Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Auth

121 Citing cases

  1. Jackson v. Bridgeport

    2008 Ct. Sup. 11667 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008)

    On October 17, 2003, a default judgment was entered against PSG for failure to appear. The case was tried to a jury against the WPCA alone on discrimination claims which ultimately resulted in a plaintiff's verdict against the WPCA and PSG The jury awarded the plaintiff a verdict for $50,000, as against PSG The case was affirmed by the Connecticut Supreme Court. Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority of the City of Bridgeport, 278 Conn. 692 (2006). The Supreme Court's decision reveals that PSG was a named defendant, but did not appear, and a default judgment had been entered against PSG The Supreme Court noted that the trial court record "is silent regarding the reason for [PSG's] absence."

  2. Burton v. City of Stamford

    115 Conn. App. 47 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009)   Cited 45 times
    Declining to find that trial court abused its discretion by permitting late amendment of complaint when key factual issues remained same despite new theory of liability that would have required changes to jury instructions

    In such cases, the extent to which the trial court alters the judgment may require either a new appeal or an amended appeal." RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley View Associates, supra, 278 Conn. 692. Applying that standard to the present case, we conclude that it falls within the latter scenario.

  3. Dumas v. Bridgeport Board of Ed.

    2008 Ct. Sup. 390 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008)

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 278 Conn. 692, 705, 900 A.2d 498 (2006). "In order to establish a prima facie case [of discrimination], the complainant must prove that: (1) he [was] in the protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

  4. Soares v. Altice Tech. Servs. U.S.,LLC

    CIVIL 3:19-cv-1975 (JBA) (D. Conn. Aug. 6, 2021)   Cited 4 times

    Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Auth. of City of Bridgeport, 278 Conn. 692, 705 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In order to establish a prima facie case, the complainant must prove that: (1) he [was] in the protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) . . . the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

  5. Martin v. Town of Westport

    558 F. Supp. 2d 228 (D. Conn. 2008)   Cited 35 times
    Holding plaintiff's affidavit as to coworkers' alleged similarities insufficient to defeat summary judgment

    D. CFEPA RACE/COLOR/NATIONAL BACKGROUND DISCRIMINATION Assuming that Martin's CFEPA discrimination claim were not barred by res judicata or time-barred, it would still fail. CFEPA provides that "[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice . . . [f]or an employer . . . to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual's race, color, . . . national origin, ancestry, . . . or physical disability. . . ." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(a)(1). In the context of employment discrimination claims, the Connecticut Supreme Court looks to federal law for guidance in interpreting CFEPA, namely, it applies the familiar burden-shifting framework articulated by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Auth. of City of Bridgeport, 278 Conn. 692, 705 (2006). The Connecticut Supreme Court has summarized this framework as follows: Under this analysis, the employee must first make a prima facie case of discrimination.

  6. Auster v. Norwalk United Methodist Church

    286 Conn. 152 (Conn. 2008)   Cited 58 times
    In Auster, therefore, this court had no choice but to agree with the Appellate Court that the case should be remanded for a new trial on the remaining common-law negligence claim.

    " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 278 Conn. 692, 702, 900 A.2d 498 (2006). We turn first to the plaintiff's contention that, contrary to the conclusion of the Appellate Court, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant was a keeper of Salinas' dog within the meaning of § 22-357.

  7. Allison v. Manetta

    284 Conn. 389 (Conn. 2007)   Cited 44 times
    Concluding that trial court's instruction was “incomplete,” but, nevertheless, examining whether trial court's refusal to give defendant's proposed instruction constituted harmful error

    " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 278 Conn. 692, 702, 900 A.2d 498 (2006). The defendant, in accordance with Practice Book § 16-37, moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case-in-chief and at the close of the evidence.

  8. Roman v. A&S Innersprings U.S.

    223 Conn. App. 403 (Conn. App. Ct. 2024)   Cited 1 times

    Significantly, the United States Supreme Court has held that federal law "precludes recovery for discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation that occur outside the statutory time period." National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 153 L. Ed. 2d 106 (2002); see also Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 278 Conn. 692, 706 n.12, 900 A.2d 498 (2006) (quoting NationalRailroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, supra, at 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061, for proposition that each discrete incident of discrimination constitutes separate unlawful employment practice). [15, 16] The United States Supreme Court has further explained that a discrete discriminatory act is one that " ‘occurred’ on the day that it ‘happened.’

  9. Rossova v. Charter Commc'ns

    211 Conn. App. 676 (Conn. App. Ct. 2022)   Cited 5 times

    " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority , 278 Conn. 692, 706, 900 A.2d 498 (2006), quoting St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks , supra, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742. The following additional facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are relevant to our resolution of the defendant's claim.

  10. Costanzo v. Gray

    963 A.2d 1039 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009)   Cited 6 times

    " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 278 Conn. 692, 702, 900 A.2d 498 (2006). At trial, the defendants' counsel asked Murphy to explain testimony he gave at his deposition that Gray did not "technically" perform a left L4-L5 microdiscectomy.