Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.

146 Citing cases

  1. Osborn v. City of Waterbury

    333 Conn. 816 (Conn. 2019)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that expert testimony not necessary to determine whether "the defendants adequately supervised the children"

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. , 317 Conn. 357, 373, 119 A.3d 462 (2015). "The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury.... Contained within the first element, duty, there are two distinct considerations.... First, it is necessary to determine the existence of a duty, and [second], if one is found, it is necessary to evaluate the scope of that duty....

  2. Wiblyi v. McDonald's Corp.

    168 Conn. App. 92 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016)   Cited 10 times

    Id.; see also Fromm v. Fromm, 108 Conn.App. 376, 385, 948 A.2d 328 (2008) (doctrine of laches functions in part as kind of flexible statute of limitations).Our Supreme Court recently has observed that the defense of laches has only a limited applicability. Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 317 Conn. 357, 399, 119 A.3d 462 (2015). In that case, the court concluded that laches did not apply to actions at law brought within the statutory time period.

  3. T.S. v. Jarzbek

    No. MMXCV165008760 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jun. 1, 2016)

    The Connecticut Supreme Court has considered the meaning of 52-577d on several occasions. Roberts v. Caton, 224 Conn. 483, 619 A.2d 844 (1993); Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, 279 Conn. 207, 901 A.2d 673 (2006); Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, 317 Conn. 357, 119 A.3d 462 (2015). In Roberts v. Caton, supra, the plaintiff brought a civil action for damages against her grandfather, alleging that he had sexually assaulted her from the time she was five years old until she was eleven years old.

  4. Dupuis v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland

    2025 Me. 6 (Me. 2025)

    Certainly, other courts read our case law as saying such. See Waller v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 742 F.Supp. 581, 583 (D. Kan. 1990), aff'd, 946 F.2d 1514 (10th Cir. 1991); Johnson v. Garlock, Inc., 682 So.2d 25, 28 (Ala. 1996); Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 510-11 (Conn. 2015); State of Minn. ex rel. Hove v. Doese, 501 N.W.2d 366, 369 (S.D. 1993); Bd. of Educ. of Normal Sch. Dist. v. Blodgett, 40 N.E. 1025, 1027 (Ill. 1895); Moore v. State, 43 N.J.L. 203, 207 (1881). 2. Constitutional text confirms that a claim cannot be revived after the expiration of its statute of limitations.

  5. State v. Jose A. B.

    342 Conn. 489 (Conn. 2022)   Cited 7 times
    Noting that with the exception of two cases—one from New Jersey and one from Washington—state courts had uniformly concluded "that a negative perception of law enforcement or the criminal justice system" was a race-neutral justification for a peremptory strike

    We begin with the first Geisler factor, namely, the relevant constitutional text. See, e.g., Feehan v. Marcone , supra, 331 Conn. at 450–51, 204 A.3d 666 ; Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. , 317 Conn. 357, 409–10, 119 A.3d 462 (2015). Article first, § 19, of the Connecticut constitution, as amended by article four of the amendments, provides in relevant part: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, the number of such jurors, which shall not be less than six, to be established by law ....

  6. Fay v. Merrill

    338 Conn. 1 (Conn. 2021)   Cited 6 times
    Recognizing that Jacobson and other federal case law "provide important context" for what was in essence a textual/historical analysis of whether a legislatively-ratified executive order "adding ‘COVID-19’ as a permissible reason for absentee voting" comported with the Connecticut state constitution

    Largely reflecting the rapid speed at which this case was filed and decided in the trial court, we note that the defendant did not file an answer that properly raised laches as a special defense subject to reply by the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Practice Book §§ 10-50 and 10-56 ; Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp ., 317 Conn. 357, 397–98, 119 A.3d 462 (2015). As was discussed at oral argument before this court, the actual enforcement of any declaratory judgment that could have been rendered in the plaintiffs’ favor with respect to the August primary would have raised significant practical issues for consideration by a trial court in the first instance. Consideration of these issues presumably would implicate the factors identified by the United States Supreme Court in Purcell v. Gonzalez , 549 U.S. 1, 127 S. Ct. 5, 166 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2006), which held that a court considering injunctive relief in an election law matter is "required to weigh, in addition to the harms attendant upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunction, considerations specific to election cases and its own institutional procedures.

  7. Gilotti v. Danbury Hosp.

    323 Conn. 741 (Conn. 2016)   Cited 17 times
    In Blakely, our Supreme Court asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the following question: "Should this court continue to characterize limitation periods contained within statutorily created rights of action as jurisdictional in nature... or should this court apply a presumption in favor of subject matter jurisdiction to statutory time limitations for all other actions and determine whether strong evidence of legislative intent exists to overcome that presumption?"

    " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. , 317 Conn. 357, 422–23, 119 A.3d 462 (2015). Because such interests may be adequately vindicated by a trial judgment in the defendant's favor or on appeal, an adverse ruling on a statute of limitations defense has been deemed not to satisfy the second prong of Curcio . See State v. Coleman , 202 Conn. 86, 91, 519 A.2d 1201 (1987) ("As an affirmative defense, the statute of limitations provides the defendant with a shield, not against prosecution itself, but against successful prosecution.... [T]he rights afforded the defendant, via the remedy of the statute of limitations, were not concluded by the denial of her motion.

  8. Tara S. v. Charles J.

    178 Conn. App. 547 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017)

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. , 317 Conn. 357, 405, 119 A.3d 462 (2015).We first address the defendant's claim that § 52–577d is unconstitutional as applied to him because the plaintiff allegedly did not repress memories of the sexual assaults perpetrated by the defendant.

  9. John Doe v. Hotchkiss Sch.

    No. 3:15-cv-160 (VAB) (D. Conn. Mar. 8, 2019)   Cited 1 times
    Denying summary judgment on a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress because the plaintiff had adduced evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the severity of plaintiff's emotional distress was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant

    ECF No. 17. On May 18, 2015, the Court granted a stay until the Connecticut Supreme Court resolved Doe v. The Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 317 Conn. 357 (2015). ECF No. 22.

  10. State v. Correa

    340 Conn. 619 (Conn. 2021)   Cited 7 times
    Recognizing under art. first, § 7 of the Connecticut Constitution

    " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kono , supra, 324 Conn. at 89 n.6, 152 A.3d 1 ; see also Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp ., 317 Conn. 357, 406, 119 A.3d 462 (2015) ("It is beyond dispute that we are not bound by federal precedents in interpreting our own state constitutional provisions. [F]ederal decisional law is not a lid on the protections guaranteed under our state constitution.