Plaintiff's argument is based on the theory of equitable estoppel. "The general rule is where A, by his or her statements and conduct, leads B to do something that B would not have done but for such statements and conduct, A will not be allowed to deny his or her words or acts to the damage of B. Equitable estoppel may be defined as the effect of A's conduct whereby A is barred from asserting rights that might otherwise have existed against B who, in good faith, relied upon such conduct and has been thereby led to change his or her position for the worse." In re Parentage of Scarlett Z.–D. , 2015 IL 117904, ¶ 24, 390 Ill.Dec. 123, 28 N.E.3d 776. " ‘An insurer will be estopped from raising a limitations defense where its actions during negotiations are such as to lull the insured into a false sense of security, thereby causing him to delay the assertion of his rights.
Lack of standing is an affirmative matter that is properly raised under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2016) ). Scarlett Z.-D. , 2015 IL 117904, ¶ 20, 390 Ill.Dec. 123, 28 N.E.3d 776. A section 2-619 motion to dismiss must be brought "within the time for pleading."
¶ 11 The trial court denied Veronica's motion to reconsider and her motion to dismiss. Relying on In re Parentage of Scarlett Z.-D., 2015 IL 117904, the court reasoned Illinois does not recognize "functional parentage."
In order to raise a successful defense of equitable estoppel, the party claiming estoppel must show (1) the other party misrepresented or concealed material facts, (2) the other party knew, at the time the representations were made, that those representations were false, (3) the party claiming estoppel did not know of the falsity of the representations when they were made or when they were acted upon, (4) the other party intended or reasonably expected the representations to be acted upon by the party claiming estoppel, (5) the party claiming estoppel reasonably relied upon the representations in good faith to his detriment, and (6) the party claiming estoppel has been prejudiced by his reliance on the representations. In re Parentage of Scarlett Z.-D. , 2015 IL 117904, ¶ 25, 390 Ill.Dec. 123, 28 N.E.3d 776. Succinctly stated, "where a person by his or her statements and conduct leads a party to do something that the party would not have done but for such statements and conduct, that person will not be allowed to deny his or her words or acts to the damage of the other party."
Looking for guidance from similar situations of people involved in a minor child's life who were not the child's legal or biological parent, and were not married to the child's legal or biological parent, but who sought visitation or allocation of parental responsibilities with respect to a minor child, we find that the nonparent, even though they may have had a close relationship with the child, could not seek visitation or allocation of parental responsibilities, because he or she lacked standing to do so. See In reParentage of Scarlett Z.-D. , 2015 IL 117904, ¶ 68, 390 Ill.Dec. 123, 28 N.E.3d 776 ; In re Visitation of J.T.H. , 2015 IL App (1st) 142384, ¶ 28, 397 Ill.Dec. 518, 42 N.E.3d 433. The underlying principles guiding these decisions dictate that nonparent standing requirements be strictly construed.
Under section 2-615 of the Code, a complaint may be dismissed for the failure to state a cause of action because of factual or legal insufficiency. In re Scarlett Z.-D., 2015 IL 117904, ¶ 20. The factual or legal insufficiency must be apparent on the face of the pleading and the allegations in the pleading
(Emphasis added.) In re Parentage of Scarlett Z.-D., 2015 IL 117904, ¶ 48.¶ 20 DeHart was a model case for equitable adoption. That case involved an action against the executor of an estate to contest the decedent's will.
"The party claiming [equitable] estoppel has the burden of proving it by clear and convincing evidence." In re Scarlett Z.-D ., 390 Ill.Dec. 123, 28 N.E.3d 776, 785 (2015). Applying this standard, Onfido failed to show that Sosa should be equitably estopped from denying Onfido's enforcement of the arbitration provision.
But, applying Arthur Andersen, the Seventh Circuit has subsequently held that equitable estoppel must be analyzed under state contract law and has noted that "the Illinois Supreme Court has reaffirmed its longstanding detrimental reliance standard in equitable estoppel claims." Sosa, 8 F.4th at 637, 642 (citing In re Scarlett Z.-D., 2015 IL 117904, ¶ 25, 28 N.E.3d 776, 785). Even under federal caselaw, there must be "a direct benefit under the contract containing an arbitration clause before a reluctant party can be forced into arbitration."
(7th Cir. 2007) (quoting First Midwest Bank, N.A. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 218 Ill.2d 326, 334-35). To establish equitable estoppel, the party claiming estoppel must allege that: “(1) the other party misrepresented or concealed material facts; (2) the other party knew at the time the representations were made that the representations were untrue; (3) the party claiming estoppel did not know that the representations were untrue when they were made and when they were acted upon; (4) the other party intended or reasonably expected the representations to be acted upon by the party claiming estoppel or by the public generally; (5) the party claiming estoppel reasonably relied upon the representations in good faith to his or her detriment; and (6) the party claiming estoppel has been prejudiced by his or her reliance on the representations.” In re Scarlett Z.-D., 2015 IL 117904, ¶ 25.