the grounds that he failed to state a claim and as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). (ECF No. 8.) On March 30, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). In his SAC, Plaintiff again names Barbara Lee as a Defendant but also adds Defendants Kania and Harvel.
II. Legal Standards for Screening Complaint Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a pre-Answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). "The purpose of [screening] is 'to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.'" Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).
"The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim." Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A "incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)"). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.
Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. The "mere possibility of misconduct" or "unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]" fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Long v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).
B. Duplicative claims
Plaintiff broadly alleges that during the two and one-half years he was in the custody of the San Diego County Sheriff's Department ("SDCSD") he was "never treated for nerve damage" in his hands. (SAC at 4.) Plaintiff claims that the injuries to his hands was "caused by Sheriff Employees L.T. Kania, Sgt. Blackwell, Lance Tade and many other deputies." (Id.)
Here, the Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has two pending actions involving use of force by SDCSD deputies, including claims against Blackwell and Tade, and therefore, Plaintiff's SAC is subject to sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) because it contains claims which are duplicative of these two other actions. See James v. Agnew, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:15-cv-00409-AJB-MDD and James v. Emmens, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:16-cv-2823-WQH-NLS. A court "'may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.'" Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)).
A prisoner's complaint is considered frivolous if it "merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims." Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (construing former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Because Plaintiff appears to be litigating the identical claims presented in the instant action in James v. Agnew, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:15-cv-00409-AJB-MDD and James v. Emmens, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:16-cv-2823-WQH-NLS, the Court must dismiss these duplicative claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). See Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105 n.2; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446 n.1.
C. Medical Care Claims
Plaintiff alleges that he has "nerve damage in [his] hands" which Defendants "failed to treat." (SAC at 4.) Plaintiff claims Defendant Lee "had knowledge of my medical issue with the nerve damage in my hands" and for "one reason or another managed to avoid providing treatment." (Id.)
Prison officials are liable only if they are deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976); see also Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1241-44 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying Estelle's Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard to inadequate medical care claims alleged to violate a pretrial detainees' due process rights).
Here, Plaintiff claims he suffers from "nerve damage" but he fails to include any further "factual matter" sufficient to show or describe how or to what extent his medical needs were objectively serious. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991) (defining a "serious medical need" as one which the "failure to treat ... could result in further significant injury or the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'"), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The "existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a 'serious' need for medical treatment." McGuckin, 974 F.3d at 1059-60.
Moreover, even if the Court assumes Plaintiff's medical conditions were "objectively serious," nothing in his SAC supports a "reasonable inference that [any individual] defendant" acted with deliberate indifference to his plight. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "In order to show deliberate indifference, an inmate must allege sufficient facts to indicate that prison officials acted with a culpable state of mind." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991). Plaintiff simply alleges that Defendant Lee was "aware" of his medical condition but he fails to allege any specific facts regarding Lee's responses to his requests for treatment. (SAC at 4.) There are no specific allegations as to the date that Plaintiff claims he sustained this injury, the dates which he requested medical treatment and was allegedly denied, or the identity of any specific medical personnel whom he claims failed to treat him.
In addition, the indifference to medical needs also must be substantial; inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not amount to a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.") (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 1204 (9th Cir. 2002); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990)).
In his SAC, Plaintiff claims that the "Sheriff's blanket policy restricting medications like gabapentin to prisoners like [Plaintiff]" is "cruel and unusual punishment." However, a difference of opinion between a pretrial detainee and the doctors or other trained medical personnel at the Jail as to the appropriate course or type of medical attention he requires does not amount to deliberate indifference, see Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)).
Thus, Plaintiff's SAC, as currently pleaded, does not include facts to show that any individual San Diego Jail official actually knew of, yet disregarded any serious medical need. See Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1193 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[D]eliberate indifference requires the defendant to be subjectively aware that serious harm is likely to result from a failure to provide medical care."). Nor does it allege that any decision to refuse or delay a particular course of medical treatment caused him actual harm. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. Without more, Plaintiff's SAC currently amounts only to "unadorned, the defendant[s]-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]," which "stop[] short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief'" as to any constitutionally inadequate medical care claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
D. Respondeat Superior
Plaintiff claims in general terms that Sheriff Bill Gore had "knowledge of [his] injury" but "did nothing to treat me." (SAC at 9.) Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted because he sets forth no individualized allegations of wrongdoing by Sheriff Gore, and instead seeks to hold him vicariously liable for the actions of his deputies. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 ("Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits," Plaintiff "must plead that each Government-official defendant, though the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.")
Plaintiff's SAC contains no factual allegations describing what Defendant Sheriff Gore knew, did, or failed to do, with regard to Plaintiff's medical needs. Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.") "The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation." Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988), citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 460 (9th Cir. 1986).
Thus, without some specific "factual content" that might allow the Court to "draw the reasonable inference" that Sheriff Gore may be held personally liable for any unconstitutional conduct directed at Plaintiff, the Court finds his SAC, as currently pleaded, contains allegations which Iqbal makes clear fail to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 568.
E. Leave to Amend
A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint to state a claim unless it is absolutely clear the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (noting leave to amend should be granted when a complaint is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) "if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect"). Therefore, while the Court finds Plaintiff's SAC fails to state any claim upon which relief can be granted, it will provide him a chance to fix the pleading deficiencies discussed in this Order. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)). However, the Court cautions Plaintiff that he may not include allegations raised in other actions.
III. Conclusion and Order
Good cause appearing, the Court:
1. DISMISSES Plaintiff's SAC as frivolous and for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).
2. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave in which to file an Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading described in this Order. Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that should he choose to file an Amended Complaint, it must be complete by itself, comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and that any claim not re-alleged will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original."); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be "considered waived if not repled.").
3. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to mail to Plaintiff, together with this Order, a blank copy of the Court's form "Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983" for his use in amending.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: April 7, 2017
/s/_________
Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia
United States District Judge