Because the court finds that defendants have met their burden to show relevancy, necessity, and compelling interest of the proposed testimony, Voorhis' motion is DENIED. Voorhis cites one case, In re Jacobs, 460 B.R. 149, 156 (Bankr. E. D. Mich. 2011), but that case is distinguishable. In Jacobs, the parties agreed to the admissibility of the affidavit at trial.
Other courts, relying on the statutory text, i.e., the use of the broader term “financial condition,” rather than “financial statement,” and drawing the conclusion that factual representations regarding ownership of an asset or the existence or nonexistence of an encumbrance on an asset “go to the very heart of a [debtor's or insider's] financial condition” have held that the term “financial condition” has a broader scope. See In re Van Steinburg, 744 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir.1984); In re Jacobs, 460 B.R. 149, 155 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Mich.2011); In re Ortiz, 441 B.R. 73, 83 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Tex.2010); In re Kleiman, 2007 WL 1480716, at *4 (Bkrtcy.D.N.J. May 18, 2007). Finally, there is a third interpretation known as the “modified expansive view” which emphasizes (a) whether the statement in issue constitutes “information that a potential lender or investor would generally consider before investing” and (b) the “intended purpose of such statement.”
We acknowledge that some courts have rejected Joelson's approach in favor of Van Steinburg's. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Versa Corp. (In re Jacobs), 460 B.R. 149, 154–55 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.2011); Material Prods. Int'l, Ltd. v. Ortiz (In re Ortiz), 441 B.R. 73, 82–83 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.2010). However, Van Steinburg and its progeny collectively bring into focus another concern that we have with the broad interpretation: that is, it is difficult to conceive of any false representation regarding an asset or a particular financial condition that could justifiably induce “an extension, renewal or refinancing of credit” that would not also be a “statement respecting the debtor's ... financial condition” under the broad interpretation.