Opinion
Case Number 02-10141-BC.
February 9, 2005
The plaintiff filed the present action on May 21, 2002 seeking review of the Commissioner's decision denying the plaintiff's claim for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. The case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(b)(3). Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment to reverse the decision of the Commissioner and award him benefits or in the alternative remand for further proceedings. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment requesting affirmance of the Commissioner's decision. Magistrate Judge Binder filed a report and recommendation on November 25, 2002 recommending that the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be denied, the defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted, and the findings of the Commissioner be affirmed. The plaintiff filed timely objections to the recommendation, and this matter is now before the Court.
The Court has reviewed the file, the report and recommendation, and the plaintiff's objections and has made a de novo review of the administrative record in light of the parties' submissions. The plaintiff's objections repeat the arguments raised in his motion for summary judgment, namely, that the ALJ's conclusion that the plaintiff could perform a full range of light work — as the plaintiff apparently reads that decision — is not supported by substantial evidence and is internally inconsistent with the conclusion that he could not perform his previous work, which required only light exertion. The plaintiff also argues that the ALJ did not consider Social Security Ruling (SSR) 83-12 on the question of the plaintiff's need to have a sit-or-stand option at work, an issue not addressed by the magistrate judge, and a ground for the plaintiff's objection to the report. In addition, the plaintiff argues the ALJ and the magistrate judge both failed to provide any rationale for discrediting his testimony concerning his disability.
The plaintiff, Freddie James, presently fifty-five years old, applied for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income benefits on November 24, 1998 when he was forty-nine years old. He had worked in various capacities as an ordering and allocation clerk and a salesperson. During his career, he sold heating and air conditioning products, newspaper delivery services, and security systems. He also completed high school and received some training in heating and air conditioning.
The plaintiff has a history of serious falls and bone fractures, a ankle sprain resulting from a fall from a ladder in 1978, an ankle fracture and glenoid fracture of the shoulder caused by a fall down stairs in 1994, and a wrist fracture caused by a fall on ice in 1998. His medical records indicate that he suffered a hip fracture and underwent arthroscopic surgery on his left knee. Arthritis has plagued him for over twenty years and spread to several joints. Periodically, he suffers from skin rashes, finger blisters, and serious ulcers on his right ankle and foot. A doctor first determined in 1998 that the plaintiff had glaucoma marked by symptoms of peripheral vision loss, especially in the left eye. He last worked on December 11, 1998, which is the date he alleges his disability commenced due to excruciating arthritis pain in his shoulders, wrists, knees, ankles, hips, and spine, ulcerated foot sores, and a loss of peripheral vision.
In his application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits, the plaintiff alleged that he was unable to work due to arthritis, glaucoma, and an ulcerated sore on his right foot. On August 2, 2000, the plaintiff, then fifty-one years old, appeared before ALJ William J. Musseman, who filed a decision on August 16, 2000 in which he found that the plaintiff was not disabled. The ALJ reached that conclusion by applying the five-step sequential analysis prescribed by the Secretary in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The ALJ concluded that the plaintiff, despite his part-time employment, had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 11, 1998 because he did not exceed the earnings limits set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1574 and 416.974 (step one); the plaintiff suffered from substantial impairments consisting of arthritis, glaucoma, and osteoarthritis of the knees, which were "severe" within the meaning of the Social Security Act (step two); the plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled a listing in the regulations (step three); and the plaintiff could not perform his previous work as a salesperson or order and allocation clerk, the skill and exertional level of which were not determined by the ALJ (step four).
In applying the fifth step, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a significant range of light work activity limited to jobs that allowed him to sit or stand at his option, required only monocular vision, and did not require repeated bending and twisting or any squatting, kneeling, crawling or climbing. Relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that there was a significant number of jobs in the national economy that fit within these limitations including cashier, clerk, and receptionist, and other jobs at the less demanding sedentary level including parking attendant and dispatcher. Based on that finding and using the Medical Vocational Guidelines found at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 as a framework, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Following the decision by the ALJ, the plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council, which denied the plaintiff's request for review on April 3, 2002.
The main thrust of the plaintiff's argument in this Court is that the ALJ's determination of residual functional capacity is not supported by substantial evidence. There are three aspects to the argument. First, the plaintiff claims that his previous work required exertion at the light level and the ALJ's determination that the plaintiff could perform a full range of light work conflicts with his finding that he could not perform his previous work. Second, the plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not follow SSR 83-12 in assessing the so-called "sit/stand" option. Third, the plaintiff states that the ALJ did not provide a rationale for rejecting the plaintiff's testimony at the administrative hearing as not fully credible.
The parties agree that the plaintiff has met the non-disability requirements for benefits under both Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Likewise, there is no dispute that the plaintiff has the burden of proving disability in order to qualify for social security disability and supplemental security income benefits, and that "disability" is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity" due to a "physical or mental impairment" that could cause death or reasonably might be expected to last continuously for at least twelve months. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). Of course, a person is not disabled merely because his limitation prevents him from performing previous work if that person can perform other "substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). The parties also accept the rule that the authority of this Court to review administrative decisions of the Commissioner is limited to deciding whether the proper legal standards were used and "whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the findings." Wright v. Massanari, 321 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Duncan v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 801 F.2d 847, 851 (6th Cir. 1986)).
The Commissioner's findings are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). See also Lashley v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 708 F.2d 1048, 1053 (6th Cir. 1983). The reviewing court must affirm the Commissioner's findings if they are supported by substantial evidence and the Commissioner employed the proper legal standard. Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). This Court may not base its decision on a single piece of evidence and disregard other pertinent evidence when evaluating whether substantial evidence in the record exists. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978). Thus, where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be upheld even if the record might support a contrary conclusion. Smith v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 893 F.2d 106, 108 (6th Cir. 1989). As the magistrate judge pointed out, the substantial evidence standard "presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which decisionmakers can go either way, without interference from the courts." Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (internal quotes and citations omitted). Thus, the Court "may not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of credibility." Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984).
The plaintiff's first argument can be resolved by examining the ALJ's residual functional capacity finding. Contrary to the plaintiff's argument, the ALJ did not conclude that the plaintiff could perform a full range of light work. Rather, the ALJ found that the plaintiff could perform a restricted range of light work, that is, subject to significant limitations. The plaintiff's previous work may not have fit within those limitations. Nonetheless, in making the finding, the ALJ accounted for the limitations documented in the administrative record by the treating and examining physicians. The summary of those findings is well stated by the magistrate judge in his report, which the Court adopts here. It is sufficient to observe, however, that although Dr. Norman Walter and Dr. Sidney Schuchter found the plaintiff to be suffering from arthritis, and Dr. John Waters and Dr. Saul Rubenstein diagnosed and assessed the plaintiff's glaucoma, none of these physicians imposed limitations on the plaintiff's functional abilities greater than the ALJ found. Residual functional capacity is an "assessment of [the claimant's] remaining capacity for work," once his limitations have been considered. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a). It is meant "to describe the claimant's residual abilities or what the claimant can do, not what maladies a claimant suffers from — though the maladies will certainly inform the ALJ's conclusion about the claimant's abilities." Howard v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 240 (6th Cir. 2002).
One of the limitations imposed on the plaintiff's capacity to engage in substantial gainful activity was the ability to alternate between periods of sitting and standing. The Commissioner has recognized that such a limitation is appropriate for persons who are "not functionally capable of doing either the prolonged sitting contemplated in the definition of sedentary work (and for the relatively few light jobs which are performed primarily in a seated position) or the prolonged standing or walking contemplated for most light work." SSR 83-12, 1983 WL 31253, at *4. The ruling states that such an option is typically found in managerial or professional jobs and less frequently in unskilled, structured jobs. The ruling counsels, therefore, that "[i]n cases of unusual limitation of ability to sit or stand, a VS [vocational specialist] should be consulted to clarify the implications for the occupational base." Ibid.
In this case, the ALJ recognized the plaintiff's limitation based on evidence that he could not sit or stand for prolonged periods. To accommodate that limitation, and others, the ALJ incorporated a "sit/stand" option into the hypothetical questions to the vocational expert who testified at the administrative hearing. The vocational expert responded with a list of jobs that fit within those limitations, that is, she "clarif[ied] the implications for the occupational base." The ALJ did not disregard or fail to follow SSR 83-12; rather, he complied with its requirements.
The ALJ, however, did not accept all of the limitations to the extent described by the plaintiff in his testimony. The record shows that the ALJ rejected the plaintiff's testimony that he was unable to perform any work as not fully credible because the ALJ found that "the objective medical evidence submitted in this case has not established that the claimant is unable to perform all work-related activity." Tr. at 21. The ALJ documented that conclusion by reviewing the medical information in the file, and he also placed weight on the plaintiff's testimony that he was then performing part-time work as a security systems salesman. As noted earlier, the magistrate judge has summarized the medical evidence and it need not be repeated here, and the plaintiff has not argued that it is inaccurate or incomplete. Rather, the plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not accept the plaintiff's explanation that he worked part time only to pay his bills. Although that, indeed, was the plaintiff's testimony, it does not otherwise diminish the ALJ's finding or result in a lack of substantial evidence.
Nor does this evidence undermine the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert. The rule that a hypothetical question must incorporate all of the claimant's physical and mental limitations does not divest the ALJ of his obligation to assess credibility and determine the facts. In fashioning the hypothetical question to be posed to the vocational expert, the ALJ "is required to incorporate only those limitations accepted as credible by the finder of fact." Casey v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1235 (6th Cir. 1993). "[A]n ALJ is not required to accept a claimant's subjective complaints and may properly consider the credibility of a claimant when making a determination of disability," and "can present a hypothetical to the [vocational expert] on the basis of his own assessment if he reasonably deems the claimant's testimony to be inaccurate." Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 476 (6th Cir. 2003). That is precisely what the ALJ did in this case.
After a de novo review of the entire record and the materials submitted by the parties, the Court concludes that the magistrate judge properly reviewed the administrative record and applied the correct law in reaching his conclusion. The Court agrees with the conclusion that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination that the plaintiff is capable of performing gainful activity.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the magistrate judge's report and recommendation [dkt # 13] is ADOPTED.
It is further ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [dkt # 11] is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that the defendant's motion for summary judgment [dkt # 12] is GRANTED. The findings of the Commissioner are AFFIRMED, and the complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.