SHULMAN, Judge. Defendant appeals his conviction for the offense of aggravated assault. Under the controlling authority of Jackson v. State, 149 Ga. App. 496 ( 254 S.E.2d 739), we reverse. The defendant assigns as error the trial court's refusal to allow defendant, personally, the right to address either the court or the jury, to conduct voir dire, or to examine witnesses.

This is the second appearance of this case before this court. In Jackson v. State, 149 Ga. App. 496 ( 254 S.E.2d 739) (1979), appellant's conviction of aggravated assault was reversed because the trial judge denied appellant's motion to participate as co-counsel in his own defense. It was held that appellant had a right to such participation under our state constitutional provision that "No person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend his own cause in any of the courts of this State, in person, by attorney, or both." Code Ann. § 2-109 (formerly § 2-104).

However, the power of the trial court does not extend so far as to cause an absolute deprivation of this constitutional right enjoyed by the defendant. See Jackson v. State, 149 Ga. App. 496 ( 254 S.E.2d 739) (1979); Loomis v. State, 78 Ga. App. 153, 160 ( 51 S.E.2d 13) (1948). We find that in the present case the trial court's absolute denial of the appellant's motion to participate at trial as co-counsel did deprive him of his state constitutional right of self-representation.

See Vick v. State, 237 Ga. App. 762, 763 (2) ( 516 SE2d 815) (1999); Bryan v. State, 148 Ga. App. 428 (1) ( 251 SE2d 338) (1978). See Jackson v. State, 149 Ga. App. 496, 498 (1) ( 254 SE2d 739) (1979). 3. Brown contends he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel.

The court denied the request. Vick relies on Jackson v. State, 149 Ga. App. 496, 499 (1) ( 254 S.E.2d 739) (1979) which reversed a conviction where the court refused to allow the defendant to speak during closing argument when he already had an attorney. The defendant had invoked his constitutional right to defend himself "in person, by attorney, or both."

The discretion of the trial court in regulating the conduct of counsel and the witnesses and in prescribing the manner in which business of the court shall be conducted is very broad and will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse. Butler v. State, 172 Ga. App. 405, 406 (1) ( 323 S.E.2d 628) (1984). The exercise of the inherent power of the court in this instance did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Jackson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 367, 368 (2) ( 268 S.E.2d 418) (1980); Jackson v. State, 149 Ga. App. 496, 498 (1) ( 254 S.E.2d 739) (1979). 2.

This issue has been decided adversely to appellant in Mathis v. State, 175 Ga. App. 127-128 (4) ( 333 S.E.2d 10) (1985). See also Jackson v. State, 149 Ga. App. 496, 499 (2) ( 254 S.E.2d 739) (1979). 2.

(Emphasis supplied.) Loomis v. State, 78 Ga. App. 153, 163 ( 51 S.E.2d 13); see also Jackson v. State, 149 Ga. App. 496 (1) ( 254 S.E.2d 739). The record does not support counsel's assertion that defendant was denied the right to participate as co-counsel, or required to elect whether he wanted to defend himself or permit appointed counsel to represent him.

The trial judge has the inherent power of the court to prescribe the manner in which the business of the court shall be conducted. See OCGA § 15-1-3; Jackson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 367, 368 (2) ( 268 S.E.2d 418). The discretion of the trial judge in regulating the conduct of counsel and the witnesses, and in prescribing the manner in which the business of the court shall be conducted is very broad and will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse. Jackson v. State, 149 Ga. App. 496, 498 ( 254 S.E.2d 739). Further, this court has often noted that even an otherwise valid objection is waived unless timely made at trial.

2. Appellant contends he was denied his right to actively participate in his own defense, arguing that under the rulings in Jackson v. State, 149 Ga. App. 496 ( 254 S.E.2d 739) (1979) and Moody v. State, 153 Ga. App. 866 ( 267 S.E.2d 291) (1980), it is reversible error to deny a request that a defendant be allowed to act as co-counsel with his attorneys. When appellant made his request the trial court informed him that he could represent himself or be represented by his two attorneys who were present, but he could not do both. Under the holdings in Jackson and Moody, supra, that ruling was error because Art. I, Sec. I, Par. IX of the Constitution of Georgia, 1976 (former Code Ann. § 2-109), provided that no person could be deprived of the right to defend himself, in person, by attorney, or both.