Jaiguay v. Vasquez

77 Citing cases

  1. Baron v. Genlyte Thomas Group, LLC

    132 Conn. App. 794 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 7 times

    In return for a relatively low burden of proof and expeditious recovery, employees relinquish their right to any common-law tort claim for their injuries.... Generally, then, all rights and claims between employers and employees, or their representatives or dependents, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished as a result of the act's exclusivity bar.” (Citation omitted.) Johnson v. Atkinson, 283 Conn. 243, 251, 926 A.2d 656 (2007), overruled in part on other grounds by Jaiguay v. Vasquez, 287 Conn. 323, 348, 948 A.2d 955 (2008). “The principles that govern our standard of review in workers' compensation appeals are well established.... The board sits as an appellate tribunal reviewing the decision of the commissioner.... [T]he review ... of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts.... [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner.... [T]he commissioner is the sole arbiter of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses.... Where the subordinate facts allow for diverse inferences, the commissioner's selection of the inference to be drawn must stand unless it is based on an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them....

  2. Hodgate v. Ferraro

    123 Conn. App. 443 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010)   Cited 14 times

    T had died as a result of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred in October, 2003, when he was a passenger in a van driven by S and owned by W Co., which employed both T and S. S and W Co. moved for summary judgment contending that the plaintiff's claims were barred by Massachusetts workers' compensation law, which, unlike Connecticut law, contains no exception to the exclusivity doctrine for actions arising out of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. The trial court granted the motions for summary judgment, concluding, on the basis of the "most significant relationship test" articulated by the Supreme Court in 2008 in Jaiguay v. Vasquez ( 287 Conn. 323), that Massachusetts law governed in that S and T, who were joint employees and, therefore, coemployees of W Co., L Co. or both, were returning to Massachusetts from a job site in New York when the accident occurred and, thus, were acting in the course of their employment. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held:

  3. W. Dermatology Consultants, P.C. v. Vitalworks, Inc.

    322 Conn. 541 (Conn. 2016)   Cited 54 times
    Recognizing the applicable factors under § 145 of the Restatement (Second) " the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered."

    Id.Next, the Appellate Court engaged in a choice of law analysis in accordance with the most significant relationship test set forth in §§ 6 (2) and 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws; see, e.g., Jaiguay v. Vasquez , 287 Conn. 323, 349–50, 948 A.2d 955 (2008) (adopting most significant relationship test of Restatement [Second] of Conflict of Laws for tort actions); and concluded that the trial court incorrectly had determined that the plaintiff's unfair trade practices claim was governed by Connecticut law. See Western Dermatology Consultants, P.C. v. VitalWorks, Inc. ,supra, 146 Conn.App. at 211, 78 A.3d 167.

  4. Springer v. J.B. Transp., Inc.

    145 Conn. App. 805 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013)   Cited 2 times

    The “place of the employment relation” prong requires that a claimant must demonstrate, at a minimum, a sufficiently significant relationship between Connecticut and the employee's relationship with his employer. Jaiguay v. Vasquez, 287 Conn. 323, 346, 948 A.2d 955 (2008); Burse v. American International Airways, Inc., 262 Conn. 31, 38–39, 808 A.2d 672 (2002); see part III of this opinion. On appeal, as before the review board, the plaintiff claims that the commissioner erred in deciding that Connecticut was not the place of the employment relation between her decedent and the defendant.

  5. Albarran v. Blessing

    No. 3:17-cv-2157 (SRU) (D. Conn. Mar. 11, 2020)   Cited 2 times
    Applying Connecticut law and noting that "the duty to drive with ‘due regard’ for the safety of all persons and property ... necessarily requires the exercise of judgment, which is the ‘hallmark’ of a discretionary duty"

    In tort actions, Connecticut courts apply the "most significant relationship" test set out in sections 6 and 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. See Jaiguay v. Vasquez, 287 Conn. 323, 348-50 (2008); Western Dermatology Consultants, P.C. v. VitalWorks, Inc., 322 Conn. 541, 551 n.9 (2016). In the absence of a state statutory directive indicating otherwise, Section 6(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws lists factors a court should consider in determining which jurisdiction has the most significant relationship with the action at issue:

  6. Turner v. Boyle

    116 F. Supp. 3d 58 (D. Conn. 2015)   Cited 67 times
    Finding the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction "[b]ecause Connecticut has not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to claims brought under sections 1983 or 1985. . . ."

    Over the past thirty years, however, Connecticut courts also have applied the “most significant relationship” analysis set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws for tort claims when “application of the doctrine of lex loci would produce an arbitrary, irrational result.” Macomber v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Corp., 277 Conn. 617, 640, 894 A.2d 240 (2006) (citing O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 648–50, 519 A.2d 13 (1986)); accord Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 190 (2d Cir.2009); see also Jaiguay v. Vasquez, 287 Conn. 323, 349 n. 20 & 350 n. 21, 948 A.2d 955 (2008) (noting with approval Connecticut's trend towards using the “most significant relationship” framework when determining choice of law with respect to tort claims). The factors for determining which state has the most significant relationship to a tort claim include: (1) the place where the injury occurred; (2) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties; and (4) the place where the relationship between the parties is centered.

  7. Leahy v. New England Motor Freight

    2008 Ct. Sup. 16035 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008)

    This case, however, is distinguishable from "most reported and unreported cases deciding choice of law" because in those cases the pleaded cause of action only existed under the laws of one state and therefore, the claim would not exist if the other state's law was determined to govern. See, e.g., Jaiguay v. Vasquez, 287 Conn. 323, 350, 948 A.2d 955 (2008) ("[u]nlike this state's law, however, the New York statutory scheme contains no provision authorizing an employee to bring a common-law tort action against a coworker for damages stemming from the coworker's work-related, negligent operation of a motor vehicle"). In this case, however, the defendant does not suggest that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the motion is granted.

  8. Zolla v. John Cheeseman Trucking, No

    5261 CRB 5 (Conn. Work Comp. 2008)

    Finally, they argue that the Ohio BWC has rendered a judgment in the respondent's favor on this claim, and this denial should be binding on the Connecticut forum. We have considered these arguments at length, but in light of the Connecticut Supreme Court's recent decisions in Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 286 Conn. 102 (2008) and Jaiguay v. Vasquez, 287 Conn. 323 (2008), we find these arguments unpersuasive. There is no dispute in this case that the respondent failed to file a disclaimer of liability within the statutory period to contest this claim, and pursuant to Harpaz, supra, the claimant's injury is conclusively presumed to be compensable under Connecticut law.

  9. Pressman v. Purcell

    CIVIL CASE NO. 3:17-CV-1918 (JCH) (D. Conn. Nov. 20, 2018)   Cited 2 times

    In fact, Connecticut has adopted the "most significant relationship" test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. See Jaiguay v. Vasquez, 287 Conn. 323, 349 (2008); W. Dermatology Consultants, P.C. v. VitalWorks, Inc., 322 Conn. 541, 558 (2016). Under the Restatement approach, absent a statutory directive as to the applicable choice of law, courts are directed to weigh several factors to determine which state has the most significant relationship to the underlying claim.

  10. McCullough v. World Wrestling Entm't, Inc.

    172 F. Supp. 3d 528 (D. Conn. 2016)   Cited 16 times
    Finding a lengthy complaint "replete with allegations" that defendant had "misrepresented material facts," including various health risks, did not meet Rule 9(b)'s pleading standard due to lack of factual support

    See Gerena v. Korb, 617 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir.2010) (“[W]hen a case is transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the law of the transferor state is to be applied so long as the transferor state could properly have exercised jurisdiction.”). However, in this case the determination of which state's choice-of-law rules to apply is made easier by the fact that both Oregon and Connecticut courts consider choice-of-law questions by examining the same factors, which are set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 145. Jaiguay v. Vasquez , 287 Conn. 323, 948 A.2d 955 (Conn.2008) (“we have moved away from the place of the injury rule for tort actions and adopted the most significant relationship test found in §§ 6 and 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.”); 389 Orange Street Partners v. Arnold , 179 F.3d 656, 662 (9th Cir.1999) (“Oregon courts follow the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 145 approach to determining the appropriate substantive law.”). Under the factors set forth in the Restatement and the precedent cases in either jurisdiction, Connecticut substantive law must be applied to Haynes' claims. WWE notes that its Motion to Dismiss the Haynes action argued that the District Court for the District of Oregon lacked personal jurisdiction over WWE. Thus, WWE argues that if this Court were to determine that WWE was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Oregon, Connecticut choice-of-law rules would apply.