Opinion
No. 06-03-00205-CR.
Submitted: May 10, 2004.
Decided: May 11, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH.
On Appeal from the 124th Judicial District Court, Gregg County, Texas, Trial Court No. 30643-B.
Before MORRISS, C.J., ROSS and CARTER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
James Glenn Jacobs was indicted for intentionally fleeing from a police officer in a vehicle on or about March 16, 2003. After a jury found Jacobs guilty, he elected to have the trial court assess punishment. The trial court sentenced Jacobs to two years' confinement in a state-jail facility. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. On March 16, 2003, Jacobs appeared, uninvited, at the Wheeler family barbeque. After Jacobs was asked to leave, he caused his vehicle to "squeal out" at a high speed, apparently striking a water hydrant, interrupting water service. After the police were called, Officer Kevin Freeman, a sergeant with the Kilgore Police Department, began to try to locate Jacobs. Freeman, who had been given a partial license plate number and a description of the vehicle (a red Ford Bronco), located Jacobs in his vehicle, activated his overhead lights and siren, and began following Jacobs' vehicle. Freeman was two car lengths behind Jacobs' vehicle. Jacobs accelerated his vehicle, and Freeman followed it for more than a mile. Eventually, Jacobs stopped and ran away on foot. Jacobs was not located that night. A warrant for his arrest was obtained, and on April 11, 2003, several officers went to a residence to serve the warrant on Jacobs. The red Ford Bronco that Freeman had pursued on March 16 was at the residence. Freeman was told by Shanna Goff, Jacobs' girlfriend, that Jacobs was not there. Jacobs was found hiding under the mobile home. Jacobs appeals on the following issue: Did the trial court err by allowing into evidence appellant's attempt to evade arrest on April 11, 2003? Before evidence was presented as to the arrest of Jacobs on April 11, 2003, an objection was made to "anything related to April 11" as being irrelevant to the alleged offense. Outside the presence of the jury, the court stated:
THE COURT: Well, I think the State is entitled to show when he was arrested and where he was arrested. Any other details don't have a bearing on this case, so I'm going to let you develop what date he was arrested and where he was arrested, okay?
[State's attorney]: And not the circumstances surrounding that arrest?
THE COURT: Well, where he was arrested, like if he was hiding somewhere — . . .Jacobs now argues that the evidence relating to his arrest was not relevant, contained an extraneous offense, and was per se inadmissible. An appellate court must review a trial court's admissibility decision under an abuse of discretion standard. Robbins v. State, 88 S.W.3d 256, 260 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (citing Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (op. on reh'g)). This standard requires an appellate court to uphold a trial court's admissibility decision when that decision is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. An appellate court would misapply the appellate abuse of discretion standard to reverse a trial court's admissibility decision solely because the appellate court disagreed. The general rule is the State is entitled to show the circumstances surrounding the arrest of an accused, unless such evidence is inherently prejudicial and has no relevance to any issue in the case. Maddox v. State, 682 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.Crim. App. 1985); Paz v. State, 749 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, pet. ref'd). We find the evidence was relevant concerning Jacobs' "hiding" under a mobile home when the police were attempting to arrest him. This is essentially evidence Jacobs was attempting to flee from the police and evade arrest. Evidence of flight is admissible as tending to prove knowledge of guilt. Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 883 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994); Walker v. State, 588 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979). Such evidence is a quasi-admission of guilt. Pina v. State, 38 S.W.3d 730, 738 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd). Evidence of flight has been held to evince a consciousness of guilt and is relevant to the issue of mens rea. Louis v. State, 61 S.W.3d 593 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, pet. ref'd). Jacobs testified to the following concerning the March 16 incident: he did not run from the police in a vehicle; he never saw Freeman following him; he did not know why Freeman was coming to his home; the officer did not turn on his emergency lights until he was twenty feet from Jacobs' driveway; Jacobs was out of his vehicle when the police officer turned on his (emergency) lights; he ran away on foot because the Kilgore Police Department had previously "whipped on me several times." The State was required to prove that, on March 16, while using a vehicle, Jacobs had the conscious objective or desire to flee from Freeman, a peace officer, who was attempting to lawfully arrest or detain him. Jacobs contended that he had no knowledge of the offense or that the police were seeking him. Therefore, evidence of attempted flight or evasion at the time of his arrest on April 11 was relevant on the issue of consciousness of guilt or mens rea. Flight evidence is admissible in other situations. For instance, when one is charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, evidence of attempted flight is a circumstance tending to show that the defendant knew the substance was contraband See State v. Derrow, 981 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd). We have found that the complained-of evidence was relevant apart from its tendency to prove the character of a person in order to show that he or she acted in conformity therewith. TEX. R. EVID. 404(a). Relevancy was the only objection made at trial. No objection based on TEX. R. EVID. 403 was made. Without further objection, the trial court shall admit such relevant evidence. Montgomery, 801 S.W.2d at 389 (op. on reh'g). We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed evidence that Jacobs was hiding underneath the mobile home at the time the police officers were attempting to arrest him. Further, even if such evidence was inadmissible, the admission of it would be a nonconstitutional error governed by TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2. The evidence logically explained the actions of the officers in attempting to arrest Jacobs. When the officers arrived to serve the warrant on Jacobs, even though they saw his vehicle at the residence, they were told he was not there. It would have been difficult to present any evidence of the circumstances of Jacobs' arrest without explaining how and where he was located after the officers were told he was not at that residence. Further, the evidence was not mentioned by the State in its final argument. We find that, even if this evidence was improper, it was an error that did not affect the substantial rights of Jacobs and, therefore, must be disregarded. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). We affirm the judgment.