On October 17, 2003, a default judgment was entered against PSG for failure to appear. The case was tried to a jury against the WPCA alone on discrimination claims which ultimately resulted in a plaintiff's verdict against the WPCA and PSG The jury awarded the plaintiff a verdict for $50,000, as against PSG The case was affirmed by the Connecticut Supreme Court. Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority of the City of Bridgeport, 278 Conn. 692 (2006). The Supreme Court's decision reveals that PSG was a named defendant, but did not appear, and a default judgment had been entered against PSG The Supreme Court noted that the trial court record "is silent regarding the reason for [PSG's] absence."
In such cases, the extent to which the trial court alters the judgment may require either a new appeal or an amended appeal." RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley View Associates, supra, 278 Conn. 692. Applying that standard to the present case, we conclude that it falls within the latter scenario.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 278 Conn. 692, 705, 900 A.2d 498 (2006). "In order to establish a prima facie case [of discrimination], the complainant must prove that: (1) he [was] in the protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.
Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Auth. of City of Bridgeport, 278 Conn. 692, 705 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In order to establish a prima facie case, the complainant must prove that: (1) he [was] in the protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) . . . the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.
D. CFEPA RACE/COLOR/NATIONAL BACKGROUND DISCRIMINATION Assuming that Martin's CFEPA discrimination claim were not barred by res judicata or time-barred, it would still fail. CFEPA provides that "[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice . . . [f]or an employer . . . to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual's race, color, . . . national origin, ancestry, . . . or physical disability. . . ." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(a)(1). In the context of employment discrimination claims, the Connecticut Supreme Court looks to federal law for guidance in interpreting CFEPA, namely, it applies the familiar burden-shifting framework articulated by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Auth. of City of Bridgeport, 278 Conn. 692, 705 (2006). The Connecticut Supreme Court has summarized this framework as follows: Under this analysis, the employee must first make a prima facie case of discrimination.
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 278 Conn. 692, 702, 900 A.2d 498 (2006). We turn first to the plaintiff's contention that, contrary to the conclusion of the Appellate Court, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant was a keeper of Salinas' dog within the meaning of § 22-357.
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 278 Conn. 692, 702, 900 A.2d 498 (2006). The defendant, in accordance with Practice Book § 16-37, moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case-in-chief and at the close of the evidence.
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court has held that federal law "precludes recovery for discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation that occur outside the statutory time period." National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 153 L. Ed. 2d 106 (2002); see also Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 278 Conn. 692, 706 n.12, 900 A.2d 498 (2006) (quoting NationalRailroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, supra, at 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061, for proposition that each discrete incident of discrimination constitutes separate unlawful employment practice). [15, 16] The United States Supreme Court has further explained that a discrete discriminatory act is one that " ‘occurred’ on the day that it ‘happened.’
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority , 278 Conn. 692, 706, 900 A.2d 498 (2006), quoting St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks , supra, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742. The following additional facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are relevant to our resolution of the defendant's claim.
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 278 Conn. 692, 702, 900 A.2d 498 (2006). At trial, the defendants' counsel asked Murphy to explain testimony he gave at his deposition that Gray did not "technically" perform a left L4-L5 microdiscectomy.