Since appellant's post-conviction, post-appeal motion does not allege a ground upon which the judgment of conviction entered against him can be declared void, it does not qualify as a § 17-9-4 motion and does not provide a means by which a direct appeal to this Court may be obtained. In effect, appellant seeks a second direct appeal by means of his motion containing an issue he could have raised on his direct appeal, and he is not entitled to a second direct appeal from the judgment of conviction. Jackson v. State, 273 Ga. 320 ( 540 S.E.2d 612) (2001). Appellant's attempt to obtain a second appeal of his conviction is subject to dismissal, and we hereby dismiss it. Shields v. State, 276 Ga. 669 (2) ( 581 S.E.2d 536) (2003).
See also Valenzuela v. Newsome, 253 Ga. 793, 795 ( 325 S.E.2d 370) (1985) (failure to follow procedural rule requiring insufficiency of evidence to be raised on direct appeal precludes raising issue on habeas unless cause and prejudice test met); Carter v. State, 48 Ga. 43 (1873) (if evidence does not establish venue and assignment of error raised, new trial will be granted).Jackson v. State, 273 Ga. 320 ( 540 S.E.2d 612) (2001); Cox v. Hillyer, 65 Ga. 57 (1880).Cox, 65 Ga. at 57.
Id.;Butts v. State, 244 Ga. App. 366 ( 536 S.E.2d 154) (2000); Barnes v. State, 243 Ga. App. 703 ( 534 S.E.2d 440) (2000). Due to the very nature of an out-of-time appeal, it is not a remedy available to a criminal defendant whose conviction has been reviewed by an appellate court on direct appeal since that defendant is not entitled to a second direct appeal from his judgment of conviction. Jackson v. State, 273 Ga. 320 ( 540 S.E.2d 612) (2001). See also Cox v. Hillyer, 65 Ga. 57 (1) (1880) (general rule is that second appeal is not permitted from a criminal judgment of conviction affirmed on appeal); Grant v. State, 159 Ga. App. 2, 3 ( 282 S.E.2d 668) (1981).
See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Bullington, 227 Ga. 485, 485 (2) (181 S.E.2d 495) (1971) ("The effect of the dismissal of the first appeal from an appealable judgment was to affirm the judgment of the trial court there excepted to . . . which was res judicata between the parties."); see also generally Jackson v. State, 273 Ga. 320, 320 (540 S.E.2d 612) (2001) (a party "is not entitled to another bite at the apple by way of a second appeal"); Echols v. State, 243 Ga.App. 775, 776 (534 S.E.2d 464) (2000) ("It is axiomatic that the same issue cannot be relitigated ad infinitum.") (citation and punctuation omitted).
The same is true of appeals of the same issue on the same grounds.") (punctuation omitted); Jackson v. State, 273 Ga. 320, 320 (540 S.E.2d 612) (2001) (a party "is not entitled to another bite at the apple by way of a second appeal"). See also Ross v. State, 310 Ga.App. 326, 327 (713 S.E.2d 438) (2011) (dismissal of previous appeal constitutes the binding law of the case, even though the appeals court did not reach the merits of the claim in the prior case).
See Ross v. State, 310 Ga.App. 326, 327 (713 S.E.2d 438) (2011) ("[A]ny issue that was raised and resolved in an earlier appeal is the law of the case and is binding on this Court ....") (citation and punctuation omitted); accord Hook v. Bergen, 286 Ga.App. 258, 261 (1) (649 S.E.2d 313) (2007) ("[T]he denial of an application for discretionary appeal is an adjudication on the merits of the underlying order and acts as res judicata in subsequent proceedings."); see also Jackson v. State, 273 Ga. 320, 320 (540 S.E.2d 612) (2001) (a defendant "is not entitled to another bite at the apple by way of a second appeal").
Moreover, our denial of Mahtani's application in Case No. A25D0050 renders the current appeal of the revocation of his probation barred by the law of the case doctrine. See Ross v. State, 310 Ga.App. 326, 327 (713 S.E.2d 438) (2011) ("[A]ny issue that was raised and resolved in an earlier appeal is the law of the case and is binding on this Court ....") (citation and punctuation omitted); accord Hook v. Bergen, 286 Ga.App. 258, 261 (1) (649 S.E.2d 313) (2007) (a ruling on an application for discretionary review acts as res judicata in later proceedings); see also Jackson v. State, 273 Ga. 320, 320 (540 S.E.2d 612) (2001) (a defendant "is not entitled to another bite at the apple by way of a second appeal").
(citations and punctuation omitted); Aetna Cas. &Sur. Co. v. Bullington, 227 Ga. 485, 485 (2) (181 S.E.2d 495) (1971) ("The effect of the dismissal of the first appeal from an appealable judgment was to affirm the judgment of the trial court there excepted to . . . which was res judicata between the parties."); see also generally Jackson v. State, 273 Ga. 320, 320 (540 S.E.2d 612) (2001) (a party "is not entitled to another bite at the apple by way of a second appeal"); Echols v. State, 243 Ga.App. 775, 776 (534 S.E.2d 464) (2000) ("It is axiomatic that the same issue cannot be relitigated ad infinitum.") (citation and punctuation omitted).
"It is well established that any issue that was raised and resolved in an earlier appeal is the law of the case and is binding on this Court," and it matters not that the dismissal of the previous appeal did not reach the merits of the claim "because the dismissal, nevertheless, constitutes binding law of the case." Ross v. State, 310 Ga.App. 326, 327 (713 S.E.2d 438) (2011) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Jackson v. State, 273 Ga. 320, 320 (540 S.E.2d 612) (2001) (a party "is not entitled to another bite at the apple by way of a second appeal").
Additionally, as we noted in our dismissal of Case Nos. A24A0681 and A24A0684, this appeal is barred because the issues Bussey raises were or could have been litigated in his prior appeals. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 273 Ga. 320, 320 (540 S.E.2d 612) (2001) (a party "is not entitled to another bite at the apple by way of a second appeal").