Based on OCGA § 16-5-91(a), as limited by the language of the indictment, Jones could be convicted for aggravated stalking upon the State's showing that Jones (1) violated a good behavior bond; (2) which prohibited following, placing under surveillance, or contacting the victim; (3) without the consent of the victim; and (4) for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the victim. See Jagat v. State, 240 Ga.App. 822, 822(1), 525 S.E.2d 388 (1999).          Although the statute fails to provide a definition of the term " surveillance," the term is readily understood by people of ordinary intelligence as meaning a " close watch kept over someone or something."

In order to establish the offense of aggravated stalking in this case, the State was required to prove (1) that Burke violated a protective order; (2) that prohibited contact with Bolton; (3) without Bolton's consent; and (4) for the purpose of harassing and intimidating her. See OCGA § 16-5-91 (a); Jagat v. State, 240 Ga. App. 822, 823 (1) ( 525 SE2d 388) (1999). We find the evidence sufficient to support a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the State established the first three of these elements.

Even though the letters were not overtly threatening, given the rambling nature of the letters, which included disparaging references about the victim's appearance, references to Maskivish's infidelities, and a suggestion that the victim be tested for HIV, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that such acts were intended to harass and intimidate and reasonably placed the victim in fear for her safety. See Jagat v. State, 240 Ga. App. 822, 823 (1) ( 525 SE2d 388) (1999). 2.

Even though she refused to open the door and requested that he leave, Johnson returned a short time later, again knocking on Daniels' door and demanding to talk with her, causing Daniels to feel it was necessary to call the police for protection. Under these facts a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that such acts were intended to harass and intimidate and reasonably placed Daniels in fear for her safety. See Jagat v. State, 240 Ga. App. 822, 823(1) ( 525 S.E.2d 388) (1999). 2.

Beyond the direct phone contact, the other indirect contacts also qualify to establish a scheme of prohibited behavior. See Jagat v. State, 240 Ga. App. 822, 823(1) ( 525 S.E.2d 388) (1999); Wright v. State, 232 Ga. App. 646, 647(1) ( 502 S.E.2d 756) (1998). In May 1997, he confronted her face-to-face at her workplace (bearing a knife in his pocket and telling her he wanted her "to go to heaven" with him), called her repeatedly that night, and was near the entrance of her workplace the next morning.

"The applicable essential elements of aggravated stalking are: (1) violation of a bond posted pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-6-110, (2) which prohibits following, placing under surveillance, or contacting another person, (3) without the consent of that person, and (4) for the purpose of harassing and intimidating that person." Jagat v. State, 240 Ga. App. 822, 823 (1999). In support of the warrant application, Williams attested that Malone attempted "to contact and harass call the Camden House and make contact with . . . Sumrall[,] which is in violation of a pre-existing TPO/Bond condition."