Opinion
No. A-10116.
July 8, 2009.
Appeal from the Superior Court, First Judicial District, Juneau, Patricia A. Collins, Judge. Trial Court No. 1JU-07-767 Cr.
David D. Reineke, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Jack Schmidt, Assistant District Attorney, and Talis J. Colberg, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Bolger, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Leroy R. Jacobs was convicted of second-degree assault for slashing another man's face with a knife. In this appeal, Jacobs raises two claims. First, Jacobs contends that no reasonable fact-finder could have rejected his assertion that he acted in self-defense. Second, Jacobs argues that the State failed to prove that the victim of the assault sustained "serious physical injury" as defined in AS 11.81.900(b)(56).
AS 11.41.210(a)(1).
With regard to Jacobs's claim of self-defense, the evidence presented at Jacobs's trial was conflicting.
The victim, Robert Milton, testified that he was in Marine Park in Juneau in the early morning hours of July 4, 2007. A stranger standing near him said something inappropriate, and the two men exchanged words. Then, without warning, this stranger (who was later identified as Jacobs) slashed Milton's face with a knife.
Jacobs, for his part, testified that he was in Marine Park and that he engaged in conversation with a stranger. According to Jacobs, this stranger asked him for money — and, when Jacobs demurred, the stranger replied, "Well, how about we just take it from you?" Jacobs tried to walk away, but the stranger kept following him, even after Jacobs pulled out and displayed a knife that he was carrying. Jacobs testified that he became fearful for his safety, so he "decided to flail [the knife] about" in a "pre-emptive strike" — thereby injuring Milton.
When a defendant raises a claim self-defense (and presents evidence to support that claim), it is the government's burden to disprove the defendant's assertion of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. In this appeal, Jacobs contends that even though the evidence was conflicting, no reasonable fact-finder could have concluded that the State met its burden of disproving his assertion of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jacob argues that his version of events ( i.e., his testimony that he acted in self-defense against an apparent robbery attempt) was quite strong, and that Milton's competing testimony "was so inconclusive as to be virtually worthless".
See AS 11.81.335 (defining the circumstances in which a person may lawfully use deadly force in self-defense); AS 11.81.300 (declaring that a claim of self-defense is a "defense"); and AS 11.81.900(b)(19)(B) (declaring that, when a defendant raises a "defense", it is the government's burden to disprove the claimed defense beyond a reasonable doubt).
We disagree with Jacobs's assertion that Milton's testimony was "inconclusive" — if, by that term, Jacobs means to assert that Milton's testimony was "incoherent". Milton testified that he was attacked without warning by a man wielding a knife (a man later identified as Jacobs). Although Milton was unable to recall every detail of the encounter, his description of events was not incoherent.
Alternatively, if Jacobs means to argue that Milton's testimony was unconvincing, that is not a matter for an appellate court to decide. Superior Court Judge Patricia A. Collins (who sat as the fact-finder at Jacobs's bench trial) heard the competing evidence, and she concluded that the State had disproved Jacobs's claim of self-defense. On appeal, this Court is not allowed to re-assess the credibility of witnesses or the relative weight of competing testimony; rather, we are obliged to view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's verdict.
See, e.g., Eide v. State, 168 P.3d 499, 500 (Alaska App. 2007); Simpson v. State, 877 P.2d 1319, 1320 (Alaska App. 1994).
Viewing the evidence in that light, we conclude that the evidence supports Judge Collins's conclusion that the State rebutted Jacobs's claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The remaining issue is whether the State proved that Milton suffered "serious physical injury" as that term is defined in AS 11.81.900(b)(56). Under this statute, "serious physical injury" includes "physical injury that causes serious and protracted disfigurement [or] protracted impairment of health".
The evidence presented to the superior court showed that Jacobs slashed Milton across the side of his face, from his ear to his chin. The knife blade nearly cut completely through Milton's cheek, and nineteen stitches were required to close this wound. Milton testified that the wound "hurt tremendously for days", and that at the time of trial (three months later) the wound still hurt "every now and then". The wound left a seven-inch scar on Milton's face, and Milton testified that he "[receives] stares . . . when [he is] out in public [because of] the cut across [his] face".
This evidence is sufficient to support the conclusion that Milton suffered "serious and protracted disfigurement". See City of Bethel v. Peters, 97 P.3d 822, 829 (Alaska 2004), w here the supreme court declared (in a civil context) that "disfigurement" refers to an injury "which impairs or injures the beauty, symmetry, or appearance of a person or . . . which renders [a person's appearance] unsightly, misshapen, or imperfect", and that a disfigurement is "severe" if it "mars the [victim's] physical appearance and causes a degree of unattractiveness sufficient to bring negative attention or embarrassment".
Quoting Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) at page 420 for the definition of "disfigurement".
For these reasons, we conclude that the evidence presented at Jacobs's trial was sufficient to support the finding that he inflicted serious physical injury on Milton.
The judgement of the superior court is AFFIRMED.