The resolution of conflicts in the evidence rests solely with the trier of fact, in this case, the jury. Jones v. Beltazar, 658 So.2d 420 (Ala. 1995); James v. Woolley, 523 So.2d 110, 112 (Ala. 1988). The record contains substantial evidence to support the jury verdict; thus, we must conclude that the verdict was not plainly and palpably wrong.

The plaintiff presented the expert testimony of Dr. Jonathan Glauser; his testimony created a factual dispute between the experts as to the standard of care. Because of the conflicting expert testimony, the factual determination rested solely with the jury. James v. Woolley, 523 So.2d 110, 112 (Ala. 1988). Apparently, the jury believed Dr. Sherer's testimony that both Dr. Broughton and Dr. Chang met the standard of care.

Summary judgment should not be granted against a claim where there is presented any evidence from which an inference may be drawn in support of the claim. James v. Woolley, 523 So.2d 110 (Ala. 1988); Allen v. Mobile Infirmary, 413 So.2d 1051 (Ala. 1982). The original complaint in this case was filed prior to June 11, 1987, the effective date of Alabama Code 1975, § 12-21-12.

This Court has recently reaffirmed the "medical judgment rule," the principle that a physician is not liable for malpractice when he chooses a recognized method of treatment, even though other experts testify that they would have chosen an alternative method of treatment. James v. Woolley, 523 So.2d 110 (Ala. 1988). Additionally, the testimony provided by Mr. Turner and Dr. Larry Britt that contradicted their earlier statements could have persuaded the jury to assign little weight to their testimony, or to disbelieve their testimony altogether.

The law does not require a physician to be infallible in his treatment of a patient, and this Court has recently reaffirmed the "medical judgment rule," which stands for the proposition that a physician is not liable for malpractice when he makes an informed choice between viable alternatives, even though other experts, with the benefit of hindsight, testify that they would have chosen an alternate method of treatment. James v. Wooley, 523 So.2d 110 (Ala. 1988). In light of the conflicting evidence presented on the issue of whether Dr. Coleman's failure to perform a urinalysis or blood sugar test was a deviation from the appropriate standard of care, the trial court was fully justified in charging the jury as to alternative methods of treatment.

The resolution of conflicts in the evidence rests solely with the trier of fact, in this case, the jury. See Sharrief v. Gerlach, 798 So.2d 646, 651 (Ala. 2001) (citing Jones v. Baltazar, 658 So.2d 420, 422 (Ala. 1995), citing in turn James v. Woolley, 523 So.2d 110, 112 (Ala. 1988) ). We conclude that the jury properly exercised its duty to resolve conflicts, find the facts, and express its findings in its verdict.