Opinion
CA 3:03-CV-470-R
January 13, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Beltex Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant" or "Beltex"). Plaintiff Frenada James ("Plaintiff or "James") filed this suit asserting claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, battery, and discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against Beltex, requesting compensatory and exemplary damages, attorneys' fees, and injunctive and equitable relief. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to all claims.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND FACTS
Plaintiff Frenada James is an African-American male and former employee of Defendant Beltex Corporation, a company that operates in Fort Worth, Texas, and processes horse meat. James proceeds pro se and filed his initial complaint against Beltex on March 5, 2003, after receiving a determination by the EEOC together with a notice of his right to sue. In his complaint, James, formerly employed by Beltex as a full-time accountant, alleges that while at Beltex he was harassed. Specifically, James contends that the excessive workload he was assigned was tantamount to harassment, and he references one specific instance in which the Livestock manager said, "Let's go hang ol' Frenada up outside and show folk how we treat people that don't act right." James was informed that he was terminated due to his inability to adapt to Beltex's "culture." Plaintiff's suit against Beltex asserts claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, and discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Beltex initially hired James in September of 2001 as a temporary payroll clerk and subsequently made him a full-time accountant. James contends that he was the first African-American to serve in an administrative capacity at Beltex. As an accountant, he earned an annual salary of $28,000. On May 28, 2002, two supervisors at Beltex met with James to discuss his job performance. An email that outlined James' needed improvements followed on May 31, 2002. It enumerated James' job functions and stated that James was thought capable of performing the duties and tasks associated with his position. It described James' concerns over workload and his request for a "substantial raise." The confirmation email then set forth areas in which James needed improvement: quality and quantity of work, job knowledge, initiative, and altitude. Finally, James was given a deadline of July 1, 2002, to meet Beltex's established standards of "usually meets" and "seldom falls short" of desired results. Such satisfactory improvement was to result in consideration for salary adjustment, and unsatisfactory change was to result in termination. On June 27, 2002, Beltex terminated James.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows summary judgment only when the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Melton v. Teachers Ins. Annuity Assoc. of Am., 114 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1997). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
Once the movant has discharged its initial burden under Rule 56, the nonmovant must set forth specific facts, by affidavits or otherwise, that show a genuine issue for trial. See Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1132 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 825 (1992). In weighing the evidence, the court must decide all reasonable doubts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Walker v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 1988); Thornbrough v. Columbus Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 640 (5th Cir. 1985). As long as there appears to be some support for the disputed allegations such that "reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence," the motion for summary judgment must be denied. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). Summary judgment for the defendant will be granted if the plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a material issue of fact as to the existence of an element essential to its case. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Because this case was brought by a pro se Plaintiff, this Court holds the allegations by the Plaintiff to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
B. Plaintiff's Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim
Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim fails as a matter of law. James claims that Beltex engaged in a pattern of harassment rising to the level of an actionable claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. To prove a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Texas, James must prove: (1) that Beltex acted intentionally and recklessly; (2) that Beltex's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the conduct caused James emotional distress; and (4) that the emotional distress was severe. See Toles v. Toles, 113 S.W.3d 899, 920 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003).
First, to qualify as extreme and outrageous, Beltex's conduct must go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 611 (Tex. 1999). While this Court acknowledges the inappropriate and unacceptable nature of the comment alleged, the Fifth Circuit's application of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in workplace situations instructs that even racial epithets, slurs, and jokes do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. See Thomas v. Clayton Williams Energy, Inc., 2 S.W.3d 734, 741 (Tex.App.-Houston [14 Dist.], 1999). Assigning demanding workloads and requiring late work hours also fail to meet the threshold of extreme and outrageous conduct. Furthermore, in Texas, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires that severe emotional distress be the intended consequence or primary risk of the tortfeasor's conduct. See Standard Fruit Vegetable Co. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Tex. 1998). No such factual allegation supports this claim. Because no genuine issues of material fact remain, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to this claim.
C. Plaintiff's Assault and Battery Claims
In his complaint, Plaintiff claims that "Defendants' supervisors and employees, acting within the course and scope of their employment, or alternatively, their acts ratified by Defendants intentionally engaged in abusive, verbal and physical contacts with Plaintiff which Defendant knew or should reasonably have believed were offensive." In Texas, the definitions of causes of action of assault and battery are the same in civil and criminal suits. Green v. Industrial Specialty Contractors, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 126, 134 (Tex.App.-Houston [1 Dist.], 1999). Assault requires that a person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause bodily injury to another. See DeLeon v. Hernandez, 814 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex.App.-Hous. [14 Dist.], 1991). Battery requires offensive touching, but not the intent to injure. See Price v. Short, 931 S.W.2d 677, 687 (Tex.App-Dallas, 1996). James alleges facts supporting neither offensive touching nor bodily injury. As such, his claim under assault and battery fails, and Defendant is granted summary judgment as to this claim.
D. Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Claim
Plaintiff claims a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because he "was not allowed to contract as an employee by Defendants in the same manner on the same terms as Anglo or Hispanic employees." To survive summary judgment on this § 1981 claim, James must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Patel v. Midland Memorial Hosp and Medical Center, 298 F.3d 333, 342 (5th Cir. 2002). If a case of discrimination is sufficiently presented, then the Defendant must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision. Id, Should the Defendant present such a reason, then the Plaintiff must offer evidence that the reason proposed is a pretext for racial discrimination. Id. In this case, it appears that Plaintiff's § 1981 claim alleges discriminatory treatment in the making and enforcing of a contract.
To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under § 1981(a), James must establish: (1) that he belongs to a protected group; (2) that Beltex had an intent to discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) that the discrimination concerned the making and enforcing of a contract. See Bellows v. Amoco Oil Co., 118 F.3d 268, 273 (5th Cir. 1997). As an African-American male, James belongs to a protected group. As evidence of intentional discrimination, Plaintiff submits that he was the only African-American to have worked in an administrative position at Beltex, and he cites the aforementioned comment by a livestock manager. To support the third element of his claim, James argues that "Anglo and Hispanic" employees who complained about the increased workload assigned to them were not thereafter terminated. No evidence has been submitted to the Court with regard to this allegation, and the allegation itself may not even demonstrate an instance of discrimination in the enforcement of a contract. As to both the second and third elements of his § 1981 claim, Plaintiff fails to make an evidentiary showing sufficient to establish any material facts.
Should this pro se Plaintiff have intended to pursue a § 1981 claim on slightly different grounds, the evidence in the record similarly fails to support such a claim. "A prima facie case can generally be satisfied if the plaintiff (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position that he held before being discharged, (3) he was discharged, and (4) his employer filled the position with a person who is not a member of the protected class." Raggs v. Mississippi Power Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 468 (5th Cir. 2002). While the first three elements of this claim are undisputed, neither party has submitted evidence to indicate that James was replaced by a person who is not a member of the protected class.
Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to support a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to Beltex to put forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for their adverse employment decision. To this end, Beltex asserts that James was terminated due to his unsatisfactory work, unwillingness to accept change and additional work, inability to complete assigned projects, and poor attitude. In opposing Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, James has offered no evidence that Beltex's explanation serves as a pretext for discrimination; rather, evidence from both parties supports Defendant's explanation. No genuine issues of material fact remain, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to this claim.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to all claims.