Moreover, such "[a]llegations of race discrimination must be supported by material facts, not mere conclusions." See, ECF No. 64 at 6 (citing Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1982)). Yet despite having been instructed thusly, LCI again leans on the same allegations that were twice found to be conclusory and insufficient to support an inference of racial animus.
Neither general denunciations of racism nor refusals to meet with Review members — even white Review members — are enough to premise an inference of discrimination based on the Students' race. See Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1982) (requiring fact-specific allegations showing that "race was the reason for" the discrimination). As one court has written:
When an amendment will not cure the legal deficiencies of the original complaint, the district court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant leave to amend. Textor v. Board of Regents of Northern Illinois University, 711 F.2d 1387, 1391 (7th Cir. 1983); Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1982). Failure to remedy the jurisdictional defects of a complaint is one example of where an amendment would prove futile.
“[I]n American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); see also Sargeant v. Dixon, 130 F.3d 1067, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1966); Sattler v. Johnson, 857 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir. 1988); Sibley v. Obama, 866 F.Supp.2d 17, 22 (D.D.C. 2012); Otero v. U.S. Attorney General, 832 F.2d 141, 141-42 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); see also Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1982). In other words, the decision of whether or not to prosecute, and for what offense, rests with the prosecution, see, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978), and “an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion[,]” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
Allegations of race discrimination must be supported by material facts, not mere conclusions. Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1982). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this burden simply by tacking "because of [Plaintiffs'] race" onto their allegations or by merely alleging that Defendants "treated [Plaintiffs] differently than whites, on the basis of racial animus."
Moreover, the alleged conspirators must have intended to discriminate against the plaintiff and deprive him of equal protection or equal privileges and immunities because of his race. Griffin v. Breckinridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1983); see also, Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640 at 643 ("To sufficiently state a cause of action [under Section 1985] the plaintiff must allege some facts that demonstrate that his race was the reason for the defendant's [action]." (emphasis added)).
Nor has he alleged any racial or other class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1982). Thus, Szeklinski's claims under Section 1985 will be dismissed.
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs cannot plead intentional discrimination in a conclusory fashion. They must plead sufficient facts to show or raise a plausible inference that the defendant purposefully discriminated against them because of their race. Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff "must allege some facts that demonstrate that his race was the reason" for the defendant's actions); Davis v. Frapolly, 747 F. Supp. 451, 452 (N.D.Ill. 1989) ("A mere conclusory allegation of intentional discrimination is insufficient" under § 1981.) This burden may be satisfied by allegations showing direct evidence of discrimination, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985), or through the indirect, burden-shifting method first established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
The plain language of the rule directs the court to grant leave "when justice so requires," Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), and the court must respect the spirit of the rule, which is tolerant toward amendments. Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1982).
Thus, under § 1981, the events of the intentional and purposeful discrimination, as well as the racial animus constituting the motivating factor for the defendant's actions must be specifically pleaded in the complaint to withstand dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See Gen. Bldg. Contractors, 458 U.S. at 391, 102 S.Ct. at 3150; Albert, 851 F.2d at 572; Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 1989); Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1982). In the case at bar, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant violated his rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, by virtue of the fact that: (1) he is a native and citizen of the Republic of Bangladesh; (2) the Panel found him guilty of sexual harassment; (3) the penalty imposed upon the plaintiff was disparate when compared to the penalty imposed upon Weisman, a Caucasian student, who was found guilty of assault.