(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. , 317 Conn. 357, 373, 119 A.3d 462 (2015). "The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury.... Contained within the first element, duty, there are two distinct considerations.... First, it is necessary to determine the existence of a duty, and [second], if one is found, it is necessary to evaluate the scope of that duty....
Id.; see also Fromm v. Fromm, 108 Conn.App. 376, 385, 948 A.2d 328 (2008) (doctrine of laches functions in part as kind of flexible statute of limitations).Our Supreme Court recently has observed that the defense of laches has only a limited applicability. Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 317 Conn. 357, 399, 119 A.3d 462 (2015). In that case, the court concluded that laches did not apply to actions at law brought within the statutory time period.
The Connecticut Supreme Court has considered the meaning of 52-577d on several occasions. Roberts v. Caton, 224 Conn. 483, 619 A.2d 844 (1993); Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, 279 Conn. 207, 901 A.2d 673 (2006); Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, 317 Conn. 357, 119 A.3d 462 (2015). In Roberts v. Caton, supra, the plaintiff brought a civil action for damages against her grandfather, alleging that he had sexually assaulted her from the time she was five years old until she was eleven years old.
Certainly, other courts read our case law as saying such. See Waller v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 742 F.Supp. 581, 583 (D. Kan. 1990), aff'd, 946 F.2d 1514 (10th Cir. 1991); Johnson v. Garlock, Inc., 682 So.2d 25, 28 (Ala. 1996); Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 510-11 (Conn. 2015); State of Minn. ex rel. Hove v. Doese, 501 N.W.2d 366, 369 (S.D. 1993); Bd. of Educ. of Normal Sch. Dist. v. Blodgett, 40 N.E. 1025, 1027 (Ill. 1895); Moore v. State, 43 N.J.L. 203, 207 (1881). 2. Constitutional text confirms that a claim cannot be revived after the expiration of its statute of limitations.
We begin with the first Geisler factor, namely, the relevant constitutional text. See, e.g., Feehan v. Marcone , supra, 331 Conn. at 450–51, 204 A.3d 666 ; Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. , 317 Conn. 357, 409–10, 119 A.3d 462 (2015). Article first, § 19, of the Connecticut constitution, as amended by article four of the amendments, provides in relevant part: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, the number of such jurors, which shall not be less than six, to be established by law ....
Largely reflecting the rapid speed at which this case was filed and decided in the trial court, we note that the defendant did not file an answer that properly raised laches as a special defense subject to reply by the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Practice Book §§ 10-50 and 10-56 ; Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp ., 317 Conn. 357, 397–98, 119 A.3d 462 (2015). As was discussed at oral argument before this court, the actual enforcement of any declaratory judgment that could have been rendered in the plaintiffs’ favor with respect to the August primary would have raised significant practical issues for consideration by a trial court in the first instance. Consideration of these issues presumably would implicate the factors identified by the United States Supreme Court in Purcell v. Gonzalez , 549 U.S. 1, 127 S. Ct. 5, 166 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2006), which held that a court considering injunctive relief in an election law matter is "required to weigh, in addition to the harms attendant upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunction, considerations specific to election cases and its own institutional procedures.
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. , 317 Conn. 357, 422–23, 119 A.3d 462 (2015). Because such interests may be adequately vindicated by a trial judgment in the defendant's favor or on appeal, an adverse ruling on a statute of limitations defense has been deemed not to satisfy the second prong of Curcio . See State v. Coleman , 202 Conn. 86, 91, 519 A.2d 1201 (1987) ("As an affirmative defense, the statute of limitations provides the defendant with a shield, not against prosecution itself, but against successful prosecution.... [T]he rights afforded the defendant, via the remedy of the statute of limitations, were not concluded by the denial of her motion.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. , 317 Conn. 357, 405, 119 A.3d 462 (2015).We first address the defendant's claim that § 52–577d is unconstitutional as applied to him because the plaintiff allegedly did not repress memories of the sexual assaults perpetrated by the defendant.
ECF No. 17. On May 18, 2015, the Court granted a stay until the Connecticut Supreme Court resolved Doe v. The Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 317 Conn. 357 (2015). ECF No. 22.
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kono , supra, 324 Conn. at 89 n.6, 152 A.3d 1 ; see also Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp ., 317 Conn. 357, 406, 119 A.3d 462 (2015) ("It is beyond dispute that we are not bound by federal precedents in interpreting our own state constitutional provisions. [F]ederal decisional law is not a lid on the protections guaranteed under our state constitution.