Opinion
Civil No. 02-1084 (JRT/RLE)
June 16, 2003
Thomas Ray Jackson, Minnesota Correctional Facility, Faribault, MN, pro se.
Kenneth Hunt Bayliss, III, QUINLIVAN HUGHES, St. Cloud, MN, for defendants.
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Thomas Jackson ("Jackson") has sued defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his civil rights. This matter is now before the Court on Jackson's objections to the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Raymond L. Erickson dated May 31, 2002. The Court has conducted a de novo review of Jackson's objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and D. Minn. LR 72.1(c)(2).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court now adopts the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, and dismisses Jackson's complaint.
BACKGROUND
Jackson is serving a prison sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Minnesota law. Jackson filed his complaint in this case on May 22, 2002, alleging that defendants violated his constitutionally protected right to due process of law. Jackson alleges that because of these violations, he "was convicted of felon in possession and sentenced to five years in prison." (Complaint § V.) Jackson also submitted an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). In reviewing Jackson's IFP application, the Magistrate Judge found his complaint to be frivolous because it did not state a valid claim under § 1983. In a Report and Recommendation dated May 31, 2002, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing Jackson's complaint. Jackson objects to the Report and Recommendation.
ANALYSIS
I. Jackson's Request for a "Writ of Appearance"
Before analyzing Jackson's objections to the Report and Recommendation, the Court must clear up a misunderstanding. On August 27, 2002, the Court received a letter from Jackson in which he requested a "writ of appearance" in response to an "attorney appearance that was filed by the attorney representing the defendants." (Letter, Docket No. 7.) From reading the letter, it is evident that Jackson understood an August 8, 2002 entry on the Court's docket titled "Notice of Attorney Appearance" to mean that an attorney for the defendants actually appeared before the Court and made arguments regarding this case. (See Docket No. 5.) The Court understands why such an ex parte appearance would concern Jackson. However, no such appearance ever took place.
Rather, Jackson misunderstood the docket's notation. The "Notice of Attorney Appearance" was merely a three-sentence letter notifying the Court of who represented the defendants. This letter was routine correspondence and did not contain any substantive arguments. No hearings or arguments have occurred in this case without Jackson's knowledge and participation.
The full text of the letter is as follows:
July 31, 2002 United States District Court 515 W. 1st St. Duluth, MN 55802-1397 RE: Jackson vs. Stearns County, et al. Court File #02-1084 JRT/RLE Our File #19243-12137
Dear Sir/Madam:
Please be advised that I represent the defendants in the above-entitled action. Please add my name to your docket to ensure that I receive further information on this case as activity occurs. Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely,
Kenneth H. Bayliss Attorney KHB/spc
(Notice of Attorney Appearance, Docket No. 5.)
II. Jackson's Objections to the Report and Recommendation
The Magistrate Judge found that Jackson's complaint was not cognizable under § 1983 because it would necessarily imply that his conviction and sentence were invalid, and that Jackson had not already shown that they were invalid. Jackson objects to the Magistrate Judge's conclusions. The gravamen of his objections is that technical rules should not prevent the Court from investigating and punishing defendants for what Jackson claims were violations of his constitutional rights.
Jackson does not object to the Magistrate Judge's sua sponte evaluation of his complaint to determine whether it is frivolous, and the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge properly performed this examination as part of his review of the IFP application. Title 28, Section 1915 of the U.S. Code provides that the Court shall dismiss a case filed in forma pauperis at any time if the Court determines that the action is "frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Carney v. Houston, 33 F.3d 893, 895 (8th Cir. 1994) ([W]hether a complaint is frivolous . . . precedes the decision whether to grant in forma pauperis status. . . ."). A complaint is frivolous "where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. See Williams v. White, 897 F.2d 942, 944 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that an IFP complaint should be dismissed when the plaintiff "cannot make any rational argument in law or fact entitling him to relief"). In this case, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Jackson's complaint has no basis in law.
In this § 1983 action, Jackson seeks money damages for alleged constitutional violations by defendants. The Magistrate Judge found, however, that if Jackson's complaint succeeds, it would imply that his conviction was invalid. The United States Supreme Court has held that such claims are not cognizable under § 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). In Heck, the Court reasoned that to allow state plaintiffs, like Jackson, to launch collateral attacks upon their convictions would undermine the statute expressly designed for such challenges, the state habeas corpus statute of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Id. at 484-86. Specifically, the Court found that the § 2254 exhaustion requirements could be evaded, because there are no exhaustion requirements for § 1983. Id. Therefore, the Court concluded as follows:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.
Id. at 486-87 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
In this case, it is clear that Jackson believes the alleged violations undergirding his damage claims also caused him to be wrongfully convicted. For example, his complaint alleges that because the purported violations were not revealed or stopped, he "was convicted of felon in possession and sentenced to five years in prison." (Complaint § V.) His objections make similar claims, arguing that if an officer had acted differently, "I would not of [sic] been convicted, nor charged." (Obj. at 2) (emphasis original). Jackson further states that if "the truth" about defendants' actions "is revealed . . . it would also . . . [cause] a new trial and one less conviction . . . and [probably] cause a[n] innocent finding. . . ." (Obj. at 3.) These statements clearly demonstrate that Jackson's § 1983 claim, if successful, would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.
Furthermore, because Jackson remains in prison, it is obvious that neither his conviction nor sentence has already been invalidated. Therefore, the Court finds that under the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, Jackson's complaint lacks any arguable basis in law. The Court will overrule Jackson's objections and adopt the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. Because the Court is dismissing Jackson's complaint, his application to proceed in forma pauperis is moot.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, all the records, files, and proceedings herein, the Court OVERRULES plaintiff's objections [Docket No. 4] and ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation dated May 31, 2002 [Docket No. 3]. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's Complaint [Docket No. 1] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2. Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [Docket No. 2] is DENIED as moot.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.