Opinion
Civil Action No. 6:00CV527
September 29, 2000
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
On the 25th day of September, 2000, the court considered plaintiff's application for preliminary injunction. After considering the application, the court is of the opinion that it should be and is hereby GRANTED.
In reaching its decision, the court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. All findings of fact are made by a preponderance of the admissible evidence. Any finding of fact that is actually a conclusion of law should be deemed a conclusion of law. Any conclusion of law that is actually a finding of fact should be deemed a finding of fact.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The plaintiff in this case is Gertrude James ("James").
2. James is a diabetic. Both of her legs have been amputated. She has restricted use of her hands. She is also legally blind.
3. James is confined to a wheelchair, totally disabled and unable to work. She has been receiving disability benefits since having heart surgery in 1991.
4. James has two granddaughters living in her household. James supports her granddaughters with benefits received under the Medicaid, tan and Food Stamp programs. James's granddaughters have lived with James their entire lives.
5. One of the granddaughters, Shaneque Lee, is seventeen (17) years old. The other, Shaquoya Lee, is ten (10) years old and is in the fifth grade.
6. Shaneque Lee graduated from Winnsboro High School in three years, instead of the usual four. She excelled in high school, earned straight "A's", and recently enrolled as a student in the Northeast Texas Community College in Mt. Pleasant, Texas. Shaneque is a full-time student in the college's nursing program. When she graduated from high school, Shaneque was sixteen (16) years old. She will turn eighteen (18) years old on August 10, 2001.
7. Shaneque has worked and continues to work part-time at a grocery store. Shaneque uses all or substantially all of the income she earns through her employment at the grocery store for transportation to and expenses associated with her enrollment at the community college.
8. Plaintiff James receives food stamp benefits. Federal funds supplied by the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") support the food stamp program. The Texas Department of Human Services ("DHS") administers these benefits at the local level. The USDA exercises ultimate authority and oversight over the Food Stamp program.
9. Until recently, James's household income level permitted her to receive Food Stamp benefits in the amount of $191 per month. When Shaneque graduated from high school early, DHS informed James that the income Shaneque earned from her part-time employment at the grocery store would be included in the James household's gross income calculation for food stamp benefits. DHS's inclusion of Shaneque's part-time income reduced the household's Food Stamp eligibility to approximately thirty dollars per month. Moreover, despite lacking any statutory or regulatory authorization, DHS also decided to reduce James's Medicaid and TANF benefits by including Shaneque's income in its calculation of the household's income levels under those programs.
TANF is a temporary cash assistance program for needy families. A hearing officer reversed the initial decision of DHS to reduce James's TANF and Medicaid benefits.
10. James exhausted her administrative remedies by requesting and receiving a hearing and appealing the hearing officer's decision. These decisions generally upheld DHS's construction of the relevant food stamp statutes and regulations.
11. Despite Congressional inquiries into DHS's construction of the food stamp statutes and regulations, DHS did not seek any clarification or input from the USDA. On August 28, 2000, James filed this suit, seeking injunctive relief to prevent DHS from reducing her Food Stamp eligibility level. On August 29, 2000, this court issued a temporary restraining order that enjoined the DHS from reducing James's Food Stamp benefits. By agreement, the parties extended the temporary restraining order until the court determined the merits of the application for preliminary injunction.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
2. This court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant and venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.
3. James, as the movant for a preliminary injunction, bears the burden of establishing (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury; (3) the threatened injury outweighs any harm the injunction causes to the defendant; and (4) the injunction will not impair the public interest. Sugar Busters L.L.C. v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 1999); Canal Authority of the State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974).
4. To obtain a preliminary injunction, James must first show that there is a substantial likelihood that she will prevail on the merits of her case. James contends that DHS's interpretation and application of certain provisions of the Food Stamp Act yields an absurd result under the facts of this case. See Crandon v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 997, 1001 (1990) (court should interpret statute based on its design as a whole and consider its object and policy); Sykes v. Columbus Greenville Railway, 117 F.3d 287, 290-91 (5th Cir. 1997) (departing from literal terms of statute to avoid an absurd result). From the evidence submitted thus far in these proceedings, the court concludes that James has met her burden of demonstrating that there is a substantial likelihood that she will prevail on the merits.
5. The facts of this case present an issue of first impression. Congress enacted the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2011, et seq., "to alleviate hunger and malnutrition" among members of lowincome households. When it adopted the Food Stamp Act, Congress found that the limited food purchasing power of low-income households contributes to hunger and malnutrition among members of such households. Id. Congress declared that its policy was to raise the levels of nutrition among such low-income households to promote the general welfare and to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation's population. Id.
6. A household's entitlement to benefits under the food stamp program depends on its income. Participation in the food stamp program is limited to those households whose income and other financial resources are determined to be a substantial limiting factor in permitting them to obtain a more nutritious diet. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a). The level of a household's eligibility to participate in the food stamp program is measured by the gross income of the household, less certain deductions. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b)-(d).
7. Income earned by a child who is a member of the household, who is an elementary or secondary school student, and who is 17 years of age or younger is excluded from the household's income when determining food stamp eligibility. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(d)(7). As originally enacted, Congress intended the exclusion to apply to all household members under the age of eighteen. Dion v. Commissioner, Maine Department of Human Services, 933 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991). The exclusion serves two purposes: it avoids the problems associated with accounting for small and difficult to document sums of money, and it provides an incentive for young people to remain in school rather than enter the work force full time. Dion, 933 F.2d at 17.
8. DHS's failure to exclude the income earned by Shaneque is inconsistent with the purposes of the student income exclusion. The exclusion is designed to avoid administrative difficulties inherent in accounting for small, irregularly earned sums of money by minors. Shaneque's part-time job at a grocery store fits squarely within the category of jobs that typically produce small, irregularly earned sums of money. Moreover, the terms of the statute suggest that Congress wanted to encourage children to finish high school instead of entering the workforce full time. While Shaneque's academic performance culminated in early matriculation, her graduation from high school is surely consistent with this purpose of the exclusion. Her continuing education at the community college level is also consistent with the purpose of the exclusion as well as other federal benefit programs. At the very least, early high school graduation and college attendance are not inconsistent with any stated Congressional policy. Although the terms of the student income exclusion do not literally embrace students enrolled in college courses, this court cannot attribute to Congress so sinister an intention to penalize a low income household because it includes a child whose acumen is worthy of special attention. James has "raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation." Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1953) ( quoted in Tampa Phosphate Railroad Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 418 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 90 S.Ct. 907 (1970)). James has satisfied her burden of persuading this court that there is a substantial likelihood that she will prevail on the merits.
The USDA's regulations expand the types of educational programs that qualify under the student income exclusion. Under the regulations, students pursuing high school diplomas under home school programs and those who are enrolled in a general equivalency diploma ("GED") program qualify for the exclusion. 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(c)(7). At the hearing, DHS conceded that if Shaneque had dropped out of high school and was pursuing GED courses at the same community college she now attends, her income would be excluded.
9. There is a substantial threat of irreparable injury. Under the facts developed at the hearing on the application for preliminary injunction, reduction of James's food stamp benefits from $190 a month to $30 a month would seriously impair the household's ability to obtain and maintain any sort of a nutritious diet. Not only would this injure the household generally, but the specific effect of the reduction would disproportionately impact James's younger granddaughter, Shaquoya. James accurately summed up the impact of the reduction on ten-year old Shaquoya when she declared that Shaquoya would have a lot of "hungry" days. The very real threat of malnutrition inflicted on a fifth grader, with all of its consequences, constitutes a substantial threat of irreparable injury. DHS's construction of the student income exclusion runs counter to the principle that a court should strive to avoid a construction that reduces or deprives a needy family of benefits through no fault of their own. Wilcox v. Ives, 864 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1988). In this case, DHS's construction of the student income exclusion — and the resulting reduction of food stamp benefits — would deprive a ten year old of much needed benefits through no fault of her own. DHS's construction of the student income exclusion is contrary to the stated Congressional purposes of the Food Stamp Act.
10. The threatened injury outweighs any harm the injunction will cause the defendant. The court can identify no harm that will result to the defendant by the granting of this injunction.
11. The injunction will not impair the public interest. The court concludes that the injunction will advance the public policies underlying the Food Stamp program, the specific income exclusion at issue and benefit programs in general.
12. A preliminary injunction is appropriate.
13. The court has considered the amount of an appropriate bond and remains of the opinion that the amount of such bond is $0.00.
It is therefore ORDERED that the defendant, Eric Bost, Commissioner of Texas Department of Human Services, his agents, servants, employees, attorneys and all others acting in concert with him with knowledge of this order are hereby enjoined to continue to authorize current food stamp benefits for plaintiffs household in an amount to be calculated by excluding the earned income of Shaneque Lee. It is further
ORDERED that this preliminary injunction will continue in force and effect until such time as the trial on the merits of this action absent further order of this court. It is further