Ridenour v Bay County, 366 Mich. 225; 114 N.W.2d 172 (1962). Where an ample hearing is afforded, due process does not require a state to provide a rehearing of the same matter or a new trial, Pittsburgh, C C St L R Co v Backus, 154 U.S. 421; 14 S Ct 1114; 38 L Ed 1031 (1894); James v Appel, 192 U.S. 129; 24 S Ct 222; 48 L Ed 377 (1904), or even an appellate review, United States v MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317; 96 S Ct 2086; 48 L Ed 2d 666 (1976); Griffin v Illinois, 351 U.S. 12; 76 S Ct 585; 100 L Ed 891 (1956); McKane v Durston, 153 U.S. 684; 14 S Ct 913; 38 L Ed 867 (1894); J F Hartz Co v Lukaszcewski, 200 Mich. 230; 167 N.W. 18 (1918); Messenger v Teagan, 106 Mich. 654; 64 N.W. 499 (1895). Const 1963 does provide a right to appeal certain kinds of cases.
Since promulgated in substance by this court as Rule 59(e). The Texas courts construed the act we adopted from it to be mandatory and held and still hold, that a motion was discharged by operation of law if not acted upon at the same term. James v. Appel, 192 U.S. 129, 135, 24 S.Ct. 222, 48 L.Ed. 377. To the same effect is Svea Ins. Co. v. McFarland, 7 Ariz. 131, 60 P. 936.
In doing so we should not assume that Congress chose to disregard a constitutional danger zone so clearly marked, or that it used the words "advocate" and "teach" in their ordinary dictionary meanings when they had already been construed as terms of art carrying a special and limited connotation. See Willis v. Eastern Trust Banking Co., supra; Joines v. Patterson, supra; James v. Appel, 192 U.S. 129, 135. The Gitlow case and the New York Criminal Anarchy Act there involved, which furnished the prototype for the Smith Act, were both known and adverted to by Congress in the course of the legislative proceedings.
People v. Guiton, 210 N.Y. 1, 8, 9, 103 N.E. 773. The adoption of these words after this interpretation and in the face of the Congressional knowledge of the New York decision and of the controversy over the effect of the use of such language, petitioners contend, brings into play the general rule that adoption of the wording of a statute from another legislative jurisdiction carries with it the previous judicial interpretations of the wording. Willis v. Eastern Trust Banking Co., 169 U.S. 295, 307; cf. James v. Appel, 192 U.S. 129, 135; Joines v. Patterson, 274 U.S. 544, 549. Sec. 64(3). "No person shall manufacture, sell or exchange, offer or expose for sale or exchange, or have in his possession with the intent to sell or exchange any condensed, evaporated, concentrated, powdered, dried or desiccated milk, cream or skimmed milk to which there has been added or with which there has been mixed, blended or compounded, any fats or oils, other than milk fat, so that the finished product shall be in imitation or semblance of condensed, evaporated, concentrated, powdered, dried or desiccated milk."
So construed, they became, in effect, laws of the United States as though originally enacted by Congress for government of the Territory. Willis v. Eastern Trust Banking Co., 169 U.S. 295, 307; James v. Appel, 192 U.S. 129, 135; Gidney v. Chappel, 241 U.S. 99, 102. See also Byrd v. State, 99 Okla. 165.
See also Thorpe v. Housing Authority, supra note 50, 393 U.S. at 282 n. 43, 89 S.Ct. 518, 21 L.Ed.2d 474; Greene v. United States, supra note 34, 376 U.S. at 160-161, 84 S.Ct. 615, 11 L.Ed.2d 576; Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 7-9, 65 S.Ct. 16, 89 L.Ed. 3 (1944); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Louisville N. R. R., supra note 56, 258 U.S. at 19-20, 42 S.Ct. 258, 66 L.Ed. 437; Massingill v. Downs, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 760, 768, 12 L.Ed. 903 (1849). Cf. Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 310-311, 65 S.Ct. 1137, 89 L.Ed. 1628 (1945); James v. Appel, 192 U.S. 129, 136-137, 24 S.Ct. 222, 48 L.Ed. 377 (1904). The rule stated in text is subject to an exception in the case of a "public right," which even after its establishment by a judgment may be altered by subsequent legislation.
It is a general rule that where a statute has been previously enacted in another jurisdiction, interpretations by its courts before its enactment in another jurisdiction are to be followed because the statute "generally is presumed to be adopted with the construction which it has received." Holmes, J., in James v. Appel, 192 U.S. 129, 135, 24 S.Ct. 222, 223, 48 L.Ed. 377. And constructions adopted by other jurisdictions are peculiarly persuasive where the statute is designed to be "uniform."
It is to be noted that this provision of the statute was taken verbatim from a similar statute of the State of New York. The decisions of the Court of Appeals of New York construing it, therefore, would seem to be more than persuasive and to become authoritative under the rule that a statute adopted from another state will be presumed to have been adopted with the construction placed upon it by the courts of that state. James v. Appel, 192 U.S. 129, 135, 24 S.Ct. 222, 48 L.Ed. 377; 59 C.J. 1065-1068; 25 R.C.L. 1069. The New York statute came before the Court of Appeals of that state for interpretation in the year 1931 in the case of Brustein v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 255 N.Y. 137, 174 N.E. 304, 305. The court quoted the provisions of Sec. 109 of the Insurance Law, Consol. Laws N.Y. c. 28, the first of which was the standard bankruptcy clause, similar to the first paragraph of Sec. 4326a of the Virginia Code, the second related to notice, and the third was in the exact language italicized in our quotation of the Virginia statute.
When this statute was adopted by Congress the Supreme Court of that state had given the statute a construction. Presumably the construction so given the statute by the highest court of the state became part of the law as adopted by Congress. Warner v. Railway Co., 164 U.S. 418, 423, 17 Sup.Ct. 147, 41 L.Ed. 495; Willis v. Banking Co., 169 U.S. 295, 307, 18 Sup.Ct. 347, 42 L.Ed. 752; Henrietta M. & M. Co. v. Gardner, 173 U.S. 123, 130, 19 Sup.Ct. 327, 43 L.Ed. 637; James v. Appel, 192 U.S. 129, 135, 24 Sup.Ct. 222, 48 L.Ed. 377; Welsh v. Barber Asphalt Co., 167 F. 465, 472, 93 C.C.A. 101; Jennings v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Min. Co., 170 F. 146, 149, 95 C.C.A. 388. In the case of Bremer & Co. v. Fleckenstein & Mayer, 9 Or. 266, 271, the Supreme Court of Oregon, construing this statute, said:
A statute adopted from another state which has been construed by the highest court thereof is presumed to be adopted with the construction thus placed upon it. Tucker v. Oxley, 5 Cranch, 34, 42, 3 L.Ed. 29; Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, 18, 7 L.Ed. 327; Metropolitan Railroad v. Moore, 121 U.S. 558, 572, 7 Sup.Ct. 1334, 30 L.Ed. 1022; Interstate Commerce Commission v. B. & O. Railroad Co., 145 U.S. 263, 284, 12 Sup.Ct. 844, 36 L.Ed. 699; Sanger v. Flow, 48 F. 152, 154, 1 C.C.A. 56, writ of error dismissed 149 U.S. 785, 13 Sup.Ct. 1051, 37 L.Ed. 962; Warner v. Railway Co., 164 U.S. 418, 423, 17 Sup.Ct. 147, 41 L.Ed. 495; Willis v. Banking Co., 169 U.S. 295, 307, 18 Sup.Ct. 347, 42 L.Ed. 752; Henrietta M. & M. Co. v. Gardner, 173 U.S. 123, 130, 19 Sup.Ct. 327, 43 L.Ed. 637; James v. Appel, 192 U.S. 129, 135, 24 Sup.Ct. 222, 48 L.Ed. 377. It is true that the two statutes are not identical as a whole, but the change in the Alaska Code from the Oregon Code makes more definite and certain the purpose of Congress to adopt the construction of the Supreme Court of Oregon for estates where the decedent left no husband, wife, or children.