Opinion
No. 1-02-1163-T
May 4, 2004
Defendants Burkley Sain and Olivia Johnson have filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial and remittitur of the punitive damages award pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants have also moved for a hearing on that motion. Plaintiff has filed a motion for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Plaintiff has responded to Defendants' motions, and Defendants have responded to Plaintiff's motion. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's motion for attorney fees and expenses is DENIED. Defendants' motion for a hearing is DENIED as unnecessary because the parties have thoroughly briefed the issues.
I.
On the evening of July 4, 2001, Sergeant Burkley Sain of the Jackson Police Department received a communication from a radio dispatcher that a citizen reported seeing some teenagers brandishing firearms. After responding to the call and taking a suspect into custody, Sergeant Sain issued a radio bulletin advising officers in the east Jackson area to be on the lookout for other suspects driving a white Ford Explorer and a small, blue or dark colored Geo or Hyundai. Sergeant Sain notified the other officers that the driver of the dark colored vehicle was a black female.
Shortly after hearing Sergeant Sain's radio bulletin, Officers Olivia Johnson and Rolanda James, on patrol in east Jackson, observed Fakesha Jacox, a black female, driving a black Chevrolet Malibu. Suspecting that Ms. Jacox might have been the subject of the bulletin, the officers turned on their cruiser's blue lights to signal her to stop. Ms. Jacox, who was only a few blocks away from her father's house when the officers signaled her to stop, did not stop her vehicle until she arrived at the house.
As Ms. Jacox exited her vehicle, Officer Johnson approached her and asked whether she knew that police lights meant to stop. Ms. Jacox provided Officer Johnson her driver license and asked why the officers had stopped her. Ms. Jacox's father, Jessie Jacox, who at the time was a member of the Jackson city council, then approached from the back yard and asked Officer Johnson what was going on. Ms. Jacox said to her father "get her off me" and started to walk toward the house. Mr. Jacox told his daughter to be quiet and to go in the house. Officer Johnson grabbed Ms. Jacox's arm, but she continued on toward the house. Officer Johnson claims that she told Ms. Jacox to stop walking away from her. Ms. Jacox denied that Officer Johnson told her to stop.
Officer Johnson told Sergeant Sain, who had just arrived on the scene, to get Ms. Jacox as she continued to walk to her house. According to Ms. Jacox, who was five months pregnant at the time, Sergeant Sain tackled her and forced her to the ground, where she landed on her stomach. The Defendants testified that Sergeant Sain grabbed her by the arm only and that she did not fall to the ground. Mr. Jacox grabbed Sergeant Sain after he had made physical contact with Ms. Jacox. The officers then placed Ms. Jacox under arrest for disorderly conduct and evading arrest. Mr. Jacox was also arrested.
Ms. Jacox, Mr. Jacox, and Asia Thompson, Ms. Jacox's son, filed suit against the City of Jackson, Tennessee, Sergeant Sain, Officer Johnson, and unnamed Officers Doe 1 through 10, raising claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law. Officers Doe 1 through 10 were dismissed, the City of Jackson was granted summary judgment, all state claims were dismissed, and Sergeant Sain and Officer Johnson were granted summary judgment with respect to Asia Thompson and Jessie Jacox's claims arising under § 1983. Sergeant Sain and Officer Johnson, were also granted partial summary judgment as to Ms. Jacox's failure to protect claim, but were denied qualified immunity. See Order, July 25, 2003.
Ms. Jacox's son was born after the events which occurred on July 4, 2001.
The case was tried before a jury on February 9 and 10, 2004. The issues presented at trial were whether Sergeant Sain and Officer Johnson violated Ms. Jacox's Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force against her, arresting her without probable cause, and stopping her without reasonable suspicion. At the conclusion of the proof, Sergeant Sain and Officer Johnson moved for judgment as a matter of law. Their motion was granted with respect to the unlawful stop claim, but denied with respect to the excessive force and unlawful arrest claims. On February 11, 2004, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Sergeant Sain and Officer Johnson as to the excessive force claim and in favor of Ms. Jacox as to the unlawful arrest claim. The jury awarded Ms. Jacox $1 from each Defendant in nominal damages and $30,000 in punitive damages from Officer Johnson and $20,000 in punitive damages from Sergeant Sain.
II. A.
Sergeant Sain and Officer Johnson contend that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law with regard to the arrest without probable cause verdict on the following grounds: (1) they are entitled to qualified immunity; and (2) the verdict is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Defendants alternatively argue that the a new trial or a remittitur of the punitive damages award should be granted because: (1) the court gave the jury an improper instruction; (2) the punitive damages award is not supported by the weight of the evidence and violates the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause; and (3) one of the jurors did not truthfully respond to a material voir dire question.
A post trial judgment as a matter of law motion is governed by Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 50 provides, in part, as follows:
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue.
. . .
Whenever a motion for a judgment as a matter of law made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. . . . If no verdict was returned, the court may, in disposing of the renewed motion, direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law or may order a new trial.
The issue presented by a motion for judgment as a matter of law is whether there is sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact for the jury. Morelock v. NCR Corp., 586 F.2d 1096, 1104 (6th Cir. 1978). That is, the court must determine whether there is evidence which would properly support a jury verdict in favor of the non-movant.Patrick v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 641 F.2d 1192, 1197 (6th Cir. 1980). In making this determination, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and may neither weigh the evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, nor substitute its own judgment for that of the jury. Morelock, 586 F.2d at 1104. The court must give the non-moving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Hunt v. Coynes Cylinder Co., 956 F.2d 1319, 1328 (6th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). If all the evidence points so strongly in favor of the movant that reasonable minds could not differ, then the motion should be granted. Morelock, 586 F.2d at 1104-05. However, the motion should be granted only when there is "a complete absence of pleading or proof on an issue material to the cause of action or when no disputed issues of fact exist such that reasonable minds would not differ." Tuck v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc., 7 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1993).
Prior to the trial, Sergeant Sain and Officer Johnson moved for qualified immunity as to all of Ms. Jacox's allegations. See Defs.' Mot. for Part. Summ. J., May 13, 2003, Docket No. 48. Their motion for qualified immunity was denied on the basis that there were numerous questions of fact regarding the entire incident. See Order, July 11, 2003, Docket No. 66. In their present motion, Defendants ask the court to reconsider its earlier denial of qualified immunity with respect to Ms. Jacox's arrest in light of the evidence presented at trial.
To determine whether a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity, two questions must be asked. First, do the facts alleged, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate that the officer violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights? See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Second, if a constitutional violation occurred, was the right violated so clearly established at the time that a reasonable officer should have been aware of the its existence? Id. If the answer to both questions is yes, then the officer is not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 202. A police officer may be entitled to qualified immunity, even though the plaintiff's rights have been violated, "if the officer's mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable."Id. Qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law," and, thus, should be granted even where reasonable officers could fairly disagree about the existence of a constitutional violation. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
Whether Sergeant Sain and Officer Johnson are entitled to qualified immunity turns on the question of whether Ms. Jacox's arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment requires that an officer have probable cause to arrest a person. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979). Thus, to be entitled to qualified immunity, Sergeant Sain and Officer Johnson must have had probable cause to arrest Ms. Jacox.
In deciding whether probable cause exists to support an arrest, courts must look to the "facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense."Id. at 37. "Probable cause is assessed `from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.'" Klein v. Long, 275 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
Sergeant Sain and Officer Johnson arrested Ms. Jacox for disorderly conduct, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-305, and evading arrest, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-603. The evading arrest charge was later amended to failure to yield to an emergency vehicle, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-132. The officers submit that they also could have charged Ms. Jacox under a city ordinance which prohibits a person from resisting or interfering with a police officer in the discharge of their duty. Jackson, Tenn., Ordinance § 11-305. If probable cause exists for any one of these charges, then the arrest was lawful, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred, and the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. See Lyons v. City of Xenia. No. 03-3282, 2004 WL 187555, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 27, 2004) (citing Weaver v. Shadoan, 340 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2003)). Based upon the evidence presented at trial, Sergeant Sain and Officer Johnson had sufficient probable cause to arrest Ms. Jacox for failing to yield to an emergency vehicle and for interfering with a police officer in the discharge of duty.
The failure to yield to an emergency vehicle statute provides:
Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle making use of audible and visual signals . . . [t]he driver of every other vehicle shall yield the right-of-way and shall immediately drive to a position parallel to, and as close as possible to, the right-hand edge or curb of the roadway clear of any intersection, and shall stop and remain in such position until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed, except when otherwise directed by a police officer.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-132(a)(1). Violation of this statute is a misdemeanor. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-132(e).
The evidence presented at trial shows that Officer Johnson could have reasonably concluded that she had probable cause to arrest Ms. Jacox for failing to yield to an emergency vehicle. On direct examination, Ms. Jacox testified as follows:
Q: [W]hen's the first time you noticed any blue lights behind your car on July 4, 2001?
A: The first time I noticed the blue lights behind my car was about when I got to the street called Hamilton, which is about two streets from my driveway.
Q: Okay, and you noticed the blue lights. Then what did you do next?
A: I proceeded to my driveway, and I pulled the car right back where it was when I left.
Trial Transcript, page 99. Ms. Jacox further testified on cross examination:
Q: Now, you indicated that before you got to your house at 759 East Chester on the evening of July 4th that you realized that there was a police car behind you with blue lights on.
A: Right.
Q: Am I right on that? And I think you said that you were a couple of streets away when you — from your house when you saw that; is that right?
A: Right.
Q: Now your house is on Chester Street.
A: Right.
Q: And when you say a couple of streets away, you mean you had to pass a couple of streets that were to your right before you got to your house.
A: Right.
Q: And so is it a fair statement then to say that you passed those streets and the house along the side of Chester Street there with the police car following you with the blue lights on?
A: Yes, if — Yeah.
Id. at 127-28. This evidence shows that Ms. Jacox was aware of the police vehicle, with its emergency lights, and did not yield as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-132(a)(1). Accordingly, Officer Johnson had probable cause to believe that Ms. Jacox had violated § 55-8-132(a)(1).
Sergeant Sain also had probable cause to arrest Ms. Jacox based upon her apparent violation of § 55-8-132(a)(1). Sergeant Sain testified to his observations as follows:
A: I saw [Ms. Jacox's] vehicle stopped at the intersection with the police unit with its blue lights flashing behind it.
Q: And then what happened?
A: The light turned green, and the vehicle proceeded through the intersection, turned left onto 70 Bypass, which would have had it traveling west, with the police unit following.
Q: And the blue lights were on in Officer Johnson's car?
A: Correct.
Q: When you saw that happen, did you radio to Officers Johnson and James?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: What did you ask them?
A: I asked was that vehicle evading them.
Q: Did you ever get a response from them, or did they stop before —
A: I never got a response via the radio. They did effect a stop on the vehicle . . .
Trial Transcript, pages 286-87. Based upon Sergeant Sain's observations, he had a reasonable basis to conclude that probable cause existed to arrest Ms. Jacox for failing to yield to an emergency vehicle.
The officers also had probable cause to believe that Ms. Jacox violated the Jackson city ordinance that prohibits one from interfering with an officer while the officer is in discharge of his or her duty. Jackson, Tenn., Ordinance § 11-305. That ordinance provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to resist or in any way interfere with or hinder any police officer while the latter is in the discharge or apparent discharge of duty.Id.
The evidence presented at trial shows that Ms. Jacox walked away from Officer Johnson before the officer concluded her investigation. On cross examination, Ms. Jacox testified as follows:
Q: Did Officer Johnson at any time as you walked by her or went around the front of your car physically touch you in any way?
A: I think she — I remember her grabbing my arm and kind of swinging me back around.
Q: Okay, so she grabbed you and tried to turn you back around?
A: Right.
Trial Transcript, page 132.
Mr. Jacox testified as follows:
Q: Okay. And when's the first time you noticed Sergeant Sain? Where was he?
A: Okay, when my daughter — when the officer had shouted, "Hold it. We have the wrong car," then that kind of froze [Officer Johnson] and she backed up and stepped away. Then [Ms. Jacox] walked from around the car and got around to the front of the car right here. [Officer Johnson] grabbed [Ms. Jacox's] arm and snatched her arm around. Well, then I came — and I came up, and she said, "Daddy, you'd better get her," and I came up and said, "Be quiet and go on in the house."Id. at 156.
Officer James, who was Officer Johnson's partner that evening, testified:
Q: You said that you and Mr. Jacox had — you used the term "altercation." What do you mean by that?
A: When I told Ms. Jacox not to go in the house, her father had told her to go ahead and go in the house. And when I attempted to go and get her, Mr. Jacox stepped in my way and would not let me proceed any further.Id. at 203.
Officer Johnson testified as follows:
Q: What verbal commands did you give Ms. Jacox?
A: I believe I asked her not to leave the area of where I was at.
Q: What did it appear to you that she was trying to do?
A: Go inside the house.
Q: And how many times did you ask her not to leave the area?
A: Maybe twice.
Q: And what was her response?
A: She continued on.
Q: What was your purpose of asking — or what was your purpose in asking her not to leave the area?
A: Because I wanted to investigate the ["be on the lookout" radio dispatch] that we were stopping her on.Id. at 225-26.
Officer Johnson had a reasonable basis to believe that there was probable cause to arrest Ms. Jacox for resisting an officer. Both Mr. and Ms. Jacox testified that Officer Johnson did not tell Ms. Jacox to stop or not to proceed to the house, but, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Jacox, Officer Johnson nonetheless had probable cause. The evidence shows that Ms. Jacox, after failing to pull her vehicle over after seeing the police car's blue lights, walked away from Officer Johnson as Officer Johnson attempted to investigate whether Ms. Jacox was the subject of Sergeant Sain's radio bulletin and continued to walk toward her home after Officer Johnson grabbed her arm and tried to pull her back. While there is no case law interpreting the Jackson City Ordinance § 11-305, a reasonable officer, or any reasonable, prudent person, would certainly conclude that Ms. Jacox's actions are consistent with a person resisting or interfering with a police officer while the officer is discharging her duties. Accordingly, Officer Johnson had probable cause to arrest Ms. Jacox for violating the city ordinance.
Sergeant Sain also had probable cause to arrest Ms. Jacox because he reasonably relied on Officer Johnson's request that he "get" Ms. Jacox. Sergeant Sain testified:
Q: Well, tell us when you got [to the Jacoxes' house] what happened?
A: When I arrived, I parked behind the police unit that was parked on 70 Bypass, I believe, half on the street and half on the curb. I exited the vehicle. And as soon as I exited the vehicle, Officer Johnson made the statement or direction for me to "get her." And that would have been the lady that was walking away from the vehicle toward the house.
Trial Transcript, page 288. Sergeant Sain arrived on the scene as Ms. Jacox was walking away from his fellow officer and that officer asked him for help. When an officer arrives at the scene while a suspect is being arrested by another officer, that officer can reasonably assume that he is entitled to assist the other officer. See Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 898 (6th Cir. 2002). Based upon the evidence presented at trial, it was reasonable for Sergeant Sain to physically seize and arrest Ms. Jacox on Officer Johnson's direction. Accordingly, Sergeant Sain had probable cause to arrest Ms. Jacox.
The fact that the offenses for which the officers had probable cause to arrest Ms. Jacox were misdemeanors does not negate the reasonableness of their actions. Ms. Jacox argues that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-118(b)(1), which provides that police officers should issue a citation to those who have committed a misdemeanor instead of making an arrest, secures her right to be free from arrest for committing a misdemeanor. According to Ms. Jacox, the officers violated that state right when they arrested her and, therefore, should not be entitled to qualified immunity.
It is well established that § 1983 actions are intended to vindicate federal rights. See, e.g., Horn by Parks v. Madison County Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653, 656 (6th Cir. 1994) ("Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation under color of state law, of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States"). While a state statute may create a state right, "[a] state statute cannot `create' a federal constitutional right." Harrill v. Blount County, 55 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir. 1995). Therefore, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-118(b)(1) does not create a federal right nor does a police officer's violation of that statute give rise to a § 1983 action.
The critical question in this case is whether Ms. Jacox's arrest for suspicion of committing a misdemeanor, supported by probable cause, violates the Fourth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has announced clearly that an arrest in such circumstances does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) ("If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender"). Thus, Sergeant Sain and Officer Johnson, both of whom had probable cause to believe that Ms. Jacox had committed one or more misdemeanors, did not violate the Fourth Amendment by arresting Ms. Jacox.
Because the officers had probable cause to arrest Ms. Jacox and because her arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment, Sergeant Sain and Officer Johnson are entitled to qualified immunity as to Ms. Jacox's unlawful arrest allegation. Because the jury's verdict has been set aside and there was no constitutional violation, there is no basis for punitive damages. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law is GRANTED. Because the granting of qualified immunity effectively reverses the jury's verdict as to the arrest, it is unnecessary to decide whether the weight of the evidence supported the jury's verdict.
B.
Plaintiff, who was the prevailing party following trial, seeks the court's approval of $42, 975.01 in attorney fees and expenses pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Section 1988 provides that a prevailing party in a § 1983 is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs. Because Ms. Jacox is no longer a prevailing party in this action, she is not entitled to attorney fees or expenses and, therefore, her motion is DENIED.
III.
For the above reasons, Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law [Docket No. 98] is GRANTED. As a result, Plaintiff Fakesha Jacox is not a prevailing party in this action and Plaintiffs motion for attorney fees and expenses [Docket No. 100] is DENIED.
Finally, because the parties thoroughly briefed the issues before the court, Defendants' motion for a hearing [Docket No. 97] is DENIED.
The clerk is directed to amend the judgment previously entered in this case consistent with this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.