However, the notice must "be so drafted as to inform a member with reasonable particularity of the details of the charges." Jacques v. Local 1418, International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 246 F. Supp. 857, 860 (E.D.La. 1965). Accord, Eisman, supra; Gleason, supra; Magelssen v. Local 518, Operative Plasterers and Cement Masons, 233 F. Supp. 459 (W.D.Mo. 1964); Vars v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers Helpers (hereinafter "International Bhd. of Boilermakers"), 215 F. Supp. 943, 947 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 320 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1963).

" Id. at 1306 n. 10; see also Berg v. Watson, 417 F. Supp. 806, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("[T]he notice must `be so drafted as to inform a member with reasonable particularity of the details of the charges.'" (quoting Jacques v. Local 1418, ILA, 246 F. Supp. 857, 860 (E.D. La. 1965))). The Branch argues that this circuit applies only a minimal standard to the assessment of specificity.

Id. The Act does not allow the recovery of damages simply because the union has not followed its internal rules. Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1240; Bunz v. Moving Picture Machine Operators' Protective Union, Local 224, 567 F.2d 1117, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Martire v. Laborers' Local Union 1058, 410 F.2d 32, 36-37 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903, 90 S.Ct. 216, 24 L.Ed.2d 179 (1969); cf. Jacques v. Local 1418, International Longshoreman's Association, 246 F. Supp. 857 (E.D.La. 1965), aff'd on othergrounds, 404 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1968) (seven-day period between notice of charges and disciplinary hearing violates Act, when union by-laws require twenty-day notice period). In order to prevail, the plaintiff must show that the union's technical failure to follow its rules deprived him of a fair hearing either by severely impairing his ability to prepare and present a defense or by seriously increasing the risk that the decision-maker will reach an erroneous determination.

The Third Circuit's reasoning is sufficient. The earliest cases which dealt with the issue held that attorney's fees were not recoverable in Title I actions. See Vars v. International Bro. of Boilermakers, etc., D.Conn., 1963, 215 F. Supp. 943, 952, aff'd on a different issue, 2 Cir., 1963, 320 F.2d 576; McCraw v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, etc., E.D.Tenn., 1963, 216 F. Supp. 655, 664, aff'd 6 Cir., 1965, 341 F.2d 705; Cole v. Hall, E.D. N.Y., 1964, 35 F.R.D. 4, 8, aff'd on a different issue, 2 Cir., 1967, 339 F.2d 881; Leonard v. M.I.T. Employees' Union, D. Mass., 1964, 225 F. Supp. 937, 940; Magelssen v. Local Union 518, Operative Plasterers' and Cement Masons' International Ass'n., W.D.Mo., 1965, 240 F. Supp. 259, 263; Jacques v. Local 1418, International Longshoremen's Ass'n., E. D.La., 1965, 246 F. Supp. 857, 859; Bailey v. Netter, E.D.La., 1967, 266 F. Supp. 165. However, since the Third Circuit decided to the contrary in Gartner v. Soloner, supra, the clear trend has been to hold that a trial judge has the discretionary power to award attorney's fees to a § 412 plaintiff.

See Giordani v. Upholsterers Int'l. Union of N. Amer., 403 F.2d 85, 88-89 (2 Cir. 1968) (intra-union exhaustion under § 101 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411); Wirtz v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 267 F. Supp. 527, 531-533 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See Wirtz v. American Guild of Variety Artists, supra n. 14; Jacques v. Local 1418, I.L.A., 246 F. Supp. 857, 858-859 (E.D.La. 1965), aff'd 404 F.2d 703 (5 Cir. 1968) (intra-union exhaustion under § 101 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411). If a union desires the opportunity to render its ultimate appellate judgment on a member's complaint before he may turn to the Secretary of Labor under subsection (2) of § 402(a), it is the union which must provide an appellate timetable which produces a final judgment within the three calendar month period.

We affirm the grant of the injunction for the reasons given by Judge Herlands. The majority of the nine charges filed against Gleason lacked the specificity required by section 101(a)(5) of the Act, a defect not cured by the bill of particulars of October 4. They did not meet the standards imposed by "fundamental notions of due process" which section 101(a)(5) was enacted to protect. Jacques v. Local 1418, 246 F. Supp. 857 (E.D.La. 1965), aff'd, 404 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Vars v. International Brotherhood, 215 F. Supp. 943 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 320 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1963).

The district judge, Judge Ainsworth, in memorandum opinion filed September 30, 1965, held that appellant was not given a "full and fair hearing" within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(5) because of inadequate notice and the failure of the union's accusation to inform him with reasonable specificity of the details of the charges. Jacques v. Local 1418, International Longshoremen's Association, 246 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. La. 1965). The judgment of December 6, 1965, ordered the union to hold a rehearing within 60 days.

Distinguishing Johnson v. Nelson, supra, the District Judge commented that "of prime significance" in the Johnson case was the membership vote to reimburse the litigants, which fact does not appear in this appeal. Other cases which have passed on the allowance of counsel fees under Section 102, but without discussion of the merits, are: Jacques v. Local 1418, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 246 F. Supp. 857 (E.D.La. 1965); Leonard v. M.I.T. Employees' Union, 225 F. Supp. 937 (D.Mass. 1964); Magelssen v. Local Union No. 518, Operative Plasterers, 240 F. Supp. 259 (W.D. Mo. 1965); Bailey v. Netter, 266 F. Supp. 165 (E.D.La. 1967). COUNSEL FEES AS PROPER RELIEF UNDER SECTION 102

"Union officials cannot be expected to frame their charges and specifications technically as formal legal pleadings." Gleason v. Chain Serv. Rest., 300 F. Supp. 1241, 1251 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 422 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1970) (quoting Jacques v. Local 1418, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 246 F. Supp. 857, 859 (E.D. La. 1965), aff'd, 404 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Johnson v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers Branch 1100, 182 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 1999) ("This is not to say . . . that we hold union members to the standards required of a practicing attorney by requiring a highly technical statement of the facts."). Therefore, the required level of specificity "does not rise to the level needed for a criminal indictment," Johnson, 182 F.3d at 1074 (citing United States v. IBT, 19 F.3d 816, 823 (2d Cir. 1994)), and instead, "an informal written statement of facts suffices."

A full and fair rehearing is required where a union member is convicted without due process, and the union appeal in this case did not afford such protection. Goodman v. Laborers' Union of North America, 742 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1984); Jacques v. Local 1418, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n., 246 F. Supp. 857 (E.D.La. 1965), aff'd, 404 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1969). If the plaintiff was a member in good standing, he not only was eligible for nomination to hold the position of treasurer, but also should not have been barred from the meeting at which nominations were taken. Had Mr. Waring been allowed to enter, he could have accepted his nomination in accordance with standard union policy. Due process under 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) requires, inter alia, that an individual be "served with written specific charges.