"A finding or a conclusion cannot be held to be erroneous merely because it was based upon the testimony or opinion of one witness in opposition to that of several others testifying to the contrary. Condon v. Pomroy-Grace, 73 Conn. 607, 614, 48 A. 756, 53 L.R.A. 696; Jadovich v. Collins Co., 109 Conn. 62, 66 145 A. 25. A conclusion reached upon comparison and examination of conflicting professional opinion, by reliance upon one rather than another, can rarely be found erroneous in law in the absence of bad faith. Driscoll v. Jewell Belting Co., supra, 96 Conn. 295, at page 300, 114 A. 109.

In most of these instances tuberculosis, locally called `grinders consumption', became superimposed upon the pneumoconiosis. The cases which have engaged our attention in this connection are the following: Kovaliski v. Collins Co., 102 Conn. 6 [ 128 A. 288]; Dombrowski v. Jennings GriffenCo., 103 Conn. 720 [ 131 A. 745]; Mesite v. InternationalSilver Co., 104 Conn. 724 [ 134 A. 264]; Cishowski v. Clayton Mfg. Co., 105 Conn. 651 [ 136 A. 472]; Romaniec v. Collins Co., 107 Conn. 63 [ 139 A. 503]; Jadovich v. Collins Co., 109 Conn. 62 [ 145 A. 25]; Rousu v. CollinsCo. (December 8, 1931), 114 Conn. 24 [ 157 A. 264]. In the Rousu case pneumoconiosis is thus described: `Pneumoconiosis is an occupational disease which may develop into tuberculosis.

In addition to the testimony, the commissioner had the benefit of the many exhibits referred to. It was his province to accept the evidence which seemed to him to be credible and the more weighty. Jadovich v. Collins Co., 109 Conn. 62, 66, 145 A. 25. The subordinate facts found by the commissioner do not logically compel the conclusion that the minimal amount of silicosis in the lungs of the deceased was a substantial factor in causing his death. Upon an appeal to the Superior Court from the finding and award of a compensation commissioner, the court may not retry the facts.

In view of this conflict in the medical testimony, the conclusion of the trial court must stand. Stier v. Derby, 119 Conn. 44, 51, 174 A. 332; Senzamici v. Waterbury Castings Co., 115 Conn. 446, 451, 161 A. 860; Jadovich v. Collins Co., 109 Conn. 62, 66, 145 A. 25; Driscoll v. Jewell Belting Co., 96 Conn. 295, 299, 114 A. 109. The defendant seeks numerous additions to the finding and also attacks certain of those made by the trial court, but we can make no corrections which would materially affect the conclusion of the trial court.

The physicians called by the respondent considered that the condition of his heart was due to natural causes and in no way contributed to by the events of the afternoon. In view of this conflict in the medical testimony, the conclusion of the commissioner as to the cause of death cannot be successfully attacked on appeal. Senzamici v. Waterbury Castings Co., 115 Conn. 446, 451, 161 A. 860; Jadovich v. Collins Co., 109 Conn. 62, 66, 145 A. 25; Driscoll v. Jewell Belting Co., 96 Conn. 295, 299, 114 A. 109."

A conclusion reached by a commissioner by comparison and examination of conflicting professional opinion, by reliance upon one rather than on another, can rarely be found erroneous in law in the absence of bad faith. Driscoll v. Jewell Belting Co., 96 Conn. 295, 299, 114 A. 109; Jadovich v. Collins Co., 109 Conn. 62, 66, 145 A. 25; Kulak v. Landers, Frary Clark, 120 Conn. 606, 608, 181 A. 720. In the conflict of opinion among professional men as to the cause of the claimant's disability, it was the province of the commissioner to determine the matter and with his conclusion neither the Superior Court nor this court may interfere.

The ultimate conclusion of the commissioner is supported by the opinion of qualified experts who stated plainly and definitely that in their professional opinion mercurial poisoning was the superinducing cause of the claimant's disability. Although the case is an unusual one, we cannot say that the evidence of these physicians was such that a rational mind could not believe it. It follows that the decision of the commissioner was one based upon conflicting medical testimony with which we do not interfere. Tippman v. State, 119 Conn. 1, 174 A. 296; Senzamici v. Waterbury Castings Co., 115 Conn. 446, 451, 161 A. 860; Jadovich v. Collins Co., 109 Conn. 62, 66, 145 A. 25; Bailey v. Mitchell, 113 Conn. 721, 724, 156 A. 856; Kosik v. Manchester Construction Co., 106 Conn. 107, 136 A. 870; Driscoll v. Jewell Belting Co., 96 Conn. 295, 299, 114 A. 109.

Driscoll v. Jewell Belting Co., 96 Conn. 295, 299, 114 A. 109. A finding or a conclusion cannot be held to be erroneous merely because it was based upon the testimony or opinion of one witness in opposition to that of several others testifying to the contrary. Condon v. Pomroy-Grace, 73 Conn. 607, 614, 48 A. 756; Jadovich v. Collins Co., 109 Conn. 62, 66, 145 A. 25. A conclusion reached upon comparison and examination of conflicting professional opinion, by reliance upon one rather than another, can rarely be found erroneous in law in the absence of bad faith. Driscoll v. Jewell Belting Co., supra, p. 300.

Both sides produced medical experts before the commissioner, and while those of the claimant were of opinion that the exposure to which the deceased was subjected upon that day aggravated the pneumonia and was a contributing cause of his death, the physicians called by the respondent testified with equal positiveness that those conditions were not a substantial factor either in producing or aggravating the pneumonia, and in no way materially affected the outcome. The ultimate conclusion of the commissioner was one of fact from this conflicting evidence with which we may not interfere. Senzamici v. Waterbury Castings Co., 115 Conn. 446, 451, 161 A. 860; Bailey v. Mitchell, 113 Conn. 721, 724, 156 A. 856; Jadovich v. Collins Co., 109 Conn. 62, 66, 145 A. 25; Driscoll v. Jewell Belting Co., 96 Conn. 295, 299, 114 A. 109; Kosik v. Manchester Construction Co., 106 Conn. 107, 136 A. 870; Richardson v. New Haven, 114 Conn. 389, 390, 158 A. 886. It follows that no correction of the finding is permissible which would be of material advantage to the position of the appellant and the finding and award of the commissioner was properly sustained by the Superior Court.

The physicians called by the respondent considered that the condition of his heart was due to natural causes and in no way contributed to by the events of the afternoon. In view of this conflict in the medical testimony, the conclusion of the commissioner as to the cause of death cannot be successfully attacked on appeal. Senzamici v. Waterbury Castings Co., 115 Conn. 446, 451, 161 A. 860; Jadovich v. Collins Co., 109 Conn. 62, 66, 145 A. 25; Driscoll v. Jewell Belting Co., 96 Conn. 295, 299, 114 A. 109. That the decedent died from a coronary occlusion or thrombosis is found by the commissioner and not disputed. The appellant is entitled to have added to the finding so much of paragraph four of the motion to correct the finding as states that a thrombosis or an occlusion of the coronary artery means that the blood supply to the artery supplying the heart tissue with blood is shut off; that either a thrombosis or an occlusion is due to arteriosclerosis and the formation of the material inside the blood vessels which breaks loose and closes the artery, thereby cutting off the blood supply; and that the condition which makes a thrombosis or an occlusion possible takes a long while to develop.