Opinion
Case Number: 99-74892
February 28, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
I. Introduction
Petitioner Theodore Jackson, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility in Ionia, Michigan, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the petition.
II. Facts
Petitioner's conviction arises out of the shooting death of Antonio Thomas Conley on September 4, 1995, in Detroit, Michigan. On that date, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Petitioner was with Ezell Moore, Bradford Walton, and Petitioner's brother, Jerome Jackson, near the corner of East Canfield and Holcomb in Detroit, Michigan. Moore and Walton started arguing and were preparing to fight. Petitioner retrieved his gun from his brother's car, and fired a shot into the air to try to get Moore and Walton to stop fighting. He then looked toward a group of people, standing approximately thirty to fifty feet away, who were watching the altercation, made a derogatory statement about the group, and fired five gunshots in their direction. One of the bullets struck and killed Antonio Thomas Conley. Petitioner dropped the gun and fled.
III. Procedural History
On January 4, 1996, after a bench trial in Recorder's Court for the City of Detroit, Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. Following a juvenile disposition hearing, he was sentenced as an adult to fifteen to twenty-five years imprisonment for the murder conviction and two years imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction.
Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals, presenting the following claim:
The trial court was clearly erroneous in finding both a clear lack of intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and also finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Jackson knew such harm was likely to result.
The Michigan Court of Appeals restated the issue as follows:
First, whether it was erroneous for the trial court to find that defendant did not have an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm while at the same time finding that defendant knew death or great bodily harm would likely result from his act; second, whether there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of second-degree murder when the trial court specifically found that defendant did not have an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction. People v. Jackson, No. 195516 (Mich.Ct.App. May 12, 1998).
Petitioner then filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, presenting the same claim presented to the Michigan Court of Appeals, and the following additional claim:
Appellant Jackson['s] conviction for felony-firearm must be vacated, because the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to try him on that charge because the probate court's jurisdiction over him had been automatically waived.
The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Jackson, No. 112490 (Mich. Feb. 25, 1999).
Thereafter, Petitioner filed the pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus, presenting the same claim presented on direct review to the Michigan Court of Appeals.
IV. Analysis A. Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 ("AEDPA") altered the standard of review federal courts must apply when reviewing applications for a writ of habeas corpus. The AEDPA applies to all habeas petitions filed after the effective date of the act, April 24, 1996. Because petitioner's application was filed after April 24, 1996, the provisions of the AEDPA, including the amended standard of review, apply to this case.
As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes the following standard of review that a federal court must utilize when reviewing applications for a writ of habeas corpus:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, federal courts are bound by a state court's adjudication of a petitioner's claims unless the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 1998). Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ; see also Cremeans v. Chapleau, 62 F.3d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1995) ("We give complete deference to state court findings unless they are clearly erroneous").
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) provides, in pertinent part:
In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.
The United States Supreme Court has explained the proper application of the "contrary to" clause as follows:
A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to [the Supreme Court's] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases . . . .
A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court's clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court's] precedent.Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1519-20 (2000).
With respect to the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1), the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court should analyze a claim for habeas corpus relief under the "unreasonable application" clause when "a state — court decision unreasonably applies the law of this Court to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 1521. The Court defined "unreasonable application" as follows:
[A] federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable . . .
[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law. . . . Under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.Id. at 1521-22.
With this standard in mind, the Court proceeds to the merits of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Petitioner argues that he is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus because the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a second-degree murder conviction where the trial court judge found that Petitioner lacked both an intent to kill and an intent to inflict great bodily harm.
In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the Supreme Court established that the standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence challenge must focus on whether "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."Id. at 319 (emphasis in original). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), this Court must determine whether the state court's application of theJackson standard was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. In making this determination, this Court must afford the state court's findings of fact a presumption of correctness unless it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the factual determination in the state court was erroneous. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); West v. Seabold, 73 F.3d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2569 (1996).
The last state court to issue a reasoned opinion regarding this claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals, held, in pertinent part:
Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder . . . which has three elements: (1) the defendant caused the death of the victim; (2) the killing was done with malice; and (3) the killing was done without justification. . . . Malice may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing. . . . Malice is the intent to kill, the intent to do great bodily harm, or the intent to create a high risk of death or great bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily harm will be the probable result. . . . The Michigan Supreme Court has also defined the third form of intent as the wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that defendant's behavior has the natural tendency to cause death or bodily harm. People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 728 (1980).
Defendant concedes that the only contested issue on appeal is his state of mind at the time of the shooting and his corresponding degree of guilt. Defendant argues, however, that it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to find that defendant did not have an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm while at the same time finding that defendant knew death or great bodily harm would likely result from his act. We disagree. The trial court's findings of fact resulted from the evidence as compared to the alternative definitions of malice. The Court determined that the evidence did not support the first two definitions, i.e., that defendant intended to kill someone or intended to great bodily harm to Conley. The trial court determined, however, that the third definition of malice was met because defendant knowingly created a very high risk of death or great bodily harm knowing that death or such harm was the likely result of shooting a gun toward a crowd of people.
The trial court based its determination on defendant's derogatory comments about the group of people standing at the intersection, pointing his gun at the group who stood as close as thirty feet from him, and emptying his gun by firing five shots at the group. A review of the entire record shows that the trial judge correctly applied an appropriate definition of malice to the evidence presented at trial. Thus, we find no error.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by finding him guilty of second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt when defendant did not have an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. In reality, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence because defendant claims the trial judge failed to find all of the elements of the offense. . . . When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence following a bench trial, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .
Defendant admitted to police that he retrieved a handgun from under the hood of a car, fired the gun once in the air in order to dissuade two people from fighting, made statements about the group of people standing at the intersection who were watching the alleged fight, and fired five times into the group at the intersection until he heard his gun click and knew it was empty. Two witnesses related to defendant, Jerome and Moore, testified that defendant fired one or two shots in the air, made derogatory statements about the group at the intersection, and fired two or three shots at the intersection. Both saw someone hit by the gunshots. Walton also testified that defendant made similar derogatory statements about the group standing at least thirty feet away at the intersection before he fired the gun at the group. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor, we find sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could determine beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant created a high risk of death or great bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily harm would be the probable result when he fired at the group of bystanders and killed one of them.People v. Jackson, slip op. at 2-3.
Petitioner has failed to show that the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. As stated above by the Michigan Court of Appeals, under Michigan law, the elements of second-degree murder are: (1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse. People v. Goecke, 579 N.W.2d 868, 878 (Mich. 1998). The malice element is satisfied "by showing that the defendant possessed the intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a high risk of death or great bodily harm with the knowledge that death or great bodily harm would be the probable result. . . . Malice can be inferred from evidence that a defendant intentionally set in motion a force likely to cause death or great bodily harm." People v. Djordjevic, 584 N.W.2d 610, 612 (Mich.Ct.App. 1998) (internal citation omitted).
Petitioner claims that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to establish the element of malice. In addressing Petitioner's claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals considered the following facts: Petitioner retrieved a handgun from under the hood of a car, fired a gunshot once into the air to try to dissuade two people from fighting, made derogatory statements about a group of people who were standing at the intersection watching the fight, and fired the gun five times into that group. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that, based upon the foregoing facts, a rational trier of fact could have found Petitioner guilty of second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
Petitioner has not presented any evidence to show that the state court's findings of fact were erroneous. Petitioner instead argues that because the state court determined that Petitioner did not have an intent to kill or an intent to inflict great bodily harm, the trial court erred in finding that the malice element of second-degree murder had been proven. Under Michigan law, malice may be inferred from the "wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that defendant's behavior has the natural tendency to cause death or great bodily harm." People v. Jackson, slip op. at 2, citing People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 728 (1980). Therefore, according the state court's findings of fact a presumption of correctness, this Court concludes that the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision that all of the elements of second-degree murder were satisfied did not "result in a decision that . . . involved an unreasonable application to clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief with respect to this claim.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED and the matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.