" Foulke, 228 N.Y. at 274, 127 N.E. at 238-39. Cf. McAvoy v. Medina, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 548, 549, 87 Am.Dec. 733, 734 (1866); Kincaid v. Eaton, 98 Mass. 139, 141, 93 Am.Dec. 142, 143 (1867); Foster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co., 264 Mo. 89, 102-03, 174 S.W. 376, 379 (1915); Flax v. Monticello Realty Co., 185 Va. 474, 478, 39 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1946); Jackson v.Steinberg, 186 Or. 129, 135, 200 P.2d 376, 378 (1948). However, we must still determine when the camera bag was mislaid in order to determine the time at which the salesman relinquished close personal custody over the camera bag. Was the camera bag mislaid at the moment when Saritejdiam's salesman (a) walked away from the chair or (b) was no longer within arm's reach of the chair or (c) walked out of the diner door? The first two options are unsatisfactory because we cannot conclude unequivocally at what point Danilin was far enough away from the chair while still within the diner so as to have mislaid the property.
These common law concepts, applied to the facts of this case, would find that the $150,000 was "mislaid" and not "lost" or "abandoned." Schley v. Couch, 155 Tex. 195, 284 S.W.2d 333 (1955); Jackson v. Steinberg, 186 Or. 129, 200 P.2d 376 (1948), rehearing denied, 186 Or. 129, 205 P.2d 562 (1949): see also 1 Am.Jur.2d, Abandoned, Lost, Etc. Property §§ 4-5, 12, 15, 18-19, 21 (1962). On July 31, 1968, plaintiff was subject to Article 103 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Missouri has not specifically addressed this question, but other jurisdictions have held that possession by the agent is in fact possession by the principal. South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman, 2 L.R.Q.B. Div. 44 (1886); Goodhart, Three Cases on Possession, 3 CAMB. L.J. 195, 205-06 (1928); Jackson v. Steinberg, 186 Or. 129, 200 P.2d 376, 378 (1948). In Ray v. Flower Hosp., 1 Ohio App.3d 127, 439 N.E.2d 942, 945 (1981) the Ohio Court of Appeals stated: "In a long line of cases where hotel chambermaids, bank janitors, bank tellers, grocery store bagboys and other employees have found property while in their employ, virtually every case has charged the employee with the duty to turn the found property over to the employer for safekeeping."
This inference supports the conclusion that the money was mislaid. Jackson v. Steinberg, 186 Or. 129, 200 P.2d 376, 378 (1948) (fact that $800 in currency was found concealed beneath the paper lining of a dresser indicates that money was intentionally concealed with intention of reclaiming it; therefore, property was mislaid, not lost); Schley v. Couch, 155 Tex. 195, 284 S.W.2d 333, 336 (1955) (holding that money found buried under garage floor was mislaid property as a matter of law because circumstances showed that money was placed there deliberately and court presumed that owner had either forgotten where he hid the money or had died before retrieving it). The same facts that support the trial court's conclusion that the money was mislaid prevent us from ruling as a matter of law that the property was lost.
Typically, if the property was found to be "lost" or "abandoned," the finder would prevail, whereas if the property was characterized as "mislaid," the owner or occupier of the land would prevail. Lost property has traditionally been defined as involving an involuntary parting, i.e., where there is no intent on the part of the loser to part with the ownership of the property Foster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co., 264 Mo. 89, 174 S.W. 376 (1915); Kuykendall v. Fisher, 61 W. Va. 87, 56 S.E. 48 (1906); 1 Am.Jur.2d 4, Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property 2; annot., 170 A.L.R. 706. Abandonment, in turn, has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of ownership of property without reference to any particular person or purpose; Ellis v. Brown, 177 F.2d 677 (6th Cir. 1949); Jackson v. Steinberg, 186 Or. 129, 200 P.2d 376 (1948), rehearing denied, 186 Or. 129, 205 P.2d 562 (1949); annot., 170 A.L.R. 708; i.e., a "throwing away" of the property concerned; Foulke v. New York Consolidated R. Co., 228 N.Y. 269, 273, 127 N.E. 237 (1920); while mislaid property is defined as that which is intentionally placed by the owner where he can obtain custody of it, but afterwards forgotten. Foster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co., supra; Loucks v. Gallogly, 1 Misc. 22, 23 N.Y.S. 126 (1892); annot., 9 A.L.R. 1388, 1390.
Therefore, we treat the money involed herein as no different from other personal property and will adjudicate the possession thereof in accordance with the rules governing personal property generally. We think the proper rule regarding treasure trove is that stated by the Oregon Supreme Court in 1948 in the case of Jackson v. Steinberg, 186 Or. 129, P.2d 376, 378, 205 P.2d 562, as follows: "With regard to plaintiff's contention that the bills constituted treasure trove, it has been held that the law of treasure trove has been merged with that of lost goods generally, at least so far as respects the rights of the finder.
That does not mean that the state must prove the identity of any specific owner; its evidence, however, must be sufficient to allow the jury to find that the property at issue is not abandoned. That is because "[a]bandoned property is that of which the owner has relinquished all right, title, claim, and possession, with the intention of not reclaiming it or resuming its ownership, possession or enjoyment." Jackson v. Steinberg , 186 Or. 129, 134, 200 P.2d 376 (1948), reh'g. den. , 186 Or. 129, 205 P.2d 562 (1949).
The fuel was not a "treasure trove" — and hence the property of the finder — because it was not "[m]oney or coin, gold, silver, plate, or bullion found hidden in the earth or other private place, the owner thereof being unknown." Jackson v. Steinberg, 186 Or 129, 134, 200 P2d 376 (1948), reh'g den, 186 Or 129, 205 P2d 562 (1949) (internal quotation marks omitted). Kasper had not abandoned the property, for there was no evidence that he intended to relinquish ownership of the fuel.
Campbell v. Cochran, 416 A.2d at 221. See Favorite v. Miller, 176 Conn. 310, 407 A.2d 974 (1978); Paset v. Old Orchard Bank Trust Co., 62 Ill. App.3d 534, 19 Ill.Dec. 389, 378 N.E.2d 1264 (1978); Jackson v. Steinberg, 186 Or. 129, 200 P.2d 376 (1948). Thus, the burden upon the landlords was to prove that Fuentes voluntarily relinquished his right to the money with the intention of terminating his ownership and of not reclaiming any future rights therein at the time he was removed from his apartment suffering from a debilitating case of bullet wounds in his neck and shoulder.
"The decisive feature of the present case is the fact that plaintiff was an employee or servant of the owner or occupant of the premises, and that, in discovering the bills and turning them over to her employer, she was simply performing the duties of her employment. * * *" Jackson v. Steinberg (1948), 186 Ore. 129, 136, 200 P.2d 376, 378. The court held that the owner of the premises was the rightful "holder" of the goods and owed a duty to keep and protect the goods until claimed by the owner.