Opinion
C.A. No. 00C-12-101 RRC.
Submitted: February 14, 2003.
Decided: May 2, 2003.
On Plaintiff's Motion for Reargument. DENIED.
John H. Newcomer, Jr., Esquire, Montgomery, McCracken, Walker Rhoads, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Plaintiff
Robert C. McDonald, Esquire, Silverman McDonald Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendants
Dear Counsel:
Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Reargument pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e). Plaintiff seeks to reargue a part of this Court's December 16, 2002 Order accepting in whole the earlier findings and recommendations made by a Superior Court Commissioner, the effect of which was to "affirm" that commissioner's finding that Plaintiff had failed to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence. Plaintiff seeks only to reargue that part of the Order in which this Court determined that the commissioner, in rendering his decision, correctly declined to consider certain agreed-upon facts related to the steps that Defendant Harrison's wife took to perfect a lien in personalty after having received a "demand" letter from Plaintiff. Because this Court did not misapprehend the facts or the law in this case by accepting the commissioner's findings and recommendations, Plaintiff's Motion for Reargument is DENIED.
See Jacob v. Harrison, C.A. No. 00C-12-101 RRC, 2002 WL 31840890 (Del.Super. Dec. 16, 2002).
As set forth more fully in this Court's December 16, 2002 Order, this purported debt/breach of contract action began when Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant Harrison in the amount of $25,000 and against both Harrison and Defendant R R Trucking ("Defendants") in the amount of $5,000, for a total claimed amount of $30,000. Plaintiff was apparently engaged in the wood-buying business and Defendants apparently supplied Plaintiff with his wood; the bases for the complaint included an allegedly unpaid amount of money for logs and logging equipment, as well as a purported loan that Plaintiff had made to Defendant Harrison which was alleged to have gone unpaid. In support of his complaint, Plaintiff attached a handwritten document allegedly signed by Harrison and which indicated a debt in Plaintiff's favor in the amount of $25,000.
With the agreement of the parties, the matter was referred to a Superior Court Commissioner, who in turn conducted a case-dispositive hearing pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 132(a)(4). Prior to that hearing, however, the parties had entered into a Pretrial Stipulation that failed to identify any "issue of law" that then remained to be litigated. Nevertheless, at the hearing, Defendant Harrison's wife testified (when cross-examined by Plaintiff's attorney) that within four days of being served with a "demand" letter from Plaintiff, she had had a logging trailer re-titled to reflect a lien in her favor, and that she did so in an effort to protect her investment in R R Trucking as a whole. Plaintiff's attorney argued in his closing argument that such action essentially was an admission of Defendants' liability for the debt.
Superior Court Civil Rule 132(a)(4) provides that a Superior Court Commissioner has the power "to conduct case-dispositive hearings . . . and to submit . . . proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition . . . of any such case-dispositive matter."
Jacob v. Harrison, 2002 WL 31840890, at *2.
As further stated in the Court's December 16, 2002 Order, the commissioner thereafter determined that Plaintiff had failed to prove his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. In making such determination, the commissioner found that the handwritten document allegedly evidencing the debt in Plaintiff's favor "proved insufficient" as a matter of law to prove such debt, and that a bill of sale on the trailer that had been re-titled in Mrs. Harrison's name and which bore Plaintiff's signature "refuted soundly" any argument that money was owed by Defendants thereon. The Plaintiffs thereafter served written objections to the commissioner's findings and recommendations.
Id.
Under Superior Court Civil Rule 132(a)(4)(iv), a party may file written objections to the commissioner's proposals, in which case this Court "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings of fact or recommendations to which an objection is made."
This Court thereafter accepted the commissioner's findings in whole, thereby terminating this litigation in Defendants' favor. In doing so, this Court deferred to the commissioner's determination that the handwritten document was invalid because no "presumption of validity" attached to the document. The Court also ruled that Plaintiff's argument that the commissioner had "failed" to consider Mrs. Harrison's actions in re-titling the logging trailer as an "admission of liability" was not fairly presented to the commissioner. It is this second ruling that Plaintiff now seeks to reargue through the current motion.
In making its de novo determination, this Court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the [c]ommissioner." Super.Ct.Civ.R. 132(a)(4)(iv).
The Court found that the document was not a negotiable instrument and thus did not fall within title 6, section 3-308(a) of the Delaware Code (which provides that "[i]f the validity of . . . [a] signature is denied in the pleadings, the burden of establishing validity is on the person claiming validity, but the signature is presumed to be authentic and authorized. . . .").
Neither Plaintiff nor Defendants disputed that Mrs. Harrison re-titled the logging trailer shortly after receipt of Plaintiff's "demand" letter. Relying on a definition of "issue of law" contained in Black's Law dictionary to the effect that such issue is "[a] point on which the evidence is undisputed, the outcome depending on the court's interpretation of the law," the Court treated the effect of Mrs. Harrison's actions as an "issue of law" which was not identified in the Pretrial Stipulation as remaining to be litigated when referred to the commissioner.
In his Motion for Reargument, Plaintiff argues that "the Court erred when it determined that the [c]ommissioner did not need to consider the admission of the [D]efendant [Harrison's] wife," because that evidence "first came to light during trial . . . [and it] would not have been possible to identify [it as a remaining] issue in the Pretrial Stipulation." Plaintiff additionally argues that "Mrs. Harrison's admission that she took steps to perfect a lien after [P]laintiff's demand . . . is not an issue of law[,]" and cites Suburban Propane Gas Corporation v. Steve Patamon in support of that argument. Relatedly, Plaintiff contends that "[t]here is nothing in the [c]ommissioner's [f]indings . . . to indicate that he . . . was even cognizant of the argument [regarding Mrs. Harrison's actions], much less that he made a conscious decision that it should not be considered. . . ."
Pl.'s Mot. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 2.
Del. Super., C.A. No. 83C-FE7, Bush, J. (Mar. 5, 1984) (Letter Op.) (denying cross-motions for summary judgment on the ground that there were material facts in dispute over whether the defendant failed to repudiate pre-incorporation indebtedness when transactions occurred between the parties both before and after the defendant-debtor incorporated).
Pl.'s Mot. ¶ 2 n. 1.
In response, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's Motion for Reargument should be denied because "[t]he Court did not overlook any precedent or legal principle that would have controlling effect," and because the Court did not "misapprehend the law or facts such that it would [have] affect[ed] the outcome of the [c]ommissioner's decision." Defendants posit that "[t]he Court properly rejected Plaintiff's assertion [regarding Mrs. Harrison's actions][,]" and that because "[t]his issue was properly determined below . . . it would not be judicially efficient to address it again." Defendants additionally argue that "[i]n looking at the above issues it is evident that they were fully argued and defended before the [c]ommissioner" and that "Plaintiff's contentions. . .are mere restatements of the argument[s] [he] raised at trial and . . . [before] th[is] Court [previously]."
Defs.' Resp. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 6.
Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e) provides that a motion for reargument "shall briefly and distinctly state the grounds therefor," and that the Court "will determine from the motion and answer [thereto] whether reargument will be granted." This Court has recognized that such a motion "is appropriate where it is shown that the Court either overlooked a precedent or legal principle that would have controlling effect, or misapprehended the law or the facts such as would [have] affect[ed] the outcome of the decision." A motion for reargument "properly seeks only a re-examination of the facts in record at the time of decision or the law as it applies to those facts." Nevertheless, "[a] motion for reargument is not intended to rehash the arguments already decided by the [C]ourt."
Crowhorn v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., C.A. No. 00C-06-010 WLW, 2001 WL 789649, at *1 (Del.Super. June 13, 2001) (citation omitted).
Merendino v. Kupcha, C.A. No. 01C-02-067 RRC, 2002 WL 32067546, at *3 (Del.Super. Dec. 30, 2002) (citation omitted).
McElroy v. Shell Petro., Inc., No. 375, 1992, 1992 WL 397468, at *1 (Del.Supr. Nov. 24, 1992).
Here, neither Plaintiff nor Defendants dispute that Mrs. Harrison took steps to re-title a logging trailer, the ownership to which was in dispute, shortly after receiving a "demand" letter from Plaintiff. Because there was no dispute over this evidence, the issue for the commissioner to decide in the first instance was the legal effect, if any, that Mrs. Harrison's actions had. As explained in the December 16, 2002 Order, the Court viewed such issue as an issue of law, i.e., "[a] point on which the evidence is undisputed, the outcome depending on the court's interpretation of the law." The Court has not now been persuaded that its ruling should have been otherwise.
See Jacob v. Harrison, 2002 WL 31840890, at *4.
The case Plaintiff cites for his assertion that Mrs. Harrison's actions constituted an "issue of fact" for the commissioner to determine is not on point. That case involved a debtor who incurred said debts both before and after becoming a corporation; following incorporation, the creditor and the corporate-debtor took opposite sides concerning this evidence, i.e., the evidence was in conflict; the corporate-debtor argued that the pre-incorporation debt could not be imputed to it because it failed to assume such debt in writing and its conduct post-incorporation reflected as much, while the creditor argued that the corporate-debtor's conduct indicated an implicit assumption of the pre-incorporation debt regardless of the lack of a subsequent writing. Thus the Patamon Court decided that the question of whether the corporate-debtor assumed pre-incorporation liability through conduct alone was a question for the jury, reflected by that Court's statement that "Whether [corporate-]defendants' failure to challenge or repudiate the pre-incorporation indebtedness constituted an admission of liability . . . is a question of fact for the jury." Here, by contrast, the parties agree that Mrs. Harrison acted only after receiving a "demand" letter from Plaintiff, and neither party disputes her testimony that she did so in order to protect her investment in all of R R Trucking, so the only question that should have been presented was what effect such actions had, i.e., an "issue of law."
The evidence consisted of the following: payment for revolving debt was paid both pre- and post-incorporation on checks drawn on an account labeled "Beach Drive Diner"; the corporate-debtor did not question post-incorporation bills that were comprised of both pre- and post-incorporation debt, and the corporate-debtor made payment on those bills without specifying whether said payment was to be applied to pre- or post-incorporation debts.
Patamon, Letter Op. at 3.
See Jacob v. Harrison, 2002 WL 31840890, at *2.
With regard to Plaintiff's argument that evidence of Mrs. Harrison re-titling the logging trailer to reflect her interest in it "first came to light during trial," the Court notes that the Pretrial Stipulation identifies as a defense exhibit (coming in without objection) a "[m]otor [v]ehicle title to 1984 BIGJ." During the hearing held by the commissioner, this title was confirmed as belonging to the trailer whose ownership was in dispute. Also confirmed at the hearing was the fact that the title reflected Mrs. Harrison's lien therein. Thus, the issue of Mrs. Harrison's actions presumably could have been developed pretrial, given that the title listed in the Pretrial Stipulation apparently was one and the same as the title produced at trial, and which reflected Ms. Harrison's lien. That the full extent of Mrs. Harrison's testimony relevant to re-titling the trailer was not developed until trial does not necessarily mean that this evidence did not "come to light" until such time.
Pretrial Stip. ¶ "G" (Dkt. #16).
The following exchange took place:
Mr. McDonald: Mr. Jacob, will you agree with me that the serial number that's written on th[e] [handwritten] note is the same serial number that's written on that [certificate of title]? The Court: Would you like to see the paper? Mr. Newcomer: Your Honor, we can stipulate that it is. Tr. at 27.
The following comment was made without objection by Defendants' counsel on direct examination of Mrs. Harrison: "Okay. Now, there was some discussion about the title [to the trailer]. And I'm going to hand it back to you. This is a title from Robert L. Harrison, Jr., showing you as the lien holder. Date issued is 10/24/2000, with an expiration date of 1/15/2001." Tr. at 96.
Also, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff's argument that there is nothing in the record to indicate that the commissioner was "cognizant of" Plaintiff's argument regarding the effect of Mrs. Harrison's actions. The commissioner heard the relevant testimony elicited by both Plaintiff's and Defendants' counsel on this point, and counsel for Plaintiff argued in his closing that such actions constituted an "admission" for liability purposes. Nevertheless, as indicated in this Court's December 16, 2002 Order, the commissioner found that a bill of sale relating to the subject trailer "refuted soundly" any argument that money was owed by Defendants thereon. This statement suggests that the commissioner considered Plaintiff's arguments on Mrs. Harrison's "admission," but rejected such argument in light of the bill of sale introduced at the hearing.
See Jacob v. Harrison, 2002 WL 31840890, at *2.
After conducting the above analysis, the Court concludes that it neither overlooked a precedent/legal principle that would have had controlling effect in the first instance in this case, nor did it misapprehend the law or the facts such that the Court's December 16, 2002 Order would now be decided any differently. To the extent that Plaintiff's motion seeks to "rehash" what this Court has already decided, any relief contrary to this Court's earlier decision is not warranted. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Reargument is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.