Opinion
14-P-1289
09-15-2015
MARY F. JAMES-BROWN, personal representative, v. THE COMMERCE INSURANCE COMPANY & others.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Mary F. James-Brown, appeals from an order of the Superior Court, arguing that the denial of her motion for leave to file a third amended complaint was an abuse of the judge's discretion. We affirm.
On January 24, 2011, James-Brown signed a release and settlement of claim in a wrongful death action as to her son who had been killed in a single-car accident. In addition to James-Brown, the parties to the release included the driver of the vehicle, Luis Laboy, Jr., the owner of the vehicle, Luis Laboy, Sr., and the owner's insurer, Hanover Insurance Company. Afterwards, James-Brown brought the instant action, which, as reflected in her second amended complaint, sounded directly against the Laboys' employers, Barbara Aspell (doing business as O'Hara Property Management) and Michael O'Hara, under the theory of respondeat superior, alleging that the Laboys were acting within the scope of their employment at the time of the accident. The complaint also claimed against the employers' insurer, The Commerce Insurance Company.
All claims against the defendants in the action were decided against James-Brown on summary judgment. As the judge explained, his ruling was "based on the well-established rule that 'the release of an agent precludes a claim against his principal who is liable solely on the theory of respondeat superior.' Elias v. Unisys Corp., 410 Mass. 479, 484 (1991).'" The same judge later denied, after hearing, James-Brown's motion for relief from judgment. A panel of this court affirmed the judgment and the order denying relief from judgment. James-Brown v. The Commerce Insurance Co., 85 Mass. App. Ct. 1111 (2014).
Several weeks after the entry of judgment after rescript, James-Brown filed a motion on June 5, 2014, to amend the complaint; the proposed third amended complaint alleged that the defendant employers should be held directly liable for the decedent's injuries because they negligently had failed to provide proper training and supervision to the Laboys. On June 16, 2014, a different judge of the Superior Court denied the motion without a hearing. James-Brown's appeal from that order is now before us.
Once the time has passed to amend a pleading as of right, "a party may amend [her] pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." Mass.R.Civ.P. 15(a), 365 Mass. 761 (1974). "We review the judge's decision for an abuse of discretion, though consistent with the axiom that 'a motion to amend should be allowed unless some good reason appears for denying it.'" Doherty v. Admiral's Flagship Condominium Trust, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 104, 112 (2011) (citation omitted). The denial of such a motion may be justified for a variety of reasons, including "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party . . . [,] futility of amendment, etc." (emphasis supplied). Lipsitt v. Plaud, 466 Mass. 240, 254 (2013), quoting from Goulet v. Whitin Mach. Works, Inc., 399 Mass. 547, 549-550 (1987).
The motion to amend was properly denied. "Notwithstanding the absence of an explicit statement of reasons for that denial, '[j]ustification for the judge's action appears in the record before us.'" Mancuso v. Kinchla, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 558, 572 (2004), quoting from Castellucci v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 372 Mass. 288, 291 (1977). Permitting the plaintiff to amend her complaint for a third time would have permitted her to add another theory of relief against the same parties; such an action is barred by the doctrine against claim-splitting. We explained the doctrine in Massaro v. Walsh, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 562, 565-566 (2008):
"The rule against claim splitting 'states that the entry of a "valid and final judgment extinguishes . . . all rights of a plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose." . . . This principle will be applied to extinguish a claim even though the plaintiff is prepared in the second action to present evidence, grounds, or theories of the case not presented in the first action or to seek remedies or forms of relief not demanded in the first action.' Boyd v. Jamaica Plain Co-op. Bank, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 153, 163 (1999). See Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. [21,] 24 [(1988)]; Tinkham v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 45 Mass. App. Ct. 567, 571 (1998). 'Claim preclusion applies "even though the claimant is prepared in a second action to present different evidence or legal theories to support [her] claim." Heacock v. Heacock, supra at 23. This is so because "the party to be precluded has had the incentive and opportunity to litigate the matter fully in the first lawsuit." Foster v. Evans, 384 Mass. 687, 696 n.10 (1981), quoting A. Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion V-401 (1969).' Bagley v. Moxley, 407 Mass. [633,] 638 [(1990)]."Each claim in this litigation arose from a single transaction -- the fatal motor vehicle accident. At the time the case began, and certainly by the time of filing the second amended complaint (in July, 2011), James-Brown knew or should have known that she had the option of suing the defendants in their own right for negligence. Having failed to include those claims earlier, she cannot be permitted to do so after the case has been resolved. Judgment had entered and was affirmed on appeal. She "cite[s] no authority holding that, in reasonably comparable circumstances, a trial judge abused his discretion in denying a motion to amend." Mancuso v. Kinchla, supra, quoting from Castellucci v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., supra at 292.
The defendants' request for appellate attorney's fees is denied.
Order entered June 16, 2014, denying motion to amend complaint affirmed.
By the Court (Grainger, Hanlon & Carhart, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
Clerk Entered: September 15, 2015.